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ABSTRACT
The Impact of World Bank’s Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid on Forest Management in
Cameroon: Policy Hybridity in International Dependence Development
by
Asongayi Venard

Many developing countries depend on the World Bank for development assistance, which the
Bank often provides with policy reform conditions. Resistance to World Bank’s conditionality
caused the Bank to posit “ownership” as a country’s real assent to its development policies. The
combination of ownership and conditionality invalidates the neocolonial, false-paradigm and
dualism theses in explaining the international dependence development model. This study
explains this model by investigating how the relationship between conditionality and ownership
in the context of this model impacts forest management in Cameroon.

Integrating theoretical and methodological insights mainly from political science, economics,
geosciences, and sociology, the study finds that in this model, conditionality and ownership have
a hybrid relationship that fosters and hinders effective forest management in Cameroon. This
finding positions policy hybridity within this model. It proposes a nouvelle way to understand
international development policies’ interactions, and the effects of the interactions on natural
resource management.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Governments that enter into agreements with the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (also known as World Bank, and likewise referred to herein as the Bank) claim
that it is for the better, that opposition to the agreements is uninformed or badly intentioned. Yet
general strikes, riots, and ransacking of supermarkets manifest that World Bank policies such as
conditionality, which is basically the attachment of policy reforms to multilateral aid, and
ownership, which is fundamentally a government’s real assent1 to such policies, can mobilize
popular resistance. Scholarly opinion on the impact of these policies on forest resource
management is also divided: statistical findings range all over the spectrum of possible
conclusions. This study is an engagement in this debate on the outcome of the policies of the
World Bank by examining the complex impact that the relationship between conditionality and
ownership within the context of the international dependence development model has on forest
management in Cameroon.
The new development paradigm proposed by John H. Dunning and Fabienne Fortanier
envisions development as a “holistic and multi-faceted, yet contextual concept that embraces a
variety of human needs and objectives, [is concerned] with the dynamics of structural societal
transformations . . . emphasizes the importance of institutions . . . and regards means and ends as

1. Throughout this thesis, “real assent” is extrapolated into public policy from John Henry Cardinal
Newmann’s discourse on assent (unconditional acceptance of a proposition) to religious faith. Newmann
distinguishes between notional and real assent. By notional assent, he means the assent that one gives to statements
of truth that are general and abstract – it is the mind contemplating its own creations as notions. Acts of notional
assent include profession, credence, speculation, opinion, and presumption. Real assent is the assent to statements of
truth that have been apprehended as real objects through mental activities and experience. Real experienced objects
leave impressions on the imagination to which the intellect assents. Real assent exercises an influence on both
individual and society; and influence that notional assent does not incite. Notional assent remains at the mental level,
while real assent stimulates affections and passions, and thereby moves from notion to action. Real assent, therefore,
involves belief, conviction and certitude. John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), 89, 103, 123-125.
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interwoven and part of the development process.”2 In this process of transformation, the idea of
the improvement of human wellbeing in a sound environment remains very important. In regard
to this holism, the World Bank acknowledges the need to integrate natural resource and
environmental management into poverty reduction agenda so as to minimize the risk of
economic growth at the absolute expense of environmental protection.3 The United Nations
Organization (UNO) appreciates this risk in terms of an “environmental disaster scenario: ”
living standards in most countries have been rising; however, standards will fall dramatically by
2050 in less developed countries because of large scale deforestation, continuous land
degradation, dramatic decline in biodiversity, economic downturn, political instability, and social
inequalities.4
The stakes are high, especially as developing nations such as Cameroon continue to
depend on multilateral aid that is tied by donors such as the Bank to forest management policies
that risk fostering such a scenario. This implies that forest management in Cameroon cannot be
separated from such policies. Faced with both these dependence and environmental disaster
scenarios, it is necessary to identify the cause-and-effect policy dynamics associated with forest
resource management in the country so as to pave the way for appropriate resource management
critical in the international dependence development model, which basically asserts that less
developed countries rely on bilateral and multilateral development assistance from the developed
world.

2. John H. Dunning and Fabienne Fortanier, “Multinational Enterprises and the New Development
Paradigm: Consequences for Host Country Development,” Multinational Business Review 15, no.1 (2007): 27.
3. World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (Washington, DC: The
World Bank, 2007), 2 and 4.
4. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report (New York: United
Nations Development Programme, 2011), 31. Accessed March 1, 2014.
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/271/hdr_2011_en_complete.pdf
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Problematic
Harry Magdoff documents that at the July 1944 conference that created the World Bank,
Henry Morgenthau, the conference president, spoke of the ultimate function of this institution in
terms of the
creation of a dynamic world economy in which the peoples of every nation will be able to
realize their potentialities in peace . . . and enjoy, increasingly, the fruits of material
progress on an earth infinitely blessed with natural riches. This is the indispensable
cornerstone of freedom and security. All else must be built upon this. For freedom of
opportunity is the foundation for all other freedoms.5
Just two decades after the World Bank had been in existence, Magdoff documented these words
of Morgenthau in a book that the former titled The Age of Imperialism. According to Bruce Rich,
this institution for “freedom and security” could not have so quickly become a propagator of
imperial world governance unless the Bank “beneath its long, self-proclaimed mission of banker
to the poor [by transferring] larger and larger amounts of money to developing-country
government agencies for capital-intensive, export-oriented projects”6 had constructed the sort of
bureaucratic world that Max Weber would have characterized as “the hardest to destroy.”7 This
is the world of dependence – the reliance of developing countries on financial resources from the
Bank because they are poor despite rich natural resource endowment in those countries. To
borrow Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s image of the “Palace of Crystal,”8 in this world of dependence,
developing countries have all the development problems, and the Bank has all the answers.
Björn Hettne iterates that from the 1970s, neo-Marxists such as Henrique Cardoso,
Osvaldo Sunkel, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Ruy Mauro Marini have used three main theses to

5. Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 124.
6. Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of
Development (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 149.
7. Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 228.
8. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, “Notes from Underground,” in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. and
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, London, and Scarborough: New American Library, 1975), 71.
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explain the international dependency development model.9 The first, which Gert Tinggaard
Svendsen calls the neocolonial dependence thesis, asserts that there is an unequal power
relationship between rich nations at the center of global governance and poor countries at the
periphery, and rich nations take advantage of the power they possess to exploit poor ones. In this
exploitation process, a small group of individuals and capitalist institutions in rich nations, who
occupy the top position in global governance, ally with an elite faction that constitute the
governments of poor or peripheral countries at the bottom of the global power structure.10 Geerat
J. Vermeij explains that in top-down management, those at the power center make all the
decisions and regulations of resource management, while those at the periphery simply receive
and implement decisions from the center.11
Richard W. Stevenson observes that these governments are often weak in resisting the
capitalist institutions such as the World Bank at the power center because the former rely on
financial assistance from the latter for the government’s economic and political interests.
Furthermore, the Bank uses the aid as leverage or as an instrument of control in the top-down
global power structure. In this structure, therefore, the Bank formulates resource management
policies and compels peripheral countries to which it lends to adopt the policies as requirement
or condition for receiving assistance from the Bank. 12
However, the neocolonial dependence thesis is unable to account for two pertinent
elements that characterize global governance and resource management. The first of these, as

9. Björn Hettne, “The Development of Development Theory,” Acta Sociologica 26, No. 3/4 (1983): 253.
Accessed January 3, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4194484
10. Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, The Political Economy of the European Union: Institutions, Policy and
Economic Growth (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd., 2003), 20.
11. Richard W. Stevenson, “Security, Unpredictability and Evolution,” in Natural Security: A Darwinian
Approach to a Dangerous World, ed. Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 2008), 40.
12
Richard W. Stevensen, “A Chief Banker for Nations at the Bottom of the Heap,” New York Times (September 14,
1997): section 3, 1.
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pointed out by Doborah Moore and Leonard Sklar, is the insistence on respect for the
sovereignty of nations. This emphasis has characterized the refusal of some governments such as
Zimbabwe to submit to all social, economic, and environmental policies of the Bank without
contest.13 Secondly, there is an inherent contradiction within the political economy of capitalism
that ironically defies the neocolonial dependence thesis today. This contradiction has been
underlined by Immanuel Wallerstein in his analysis of world systems. In the ceaseless
accumulation of capital, “capitalists need a large market,” writes Wallerstein, “but they also need
a multiplicity of states, so that they can gain the advantages of working with states but also can
circumvent states hostile to their interests in favor to states friendly to their interests.”14 This
implies that the economic production and consumption that characterize capitalism need national
political power to survive. Consequently, the power relationship between capitalist institutions
such as the World Bank and the political government of nations in natural resource management
cannot be simply explained as unequal distribution of power.
A different theory, therefore, is necessary to account for the international dependence
development model. One of these theories is the false-paradigm theory. Svendsen affirms that
the false-paradigm thesis attributes economic stagnation in poor countries to uninformed counsel
from international development “experts” who, nevertheless, may provide advice without any ill
intentions.15 Ramagnoli and Mengoni iterate that this theory sees domestic governments as
robots that merely implement in their countries mainstream economic analysis and policies
formulated in the developed world without consideration for specific social, political, cultural,

13. Doborah Moore and Leonard Sklar, “Reforming the World Bank’s Lending for Water: The Process and
Outcome of Developing a Water Resources Management Policy,” in The Struggle for Accountability, ed. Jonathan
A. Fox and L. Dave Brown (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1998), 358-359.
14. Immanuel Wallerstein, World Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham and London: Duke
University Press, 2004), 24.
15. Svendsen, The Political Economy of the European Union, 20.
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religious, or environmental conditions of the country.16 This falsity is the failure of modernity the
embraced in World Bank’s economics. In the words of Jean Chesnaux, it is “the failure of a
global techno-economic short-term project, locked into itself because it has become ‘unhinged’
from natural and social realities. It works against the local and concrete interest of every human
society.”17
One solution to this failure is to polarize within the same development space the
development ideologies and policies of the Bank and those of a national government that more
often reflect the reality of the local contexts in developing countries. Nicholas A. Ashford and
Ralph Hall write about this polarization as the “dualistic thesis” of the international dependency
development model, which finds no meeting point between the substantive content of
development policies that fit rich, western societies and those that are appropriate for the
developed countries.18 This thesis suggests that for effective development, the Bank should
merely be a listener to national governments that are more versed in their local realities. Thus,
the Bank must not tie its multilateral aid to any policy reforms in a country.
There are two problems with this dualism: first, it fails to appreciate the fact that nations
have become inserted into the global whole in such a way that social, economic, and political
circumstances in powerful nations tend to determine the state of affairs in other countries.
Consequently, the formulation and implementation of public policy cannot be limited simply to
factors that arise from and remain within specific local circumstances. Second, the World Bank,
for the sake of its own perpetuity, must prescribe certain development policy requirements for its
debtors in order to ensure that the loans it disperses can be repaid. However, amidst movements

16. Ramagnoli and Mengoni, The Economic Development Process in the Middle East and North Africa, 18.
17. Jean Chesneaux, Brave Modern World (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1992), 150.
18. Nicholas A. Ashford and Ralph Hall,Technology, Globalization and Sustainable Development:
Transforming the Industrial State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 159.
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that counter neoliberal economics out of political expediency, the Bank realizes, as Maynard
Keynes ones insisted, that it needs to have “a certain amount of faith in the development
prospects of a country – a faith that transcends the expectations that can certainly be associated
with particular projects.”19
The Bank demonstrates this faith in its policy of ownership in which it appreciates some
development policies as formulated by national governments with due consideration for the
broad political economy, social relationships, cultural, and environmental aspects of their
countries and calls on national governments to internalize development and resource
management policies designed by the Bank. This policy implies that the neocolonial thesis of the
international dependence development model that privileges the neoclassical economics of
capitalist societies above all other disciplinary insights and arguments in development projects is
inadequate to explain the top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top natural resource management that the
Bank proposed to nations after the Earth Summit in Rio. This faith in the development prospects
of policies formulated by a national government also implies that the dualistic thesis of the
international dependence development model is inappropriate to explain the Bank’s perception
of the development knowledge that governments and localities possess. The Bank’s insistence on
attaching certain policy reforms as a requirement for its development assistance indicates the
Bank also has confidence in its own development knowledge. The false-paradigm must itself be
false in cases where this knowledge has yielded some positive results, as in the management of
forest resources in Cameroon.
To downplay the validity of the hitherto stated three theses of the international
dependency development model does not, however, mean that developing countries have

19. Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1973), 250-251.
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stopped relying on the World Bank for development assistance. Inasmuch as developing
countries continue to depend on the Bank, and the Bank continues to use conditionality as an
instrument of power to maximize control of its supported development programs in developing
countries, A. Gunder Frank as quoted by Hettne, could not have been absolutely right in 1977 to
claim that “dependence has now completed the cycle of its natural life.”20 As the cycle continues
in the sphere of forest resource management to which the Bank now devotes a significant amount
of its attention in its development agenda, the above critique of the three theses implies that the
dynamics of power relations, knowledge conviction, and shareholder participation associated
with the Bank-country relationship and the impact of this dynamics on natural resource
management in countries have to be explained differently.
The Bank influences this relationship through conditionality understood as policy
requirements that the Bank attaches to its financial assistance to countries. Countries also
influence this relationship through the Bank’s policy of ownership in which states grant real
assent to development and associated resource management policies. Consequently, one can say
that this explanation involves the dynamic relationship between the Bank with conditionality on
the one hand and the country with ownership on the other hand. Thus, it is not only the contact
between the Bank and the government of a country as institutional entities that can impact forest
resource management but the dialogue between conditionality and ownership as well.
Ultimately, it is this compound relationship and its impact on resource management that needs to
be explained differently.
What is this different explanation, and how and why has this different relational dynamic
affected forest management in Cameroon? These questions can be reframed into one. The

20. Hettne, “The Development of Development Theory,” 255.

17

relationship between conditionality and ownership policies arises because of international
dependency development. It is this development model that engages the management of forest
resources in Cameroon. Therefore, one can simply ask: in what way has the relationship between
conditionality and ownership within the context of international dependence development
impacted the management of forest resources in Cameroon? This is the problem of this study.
To respond to this problematic, it is important first to look at the background of forest
management in Cameroon. However, it is necessary to point out ab initio that although some
scholars have analyzed and criticized the policies of the World Bank, none of them have looked
at forest management in Cameroon in light of the relationship between conditionality and
ownership. For example, Anna Lawrence, Bianca Ambrose-Oji, Rita Lysinge, and Charles Tako
have examined biodiversity conservation on Mount Cameroon in the light of local challenges
from policies of the Cameroon government; Michael K. McCall and Peter A. Minang have
assessed participatory Geographic Information Systems for community-based natural resource
management in the country; and Peter Geschiere has criticized the World Bank for blindly
betting on the community in the 1994 forest management law. Phil René Oyono has analyzed
several times Cameroon’s strengths and flaws in forest management but has not linked them to
the relationship between conditionality and ownership.
History of Forest Resource Management in Cameroon under the Development Timeline
Cameroon lies between 8° 30 to 16° 10 E Longitude and 1° 40 to 13° 05 N latitude. It is
bordered in the north by Lake Chad, in the north-east by Chad, in the south by Gabon and
Equatorial Guinea, in the south-east by Congo (Brazzaville); the Central African Republic is in
the east, Nigeria occupies the west, and the waters of the Atlantic Ocean constantly wash the
southwest coast of the country. According to the most recent United Nations data, the 475,650
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square kilometers area country had a human population of 20,030,000 in 2011. Figure 1 shows
that the triangular nation is rich in vegetation with abundant dense forest in the south and
cropland in the north of the country respectively.

Figure 1. Map of Cameroon and the country’s diverse vegetation
Source: Interactive Forest Atlas of Cameroon in the form of Geographic Information System
Data (World Resource Institute, August 2013). Accessed September 4, 2013.
http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/congo-basin-forests/cameroon#project-tabs
Mosaic forest, close deciduous forest, and savanna are also present. In 2010, forest land
occupied 42.0% of the land area of this middle-income country of more than 240 tribes and
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languages.21 The World Bank documents that forest resources are second only to oil in the
sectorial contribution of natural resources to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country.22
The forest accounts for 9.6% of the nation’s GDP. Forest resources not only contribute
significantly to the economic growth of the country and its trading partners but also to tourism,
energy supply in the form of fuel-wood, and the infrastructural (building materials), recreational,
educational, medicinal, and cultural wellbeing of the country. Since the last century, the
utilitarian value of these forest resources has made forest management a critical element of the
nation’s political economy. The features of this management have paralleled historically the
development timeline proposed by McMichael: a journey from the development project (late
1940s to early 1970s) through the globalization project (1980s to 2000s) to millennial reckonings
(2000s to present).
The development project has its roots in colonialism, in which European colonizers
envisioned their culture and political economy as superior to those of the colonized. To develop
the colonized, therefore, meant progressively assimilating the colonized to be like the colonizers.
McMichael notes that this metamorphosis involved a pattern of colonizers establishing in
colonies an economy of specialized extraction and production of raw materials and primary
products to provide for the insufficiency of such materials in Europe. This production involved
setting up plantations. The extraction process made use of European industrial technology.23 The
colonial era was truly a time of Africa’s resource bondage to Europe. Richard A. Goodridge
observes that in this epoch of subjugation, Germany, which colonized Cameroon, promulgated

22. United Nations, “Cameroon.” United Nations. Accessed March 1, 2014.
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Cameroon
22. World Bank, Cameroon’s Development Prospects (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), 2.
23. McMichael, Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change, 5th edn. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2012),
118.
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the All-Highest Decree of 10 June 1896 in which the “Germans classified all lands in the
Protectorate of Cameroon as ‘unoccupied’ and, therefore, ‘ownerless,’ and these became ‘Crown
Lands’ to be disposed of by the Protectorate Government as they deemed fit.”24 Mike Rudin
notes that following this doctrine of terra nullus, German plantations increased in Cameroon
from seven in 1891 to 182 in 1913. Goodridge documents that by 1914, the Germans had
converted 264,000 acres of forest land in the southwest Cameroon into plantations.25
The conversion of virgin forests into plantations in Cameroon created an economic
system that contradicted the perception of forest land as a property of the commons. Ambe J.
Njoh points to German companies such as West Kamerun Gesellschaft, Afrikanishe Fucht
Kompagnie, and Thormählen, which held the above-mentioned 264,000 acres of plantation land,
as economic institutions that set up this plantation system.26 The system was also in disaccord
with the cyclical logic of land use that had been present in the country before colonialism. Oyono
iterates that under this logic, virgin forest transformed into farmlands for subsistence purposes
was allowed to fallow naturally and eventually regain its forest status.27 Under the plantation
agriculture and the export of logs to Germany and other European countries for shipbuilding and
canal piling, land was valued according to its economic utilitarian capacity. This capitalistic and
accumulative system, which Oyono terms “Eldorado,”28 became the ingredient of the
development project in the early two decades of the independence of Cameroon. Table 1 shows
forest management features in Cameroon in this development project era.

24. Richard A. Goodridge, “In the Most Effective Manner?”: Britain and the Disposal of Cameroon’s
Plantations, 1914 -1924,” The International Journal of American Historical Studies 29 (1996): 252-253.
25. Ibid., 253.
26. Ambe Njoh, “Development Implications of Colonial Land and Human Settlement Schemes in
Cameroon,” Habitat International 26 (2002): 405-406.
27. Oyono, “The Foundations of the Conflict de Langage over Land and Forests in Southern Cameroon,”
African Study Monographs 26, no.3 (2005): 119.
28. Oyono, “The Foundations of the Conflict de Langage,” 121.

21

Table 1. Cameroon’s Forest Management under France, Britain, and Ahidjo’s Planned
Liberalism29 in the Colonial and Development Project Era, late 1940s to early 1970s
Features of the Development Forest Management in Cameroon under France, Britain,
Project
and First Two Decades of Independence (1960-19782)
The forest was viewed by France, Britain, and Ahidjo’s
Development makes claims
government as a source of material for raising living
such as economic progress,
standards. Mandated masters used European technology to
and use of scientific tools.
foster forest exploitation in Cameroon.30
The British Ordinance No. 38 of 1946 gave the British
National framework for
government absolute rights to control all lands and forests in
economic growth
Cameroon. Ordinance No. 74/01 of 6 July 1974 made
Ahidjo’s government the guardian of all lands.31
Use of aid to bind developing France and Britain constructed roads in Cameroon under the
guise of development aid. France declared all lands in East
countries to the developed
Cameroon terres vacantes et sans maître, and began vast
world, and exploit natural
exploitation of forest resources in Cameroon. Britain and
resources for societal
France exploited Cameroon’s forests vastly, and they
development
exported the forest resources to Europe. Thus, the aid
dependencia development was really drainage
development.32
The French and the British upheld plantation development,
Development via
and continued administration of German plantations that
industrialization, especially
became property of the colonial state.33
agro-industrialization
Through the policy of assimilation, the French trained a class
Industrial investments are
of Cameroonian elites who were incorporated into the
managed by multi-class
management of logging companies in east Cameroon.34
alliances in developmentAhidjo put tribal elites at the head of national industries to
states
create a socio-political bond between different tribes and the
state.
The French in 1946 introduced legislation to train ethnic
Development through
groups in forest management skills. However, natives who
regional, class, gender,
racial, and ethnic inequalities received the training were elites assimilated into French
culture – les assimilés, and not les indigenes.35
in states and markets
29. Planned liberalism was a political economy of programmatic development in Cameroon under
President Ahidjo. In this political economy that combined socialism and capitalism, the Cameroon government led
the economic development of the country while encouraging the growth of the private sector. See Mark Dike
DeLancey, Rebecca Mbuh, and Mark W. DeLancey, “Planned Liberalism,” Historical Dictionary of the Republic of
Cameroon (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 308.
30. F.C. Fisiy, Power and Privilege in the Administration of Law: Land Law Reforms and Social
Differentiation in Cameroon (Leiden: African Studies Center, 1992), 53.
31. Ambe J. Njoh, “Continuity and Change in Cameroonian Land Policy,” Planning Perspectives 15
(2000), 253.
32. J.M. Mengang, “Evolution of Natural Resource Policy in Cameroon,” Yale Forest and Environmental
Studies Bulletin 102 (1998): 241-243.
33. J. Acworth et al., “Towards Participatory Biodiversity Conservation,” 76.
34. S.K. Adeyoju, A Study of Forest Administration Problems in Six African Countries: Cameroon, Ghana,
Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania (Geneva: FAO, 1976), 57-58.
35. Mengang, “Evolution of Natural Resource Policy in Cameroon,” 244.
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The development project as described by McMichael was organized at the
international level by Western centers of power such as the United States of America and Great
Britain to foster national economic growth. It involved the U.S. bilateral Marshall Plan and
multilateralism under the Bretton Woods System.36 In McMichael’s development periodization,
the period from the 1980s to the 2000s was the era of the globalization project characterized by
seven elements. First, a Washington consensus arose from global managers and policy makers
who favored market-based and rejected development strategies led by the state. Second, Britain,
USA, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan grouped themselves into the G-7. Third, this group
sought to implement global management capitalist policies through multilateral agencies such as the
World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Fourth, in this capitalist political
economy, market powers are concentrated in the hands of transnational corporations (TNCs) and financial
powers in the hands of transnational banks (TNBs). Fifth, with this concentration of powers, states found
themselves subjected to economic discipline that varied in intensity by geopolitical position, global
currency hierarchy, debt load, and resource endowment. Sixth, under this political economy, the
development of the world was conceived as realizable through class, gender, race, and ethnic inequalities
that result from the prioritization of private property and self-interest in the capitalism. Lastly, from these
inequalities arose resistance from less developed countries and from movements that contested unbridled
market rule promulgated by capitalist multilateral institutions.37

However, nowadays, not the features of the development project but those of the
globalization project characterize the international dependence development model. There are
the features of an era, precisely of the post Rio Earth Summit convention on Sustainable

36. The Marshall Plan involved transfer of billions of dollars from the USA to Europe and Japan to serve
the geopolitical interest of the USA during the Cold War, expand trade, stabilize prices, increase production, destroy
socialism and eliminate labor militancy. The Bretton Woods System involved the creation of the IMF and the World
Bank to stabilize national finances, provide money for Third World to import First World infrastructural
technologies for national economic growth, and encourage Third World primary exports to earn foreign currency.
37. McMichael, Development and Social Change, 147.
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Development in 1992, when the collaboration and resistance of the Cameroon government to the
global environmental management policies of the World Bank, in a system of interactions
between the two stakeholders, created forest management policies from both the government and
the Bank. The nature of this interaction and its impact on forest management in Cameroon
constitute the concern of this work. To speak of this relationship between the stakeholders and
their policies as interactive insinuates that interactionism will be a significant element in the
theoretical framework of this study.
Theoretical Framework and Thesis Statement
One needs a framework in order to formulate a response to the above-stated problematic.
In the framing of the problematic, one thing that was insinuated was that there is interaction
between the Bank and national governments with respect to forest management. The Bank, and
the country that receives financial assistance from the Bank, reciprocate through conditionality
and ownership. In this reciprocity, the Bank and its policies influence the government and its
policies, and vice-versa. As a result, this influence affects forest management in Cameroon.
Issues related to answering the question, therefore, are the interaction between conditionality and
ownership, specification of the nature of this interaction, and identification of the effect that the
result of this interaction has on forest management in the country.
In pointing out the difference between sociology-focused interactionist theory and ethicsbased consensus theory, N. H. Groenman, O D’a Sleven, and M. A. Buckenham underline that
interaction does not seek the acceptance of fundamental values as consensus does. At the social
level, interactionist theory as posited by modernist thought simply looks at how individuals,
understood as persons, institutions or groups, influence each other by their actions. Interaction,

24

therefore, implies that the actions of actors are linked – not independent.38 Postmodernists are
wary of this very positivist approach to interactionism. Making use of an “interpretive
interactionist” approach that is informed by post-structuralism, feminism, neo-Marxism, and
cultural studies, post-modernism extends interaction to different metaphysical spheres such as
systems of discourse. That is, as Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine
explain, post-modernism insists that as self and institutional identities have become fragmented
because of ideological exchanges between multiple systems, one must admit that ideological and
conceptual interactions are also part of the scope of interactionism.39
When different institutions (actors) and varied ideological formulations (instruments of
action) are combined, the result is a hybrid. This is a standpoint that has been affirmed by
scholars of religious fundamentalism and linguists. In his study of current trends in Islam,
Thomas Hegghammer found that changes in the political contexts in which jihadist groups
function in the Middle East (especially Western troops in the Muslim world), changes in the
media environment that allows groups with different world views to interact online, structural
and ideological cleavages between groups of different ethnic and geographical origins, and
increased subjugation of jihadists to marginalization in a world in which the majority of people
are anti-Islamic fundamentalists have led to a new jihadist identity. The interaction between
different jihadist structures and ideas has given rise to “the ideological hybridization of Jihadi
groups.”40 Linguist scholars such as A. Suresh Canagarajah have also noted that a language is
actually a hybrid of multiple languages, especially when examined from the perspective of
38. N. H. Groenman, O D’a Sleven, and M. A. Buckenham, Social Behavioral Sciences for Nurses:
Psychology, Sociology and Communication for Project 2000 (Edinburg: Campion Press Ltd, 1992), 264.
39. Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine, “Symbolic Interactionism at the End of the
Century,” in Handbook of Social Theory, ed. George Ritzer and Barry Smart (London: SAGE Publications Ltd,
2001), 227.
40. Thomas Hegghammer, “The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups,” Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology 9 (November 2009), 59.
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etymology and word migration or the adoption of words from one language into another
language without changes in spelling, pronunciation, and meaning by non-traditional speakers.
As institutions, individuals from different lingua backgrounds, and world views of these different
actors interact, words move across languages as a medium of communication. What results is a
process of word adoption that gives languages a hybrid identity.41
Thus, when there is institutional negotiation, interaction between different bodies of
power, and exchange of world views in various forms such as ideologies and policies, and
through different media such as language, the result is not a formula that is universally
applicable, but a hybrid. “Hybridity,” writes Ilan Kapoor in the Postcolonial Politics of
Development, “is not made into formula or ontology but into rule. A rule has no meaningful
content by itself and must be applied and implemented according to specific context.”42
The impact that hybrids have on any phenomenon is really a synergy of the individual
components from which the hybrid is composed. A mule, for example, is a hybrid animal from
the cross breeding of a male horse and a female donkey. When a mule acts, it acts as a whole
organism in its own right. One cannot say that when it acts with the sensitivity of a horse, it
becomes a horse, and when it lives long, it becomes a donkey. Rather, although the acts posited
by a mule may result from its composite material essence, the mule posits its own acts as one,
whole substance. In order words, it acts as a system, not as isolated parts.
Systems theory within the fields of engineering and thermodynamics sees elements
within a system as not only having strong functional relationships with each other but at times
exerting synergized influence on other assemblages. Even if a stimulus is applied to one part of

41. A. Suresh Canagarajah, “Negotiating Ideologies through English: Strategies from the Periphery,”
Ideology, Politics, and Language Policies (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V, 2000), 127.
42. Ilan Kapoor, Postcolonial Politics of Development (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 135.
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the system, the functional relationship affects the assemblage as a whole. This effect may be
weak, strong, positive, or negative. Often, considering that energy in systems is a conserved
factor, increased effect in one area is accompanied by a decreased effect in another. Therefore,
the effect can be positive in one area and negative in the other.43
Katrina Brown and Francois Ekoko apply this systems thinking to human-environment
interactions and human-ecosystem relationships in Cameroon. Having considered that forest
management in Cameroon involves the maintenance, the exploitation of forest resources, the
control, and the monitoring of forest centered activities, they avow that forest management in
parts of the country such as Southern Cameroon should be understood in terms of synergy: “the
combined or coordinated action or working-together of two or more elements . . . . This
combined action may produce an increased or enhanced effect.”44 This synergy is present in the
maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forests in the country. Thus, the thesis statement of
this study is that the hybrid relationship between conditionality and ownership within the
international dependency development model has a synergized impact on the dimensions of
maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest management in Cameroon.45

43. J.M. Mendel and R.W. McLaren, “Reinforcement-Learning Control and Pattern Recognition Systems,”
in Adaptive, Learning and Pattern Recognition Systems, 66, ed. J.M. Mendel and K.F. Fu (New York: Academic
Press, 1970), 228-230.
44. Katrina Brown and Francois Ekoko, “Forest Encounters: Synergy among Agents of Forest Change in
Southern Cameroon,” Society and Natural Resources 14, no.269 (2001): 270.
45. The interactions that make policies hybridization possible are based on institutional dependency and not
interdependence. It is necessary to point out the difference between what I refer to hear as interactive dependence
and interdependence. Hettne argues that interdependence is an “ambiguous innovation” in development theory that
can refer to one of five things. These include “the rivalry within the ‘centre’” of global power as in the case of
Western Europe being more dependent that the USA because the latter has a higher adjusted Gross Domestic
Product; the industrialization of nations such as Great Britain; the rise of new regional power centers such as Mexico
in Latin America, India in Asia, and Nigeria in Africa; “a common predicament for the peoples of the world,” which
suggests that all humanity is sailing in the same ship of riches and poverty, resource endowment and resource
deficiency, etc with disregard for classes that are within a ship and for differences in access to resources within the
ship. Interactive dependence, however, unequivocally means that in the global political economy, capitalist rely on
political governments for access to the market within nations and political governments rely on global capitalist
institutions for financial assistance to attain their economic, social, and political interests.
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Hypothesis
Conditionality and ownership may be absolutely unrelated. In this case, one cannot say
that the relationship between the two policies within the context of the international dependency
development model has any effect on forest management in Cameroon. If the absence of a
relationship affects forest management in the country, then, logically, it is this absence of link,
and not the relationship, that affects forest management in Cameroon. This no-relationship will
fall outside of the realm of the above stated status questionis of this study. The question assumes
that there is a relationship between the two policies. The relationship, however, may have no
effect on forest management in Cameroon. This constitutes the null hypothesis (H0) of this study,
and it can be briefly stated:
H0: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international dependence
development model does not affect forest management in Cameroon.
Alternatively, the relationship of conditionality and ownership may impact forest
management in Cameroon. This is the alternative hypothesis (HA). HA can involve three
possibilities: positive impact (HA1), negative impact (HA2), and positive and negative impact
(HA3). Therefore, the different strands of the alternative hypothesis can be stated as follows:
HA1: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international
dependence development model fosters the maintenance, exploitation or use, control, and
monitoring of forest management in Cameroon.
HA2: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international
dependence development model hinders the maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest
management in Cameroon.
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HA3: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international
dependence development model impacts forest management in Cameroon both fosters and
hinders the maintenance, exploitation or use, control, and monitoring of forest management in
Cameroon. Different research methods will aid in deciphering which of these hypotheses is true.
Research Design
Data Sources
Three data sources were used in this research. The first is qualitative. It involved data
collection from primary and secondary relevant sources associated with the policies of
conditionality and ownership, the relationship between these two policies, and the effect of this
relationship on forest management in Cameroon. Primary sources refer to archived documents
and publications authored by the World Bank and by the government of Cameroon from the
1980s to 2013. Analysis of documents was not simply in terms of their stated contentions; it also
considered the history behind the contentions in the documents in order to access them as both a
locus of knowledge and a symbol of power expression. Secondary sources were the
commentaries of other scholars and researchers with respect to the object of this study. Other
literatures that do not strictly focus on conditionality, ownership, and forest management in
Cameroon were also employed in this study to illuminate the response to the problematic.
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) data on Cameroon forest lands published by the
World Resource Institute in vector, raster, and image were also collected. These data were freely
available electronically in the institute’s website. The different GIS data sets used herein are
those the institute published in 2004 and 2013. Data from the different years enabled the
tracking of changes resulting from the impact of policies on forest resource management.

29

Data Analysis Methods
Qualitative theoretical analysis and quantitative analysis of the sort in this research
requires an interdisciplinary approach to unravel the complexities in the conditionalityownership relationship impact on forest management in Cameroon. Some conditionality
measures are based on economic rationalizations, some on ethics, and others on political
economy; ownership requires political will; and logging management within the context of the
international dependence development model is tailored to strengthen public and private efforts
to achieve socially, economically, and ecologically sustainable use of national forest. Thus, four
disciplines broadly used in this research are geosciences, sociology, political science, and
economics. Other disciplines used to a lesser extent are law, psychology, anthropology, and
gender and diversity studies because logging management likewise involves a mindset,
controlling illegal logging, examining how different genders relate with the forest because of the
influence of the conditionality-ownership policies relationship, and performing geospatial
analysis to determine the extent of to which stakeholders abide by the law governing forest
management and the degree of deforestation resulting from this relationship.
As varied as the above mentioned disciplines are, the methods for this interdisciplinary
research are from the natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences. The
methodological approach from the geosciences discipline of the natural sciences used in this
study is GIS analysis. This involves quarrelling GIS data, performing spatial analysis, examining
existing maps at magnified levels for detail, creating maps, and inserting coordinate points into
GIS maps.
Synthesizing discourses in different texts as a qualitative research method of the
humanities provides the theoretical insight to conceptualize the distinct natures of conditionality
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and ownership, to establish the relationship between the two policies, and analytically to
articulate the impact of this relationship on forest management in Cameroon. The concept of
infrapololitics from the political sciences also provides a methodological framework for
understanding the behavior of different actor vis-à-vis forest management in Cameroon.
James C. Scott’s notion of infrapolitics calls for the juxtaposition of hidden and public
transcripts to provide the cultural and structural underpinning of actions in the scope of politics
and political economy.46 In 1990, Scott suggested in this vein that the absence of openly declared
contests by individuals and groups to hegemonic powers does not indicate acquiescence.47 Open
contests fall into the scope of public transcripts that are verbal and non-verbal acts by which
dominant elites portray themselves.48 However, there is also everyday resistance that consists of
what subordinates say and do beyond the public realm. This is the hidden transcript; or what
sociologists call the ontological narratives of the conduct of individuals and groups. Hidden
transcripts may, therefore, take such forms as delay tactics, subtle approaches to assert one’s
possession of power to control a circumstance, and immaterial cultural attitudes such as apathy
towards issues that may be proposed by others in the power structure. Public records in this study
were accessed through written works (for example, Bank’s evaluation of its assistance and
attitudes and actions of actors commented upon by researchers). Hidden transcripts were
discerned in the daily lifestyle of Cameroonian society. This study juxtaposes both the public and
hidden transcripts associated with the relationship between conditionality and ownership and its
impact on Cameroon’s forest resource management within the international development
dependence model.

46. James C. Scott, Dominant and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1990), 184.
47. Ibid., 200.
48. Scott, Dominant and the Arts of Resistance, 18.
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Sociological analysis of power structure in relations among institutions and analysis of
behavioral patterns illuminate the impact of the hybrid on forest management in the nation in the
course of time. Statistical analysis underlines any disparities in forest management that may
result from differences in areas of emphasize in the COH and paints the picture of forest
management in Cameroon in the form of figure representations such as charts. Economic based
calculations such as cost-benefit analysis reveal the operative mindsets of entities that use forest
resources.
In the impact analysis, features of the conditionality-ownership hybrid were treated as the
independent variables, while the dimensions of forest resource management, namely
maintenance, use, control, and monitoring, were the dependent variables. For example, the
interaction between conditionality and ownership led to confidential and competitive auction as
the method of procuring forest concessions in Cameroon. Cost-benefit analysis and firm theory
enabled the establishment of the impact relationship between this method and increased
deforestation measured by changes in volume of timber harvested.
An appropriate layout is necessary to answer coherently the four sub-questions involved
in the status questionis and elaborate all the findings in this study. In this regard, the second
chapter of this work focuses on detailing the nature of conditionality and ownership as distinct
policies. Without a clear understanding of these two key concepts, one cannot identify the
relationship between them in the context of the international dependence development model.
The third chapter establishes the nature of the relationship between the two policies based on
their very nature. The fourth chapter situates this relationship in the management of Cameroon’s
forest. The fifth chapter is an analysis of the impact of this situation on forest management in
Cameroon. The sixth chapter, which is the conclusion, briefly recaps the arguments in the
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previous chapters, states which of the hypothesis is acceptable, and mentions the path to further
research that this study leads one.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NATURE OF CONDITIONALITY AND COUNTRY OWNERSHIP
In discussing legal aspects of the operations of the World Bank, the institution’s Legal
Vice Presidency office notes that conditionality, which is basically the staking of Bank loans on
certain policy reforms in recipient countries, was an uncommon phenomenon before the 1980s.1
In 1997, Jacques Polak asserted that the Bank had used the term “conditionality” in 1970 not to
refer to its own policy, but to describe conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) on the Fund’s loans.2 This corroborates Joseph Gold’s earlier (1970) contention that the
historical roots of the term “conditionality” are in the IMF, and not the World Bank.3
This brief history of policy conditionality indicates that Thaddeus Malesa and Peter
Silarsky may be right in affirming that the term “conditionality” was a relatively unused word in
the Bank’s operations before the institution introduced structural adjustment programs in the last
three decades. After the Bank introduced these programs in multiple developing countries, the
institution became famous for its practice of conditionality. Countries approaching this
international developer for aid and loans have become aware that the disbursements will most
certainly be made on condition that the country fulfills certain policy requirements issued by the
donor or lender, namely, the Bank.4 Irrespective of the precise purpose, content, and way that the
conditions associated with financial assistance are eventually implemented in a country, the

1. World Bank, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Legal Aspects of Conditionality in Policy Based
Lending (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2005), 2.
2. Jacques Polak , “The World Bank and the IMF: A Changing Relationship,” The World Bank: Its First
Half Century vol.2, ed. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 1997), 486.
3. Joseph Gold, “Use of the International Monetary Fund’s Resources: ‘Conditionality’ and
‘Unconditionality’ as Legal Categories” Journal of International Law and Economics 6 (1970): 18.
4. Thaddeus Malesa and Peter Silarsky, “Does World Bank Effort Matter for Success of Adjustment
Lending?” Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences and Lessons, ed. Stefan Koeberle et al. (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2005), 127.
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Bank is aware that the effective application of development policies and the realization of policy
objectives is impossible if a country does not internalize and treat the policies as its own. That is,
aid conditions are not enough effectively to develop a society with World Bank aid and loans;
countries also have to value and treat development policies as though they were desired,
formulated, and fully implemented by the countries without any external influence from the
Bank. This is the fundamental affirmation of the Bank’s policy of ownership.
In the dynamics of the Bank’s development assistance, therefore, there are two poles: the
Bank with conditionality at one end, and the country with ownership at the other. This chapter
focuses on these two terminals. It frames the meaning of conditionality, illuminates the rationale
and types of conditionality, and examines the essential and multidimensional nature of country
ownership.
Framing a Definition of Conditionality
Etymologically, the English word “condition” originates from two Latin words: con and
dicere. Con translates into English as “with,” and dicere is the Latin word for the English verb,
“to say”. This etymology suggests that “condition” implies that something is said with some
other thing attached to it. This implication is present in Livy’s assertion that the “condicere is
used of two parties who come into an agreement about something.” 5 In Aristotle’s philosophical
logic, to state that “B” can be done only with the implementation of “A” is to stipulate that the
realization of “A” is conditioned by “B”. This is the logic of the World Bank’s conditionality,
where “A” refers to specific policies, processes, and intended outcomes, and “B” to loans and
aid. This is the logic that leads Sarah L. Babb and Bruce G. Carruthers to define conditionality as

5. John L. Lincoln, Selections from the First Five Books of Livy’s Roman History, New ed. (New York: D.
Appleton and Company, 1871), 248.
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“the placement of policy conditions on the disbursement of financial resources to national
governments.”6
The above definition is akin to what the Bank postulates in its operational policy (OP) on
what conditionality is:
the specific set of conditions attached to the disbursement of policy-based lending or
budget support – which of course can take different forms, ranging from explicit
agreements to implicit understandings and from traditional ex ante conditions based on
promises to ex post conditions based on actual implemented measures.7
These ranges are the formal, not the material, content of loan conditions. In Paragraph 13
of OP 8.60, the Bank asserts its right and prerogative to determine the material content or matter
of loan conditions. This threefold matter includes the “maintenance of an adequate
macroeconomic policy framework, implementation of the overall program in a manner
satisfactory to the Bank, and compliance with these critical program conditions.”8 The Bank
pursues this triad through the use of prior actions, regular tranche, floating, and effectiveness
conditions. In single tranche operations with which prior actions conditions are attached, the
country takes action to meet all conditions before the Bank approves a loan to the nation. The
Bank applies regular and floating tranche conditions to multitranche operations. Regular tranche
conditions refer to policy actions for which the Bank can foresee their time of implementation
with certainty and that are critical to attain program objectives. In floating tranche, the timing is
indeterminate. Effectiveness conditions delay policy implementation by demanding that certain
conditions be implemented from the time the Bank approves a loan to the time the loan becomes

6. Sarah L. Babb and Bruce G. Carruthers, “Conditionality: Forms, Function, and History,” The Annual
Review of Law and Social Science 4 (2008): 15.
7. World Bank, “Overview,” in Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons, ed.Stefan
Koeberle et al. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), 6.
8. World Bank, “OP 8.60 – Development Policy Lending” (August 2004).
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:2
0240031~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00.html
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effective. These different conditions are present in almost all World Bank sponsored
development activities in developing countries, 9 such as forest sector reforms in Cameroon as
will be shown in the fourth chapter herein.
In the attempt to define conditionality by appeal to the form and matter of loan
conditions, the Bank falls into a problem that is common within the field of public policy,
namely, technicality. “The precision which seems to be gained through a highly technical
definition,” P. Stuart Robinson writes, “may prove spurious as it mixes awkwardly and
misleadingly with the ordinary language one must to some extent use in discussing it.”10 Here,
such crisis of technicality is in the tautological use of the word “conditions” as common words to
define conditionality. To resolve this problem, one may take recourse in Thomas Aquinas’s
philosophy of language. Aquinas asserts that in the definiens (that which symbolizes or gives the
same meaning as the word or words being defined), one can use classificatory words instead of
the definiendum or word(s) in the thing being defined11 so as to avoid circular reasoning. In this
regard, one can appeal to Benedicte Bull, Alf Morten Jerve, and Erlend Sigvaldsen’s definition
of conditionality as “the application of specific, predetermined requirements that directly or
indirectly enter into a donor’s decision to approve or continue to finance a loan or grant.”12 Here,
specific requirements are classifications that stand in the place of the Bank’s use of the word
“conditions” in defining conditionality. However, limiting aid and loan conditions to
“predetermined requirements” excludes ex-post conditions. That is, ex-post conditions are based

9. World Bank, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Modalities of Conditionality (Washington, DC:
World Bank 2005), 7-8.
10. P. Stuart Robinson, The Politics of International Crisis Escalation: Decision Making Under Pressure
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 13.
11. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae I, q.29, a.1, ad.3.
12. Benedicte Bull, Alf Morten Jerve, and Erlend Sigvaldsen, The World Bank and the IMF Use of
Conditionality to Encourage Privatization and Liberalization: Current Issues and Practices. A Report Prepared for
the Nowergian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a Background for the Oslo Conditionality Conference (November
2006), 4. www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0164/ddd/pdfv/300495-7final_conditionality_report.pdf
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on project outcome; they are not stipulated by the Bank before a development project begins, as
is the case with ex-ante conditions. Thus, ex-post conditions are not “predetermined.” This
limitation compels one to extend the search for a more comprehensive definition of
conditionality. To do this, one has to go beyond the scope of public policy into other disciplines.
One can describe this phenomenon of attaching specific requirements to loans and aid as
an interdisciplinary metaphor in the relationship between international financial institutions (IFI)
as lenders and nation-states as borrowers. In other words, conditionality can symbolize the
integration of different disciplinary insights in the development of human society. According to
the Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank, the Bank’s Articles of Agreement provide the
legal framework and power to the Bank to use conditionality in its lending process associated
with development projects.13 Economic development is central in the Bank’s development
policy, and economics involves the combination of factors of production (land, labor, capital,
and entrepreneur) in ways that can yield maximum profit. This means that economic
development, by its nature, demands that certain conditions such as the availability of land, the
minimization of labor cost, and the maximization of capital exist. An institution that is concerned
with economic development, therefore, needs the power to control the mix of these conditions in
human society. It is in this vein that Susan Schadler et al. assert that in the use of the power that
the Bank and the IMF have from their Articles of Agreement – the power to use policy
requirements in the provision of development aid and loans – both institutions simply intend to

13. Legal Vice Presidency, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Legal Aspects of Conditionality in
Policy-Based Lending (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), Nos. 2 and 3.
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foster economic growth in the country that receives development assistance from these
institutions.14
In criticizing this assertion of Schadler et al. from the perspective of political economy,
Graham Birg argues that the economics-centered claim of Schadler et al. is too narrow in
understanding World Bank’s attachment of policy reforms to development assistance. He
contends an earlier mentioned point – the Bank knows that the effectiveness of this attachment
depends on both the political will of governments to comply with stipulated conditions, and the
prevailing country circumstances that caused a national government to turn to the IFIs. This
contention is based on the fact that the political will of governments and the existing country
circumstances determine the extent to which governments implement development assistance
reforms required by the World Bank. Consequently, conditionality should be understood not only
from an economic perspective but more from the angle of political economy.15
In positing a theory of international institutional influence, Rachel E. Epstein subjects
conditionality to a sociopolitical analysis, in which she refers to such country-specific
circumstances as the “social context.” This theory states that the mechanical terrain in which IFIs
such as the World Bank and the IMF can enforce compliance to conditionality is the social
context wherein nations are embedded in a hierarchy of powers with respect to the IFIs.16 In fact,
reflective of this idea of social context, Stefan Koeberle and Thaddeus Malesa point out that the

14. Susan Schadler et al. IMF Conditionality: Experience under Stand-By and Extended Arrangements, Pt.
I: Key Issues and Findings, and Part II: Background Papers, Occasional Papers (Washington DC: International
Monetary Fund, 1995), nos. 128 and 129.
15. Graham Bird, “The Effectiveness of Conditionality and the Political Economy of Policy Reform: Is it
Simply a Matter of Political Will?” Policy Reform 2, no.1 (1998): 91.
16. Rachel A. Epstein, “The Social Context in conditionality: Internationalizing Finance in Postcommunist
Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no.6 (September 2008): 883.
On page 883 of this article, Epstein affirms that the social context is characterized by the alienation of regime and
sector in the country that turns to the IFI for loans, the perception of the status of domestic actors as subordinated to
that of the IFI, and the consistency of the conditionality norms.
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focus of conditionality has moved from macroeconomic and reforms associated with trade to
“more complex social sector and public sector management issues.”17
From the foregoing discussion, conditionality has dimensions of legal empowerment,
economic objectives, political will, and social context. Therefore, one can define World Bank as
the policy phenomenon by which the Bank, being legally empowered by its Articles of
Agreement, attaches, in varied forms, certain specific, social-context-sensitive policy
requirements to the economic assistance that it provides to countries and demands that
governments have the political will to implement the requirements. With the economic collapse
that plagued developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, the Bank has insisted that this
phenomenon is a necessary measure in its “due diligence obligation to ensure that its resources
are used effectively and responsibly by the borrowing country.”18
Rationale of Conditionality
In favor of conditionality, Christopher L Gilbert and David Vines suggest that the Bank is
not a private lender that is simply interested in making profit. Rather, it is a developer; it is the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in a politically, socially, ethically, and
economically complex world. This means that based on the Bank’s development knowledge and
survival instinct, it has a moral and institutional responsibility to ensure that the loans it gives to
countries are used for the development of human society. The Bank must be able to trust that its
financial assistance will be used to this end. As a public institution, it also has the financial and

17. Stefan Koeberle and Thaddeus Malesa, “Experience with World Bank Conditionality,” in
Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiecnes, and Lessons, ed.Stefan Koeberle, Harold Bedoya, Peter Silarsky,
and Gero Verheyen (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), 52.
18. World Bank, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Modalities of Conditionality (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2005), iii.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/409401114615847489/conditionalitymodalities7-21.pdf
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fiduciary responsibility to see to it that there is transparency and liability with respect to
development priorities and economic efficiency associated with the use of its funds.19
According to those on the left who are critical, conditionality is an instrument of power.
The global social context referred to by Epstein in the theory of international institutional
influence is pyramidal. The Washington consensus created a global hierarchical structure in
which a few developed nations in the West use financial resources, through multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank, to control the political economy of less-developed nations in
the self-interest of the Western political elites and financial giants. This perception implies that
conditionality is an instrument of control of the political economy of less-developed nations.
Conditionality gives the Bank the means to “induce reform in very poor policy environments,”
Paul Collier and David Dollar say, by “ignor[ing] domestic politics.”20
Despite such a position against conditionality, the Bank still sees the policy in its various
types as a way to safeguard trust and foster both transparency and accountability in Bank’s
financial assistance to countries. An elaboration on each of these types of policies is necessary to
understand fully how conditionality and ownership relate and how conditions attached to
development assistance can shape resource management.
Types of Conditionality
Daniel Cabello, Filka Sekulova, and Douwe Schmidt list four types of World Bank
conditionality: fiduciary, process, policy or economic policy, and outcome.21 The content of and
distinctions between these forms of conditionality provide the framework for donor or lender and

19. Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines, The World Bank: Structure and Policies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 55-56.
20. Paul Collier and David Dollar, Development Effectiveness: What have we Learnt? (Washington DC:
World Bank, 1999), 325-326.
21. Daniel Cabello, Filka Sekulova and Douwe Schmidt, World Bank Conditionality: Poor Deal for Poor
Countries, ed. Joshua Craze (Amsterdam: A SEED Europe, 2008), 8.
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beneficiary or borrower expectations in the application of requirements associated with financial
resources. These four forms of conditionality deserve expanded discussion.
Fiduciary Conditionality: Safeguarding Trust
According to David Shand, fiduciary conditionality is based on a trilogy of risk: the risk
that the funds disbursed by the Bank will be diverted and used for unknown and unauthorized
uses by the financial resources recipient nation, the risk that there may be no timely report given
to the Bank on the use of aid or loans, and the risk that although the funds reach the budget, the
expenditure is not in conformity with the approved budget.22 By use of ex ante fiduciary
conditionality, the Bank mitigates these risks and safeguards its trust in the realization of the
terms of funds disbursement. Trust is a subject that has attracted significant discourse based on
different disciplinary assumptions, especially in psychology, economics, and sociology.
Psychologists often center on attributes of a trusting party (trustor) and a party to be
trusted (trustee). They also focus on internal cognitions that result from personal attributes.
Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman contend that trust is not risk but the
willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of a trustee, knowing that such actions
may be impossible to monitor or control.23 This distinction between trust and risk is very
important to an understanding of the Bank’s operations with respect to development through
conditionality. Whenever the Bank makes financial disbursements to a country, the trilogy of
risks mentioned above is involved. Yet, this risk does not stop the Bank from providing
development assistance. The arguments of liberalists earlier stated cannot fully explain why the

22. David Shand, Managing Fiduciary Issues in Budget Support Operations (Cape Town: World Bank,
2005), 5-6.
23. Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organizational
Trust,” The Academy of Management 20, no.3 (July 1995): 712. http://www.jstor.org/stable/258792 (accessed April
23, 2011).
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Bank, despite the risks, still proceeds to provide financial aid. Nations may receive the aid and
yet refuse to be controlled by the Bank, as the case of Zimbabwe shows.
On page 390 of Jane Kanchense’s Zimbabwe’s Child Brides: Using Participatory Action
to Unleash Human Potential (published in 2008 by Trafford Publishing, Victoria), Kanchense
documents how Zimbabwe, after receiving financial assistance from the Bank for many years,
has refused to be controlled by the World Bank by resisting the Bank’s structural adjustment
programs. Following economic sanctions from the Bank and the IMF, Zimbabwe retaliated by
refusing to pay its debt to the Bank. Therefore, how can the Bank, conscious of the risky
possibility that there can be this resistance from countries, still provide development aid and
loans? The answer is trust: trust that the assistance will be used for the intended purpose; the
finances will reach the budget of the development program approved by the Bank; or trust in the
Bank itself – that if a nation resists as Zimbabwe did, the Bank will have the power to sanction
the country on the international scene. The Bank’s development assistance, therefore, involves a
mix of risk and trust. Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman have discussed
this mix from a psychological perspective in their dyadic model of trust.
The World Bank’s propensity or general willingness to trust its financial resources
recipient varies. This variation depends on the trustworthiness of the country that receives a loan
or assistance from the Bank. In psychological terms, the Bank perceives a country as trustworthy
before it provides development loans to the nation. At one end, therefore, there is the Bank as a
“trustor,” and at the other end there is the country as the trustee. Hence, the psychology-based
model of trust can be said to be dyadic. Such a model of dyadic trust reproduced in Figure 2 is
useful to analyze the psychological dimension of fiduciary conditionality.
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Factors of Trustee
Trustworthiness
Ability

Perceived Risk
Competence

Benevolence

Trust

Risk Taking
in Relation

Willingness

Outcomes

Values
Integrity
Trustor’s
Propensity

Figure 2. A dyadic model of trust based on attributes of trustors and trustees.
Source: Drawn with analytical data from Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David
Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” The Academy of Management 20,
no.3 (July 1995), figure 1.
Trustee trustworthiness is determined by three factors: ability, benevolence, and integrity.
Ability is the competence that the recipient nation has in the area, project, or program for which
the Bank makes financial disbursement to be used. Benevolence refers to the willingness of the
trustee to show good behavior to the trustor. With respect to fiduciary conditionality,
benevolence is the willingness of the trustee to be good to the Bank by duly complying with the
conditions of the financial resource disbursement. Integrity depends on the values of the trustee
that may cause it to either collaborate with or resist a trustor in this trust relationship.
The extent to which a country is receptive to Bank’s policies provides a perspective for
understanding this matrix. The Bank, as Robert H. Wade observes, upholds capitalism as a core
value in economic progress.24 Thus, if the political economy of a country favors capitalism, then

24. Robert Hunter Wade, “US Hegemony and the World Bank: The Fight over People and Ideas,” Review
of International political Economy 9, no.2 (Summer 2002): 2003.
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the Bank perceives the country as a low-risk nation. Considering that trust is inversely
proportional to risk, the Bank will likely take the risk to disburse funds with fewer and less
intense conditions to the country that upholds capitalism. If the country resists the Bank’s
capitalist political economy, then the lending risk is high and the level of trust is low.
Consequently, the Bank will present more radical conditions before disbursing funds.25 It seems
that it is in the nature of humankind to act in this way, for as Thomas Hobbes contends in his
behaviorist philosophy of trust:
Trust is a Passion proceeding from the Belief of him from whom we expect or hope for
Good, so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same
Good: as Distrust or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself
by other Means. And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust, is
manifest from this, that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way, but when he
mistrusteth that the first will not hold.26

25. First generation conditionality in Cameroon provides a good historical example of this dynamic matrix
of trust relationship between the country and the Bank. In a spirit of trust in Cameroon, the World Bank on June 2,
1986, noted that there were “no gross or obvious problems which threaten Cameroon’s financial or economic stability,
its creditworthiness, or the stability of its financial system to perform adequately on a day to day basis” (World Bank
1986). Nevertheless, after 1987, the Bank distrusted the economic stakes in the nation because of a global oil-price
crisis that presented Cameroon with a challenge to embrace “more rapid and more radical” adjustment of the nation’s
economy, and structural changes that will create jobs for the country’s rising population (World Bank 1987).
The government of Cameroon refused to trust the Bank in these demands by preferring to hang unto the
prebendalism. Rciahrd A. Joseph defines prebendalism as “patterns of political behavior which rest on the justifying
principle that offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office holders as well as their
reference or support group. The official public purpose of the office becomes a secondary concern, however much
that purpose might have been originally cited in its creation or during the periodic competition to fill it.” Richard A.
Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 68.
Piet Konings narrates that in the 1970s and 1980s, prebendalism was the principal political sociology of the
government of President Paul Biya in Cameroon. In this phenomenon, the nation was under a neopatrimonial state of
hegemonic alliances of elite groups who had access to state resources, and used this access to cement themselves to
the existing government power structure. The structural reforms that the Bank called for implied that these elites would
lose control of the state economic and political apparatus. Therefore, the elites sought to preserve their interest in the
status quo by fiercely contesting economic and political liberalization. Consequently, the government initially
preferred to initiate its own reforms in such a way that the self-interest of the elites would not be affected. It was only
when Cameroon’s economy continued to decline that the government was forced to succumb to structural changes as
conditions for receiving World Bank loans. Piet Konings, Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: Civil Society and
Agro-Industry in Anglophone Cameroon’s Plantation Economy (Bamenda: Langaa, 2011), 133-135.
26. Thomas Hobbes, “Human Nature,” The Moral and Political Works of Thomas Hobbes of Matmesbury
(London: Oxford University Press, 1750), 19.
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The rational and “belief of him” perspectives of trust indicate that trust is not an irrational
act; rather, it involves rational calculations that consider the probability of trustee openness to the
values of a trustor. According to Oliver E. Williamson, this view of trust is based on a common
assumption in economics, namely, that rational choice is the principa maxima of human
behavior.27 Mar Zey notes that the reason for this assumption is that human beings are
intentional and purposive individuals who always make logical decisions that give them the
greatest satisfaction and fulfill their self-interest.28 The sociologists Ivan Marková, Per Linell,
and Alex Gillespie, however, deny that the essence of trust can be “probabilistic calculus.”29
Rather, from a sociological perspective, they view trust as a relational concept because attempts
to subject trust to purely quantifiable probability empty trust of the context without trust cannot
exist. To replace the elements of dynamism and relation in trust with calculated control reduces
trust to a “static abstract category and it turns it into a statistical entity.”30
The above stated understandings of trust in the disciplines of psychology, economics, and
sociology are not totally at odds with each other. Satisfactory outcome at the end of the dyadic
model of trust proposed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman represents utility. Zey observes that
“expected utility theory” is simply the label that psychologists give to what economists term
“rational choice theory.” Nor are social context and rational choice absolutely at daggers drawn
with one another. Victor Nee argues that although methodological holism in sociology has
attempted to alienate choice-theoretic approach from relational concepts in institutional

27. Oliver E. Williamson, “Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,” Journal of Law and
Economics 36, no.1 (April 1993): 458.
28. Mary Zey, Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications Inc., 1998), 1.
29. Ivana Marková, Per Linell, and Alex Gillespie, “Trust and Distrust in Society,” in Trust and Distrust:
Sociocultural Perspectives, ed. Ivana Marková and Alex Gillespie (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing Inc.,
2008), 6.
30. Ivana Marková, Per Linell, and Alex Gillespie, “Trust and Distrust in Society,” 7.
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paradigms, historians have insinuated that Max Weber was right in contending that both
rationality and tradition play significant roles in institutional change. Tradition is not simply the
conservation of values and a modus operandi of institutions but the transmission of the values
and modes from one group to another in time. This transmission is not indifferent to the
prevailing circumstances in which institutions exist. Consequently, in the relationship between
past and present generations of people, the present generation calculates the applicability and
workability of the values and modes of past generations in their present context. Therefore, in
institutional change, there is a combination of tradition in which a new generation socially relates
with past generations through the transmission of values and modes, and rationality in which the
new generation calculates the trustworthiness of these elements and adapts them to present
circumstances. Thus, Nee suggests that instead of pitting rational choice against social relations
that may not involve self-interest rationalizations, “a more constructive approach is to model the
reciprocal interaction between purposive action and social structure.”31
One finds this approach in Denise M. Rousseau, Sim B. Sitkin, and Ronald S. Burt who
define trust as “a psychological state comprising intention to accept vulnerability based upon
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”32 The state is psychological; the
positive expectations are economics-based; and sociology stresses the interactive context in
which the behavior of others manifests. In fiduciary conditionality, the Bank is in a mental state
of reservation as to how the funds it gives to a country will be used. Nevertheless, it proceeds to
disburse the funds because it has a positive expectation of how the funds will be applied to
31. Victor Nee, “Sources of the New Institutionalism,” in The New Institutionalism in Sociology, ed. Mary
C. Brinton and Victor Nee (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), 4-5.
32. In this definition of trust, “intention to accept vulnerability” is a contribution made by psychology to the
understanding of trust. Economists insists on “positive expectations of the intentions,” while sociologists demand
that the “behavior of another” be included in the comprehension of trust.
Denise M. Rousseau, Sim B. Sitkin, Ronald S. Burt, and Colin Camerer, “Not So Different After All: A CrossDiscipline View of Trust,” The Academy of Management Review 23, no.3 (July 1998): 395.
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development programs. In disbursing the funds, the Bank enters into social interaction with the
recipient country. Having provided financial assistance, the Bank becomes vulnerable to how the
country will actually use the funds in the process of policy implementation. In order not to
become a victim in this vulnerability, the Bank uses process conditionality to direct the process
of policy implementation.
Process Conditionality
The material constitution of process conditionality is the management of funds under the
umbrella of good governance. According to Cabello, Sekulova, and Scmidt, process
conditionality assures that necessary institutions that build national capacity to ensure proper
financial management exist in a country before the Bank lends or gives money to the nation 33 or
that there be good governance in a country as prerequisite to receive financial aid from the Bank.
According to the Bank’s staff, P. Landell-Mills and I. Serageldin, governance denotes
“how people are ruled and how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated. It refers to a
nation’s system of politics and how this functions in relation to public administration and law.
Thus, the concept of governance goes beyond that of government to include a political
dimension.”34 This definition, however, does not address what it means to speak of governance
as “good”. Ved P. Nanda avows that “good governance” is a phenomenon with an imprecise
meaning, yet it is a determinant in the selective process of the Bank’s provision of aids.35 Nanda
attempts to resolve this crisis of meaning by the via negativa: he enumerates elements the Bank
thinks must be absent for there to be good governance. These are corruption, nepotism,

33. Cabello, Sekulova, and Schmidt, World Bank Conditionality, 8.
34. P. Landell-Mills and I. Serageldin. Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development
Economics (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992, 304.
Marquette, H. 2001. Corruption, democracy, and the World Bank. Crime Law and Social Change 36 (4): 395
35. Ved P. Nanda, “The ‘Good Governance’ Concept Revisited,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 603 (January 2006), Abstract. Accessed October 19, 2013.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097772
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bureaucracy, and mismanagement. Willem H. Buiter appeals to the principles of governance
devoid of these elements to explain what process conditionality stands for, or is aimed at. These
principles are accountability, transparency, and democratic participation.36
The Bank defines accountability as “the ability of citizens, civil society, and the private
sector to scrutinize public institutions and governments and to hold them to account. This
includes, ultimately, the opportunity to change leaders by democratic means.”37 Joseph Basset
sheds light on this rather redundant definition38 by speaking of accountability with respect to
process conditionality. He says that accountability is “the principle that government decisionmakers in a democracy ought to be more answerable to the people for their actions . . . . [It
involves] more than merely the tacit concern of the governed. It implies both mechanisms for the
active monitoring of public officials and the means for enforcing public expectations.”39 In
accountability, citizens attain voice: they interrogate the management of public goods in the
hands of their government, and they take democratic actions such as political elections to declare
judgment on the way the government manages public affairs. Deepa Narayan avows that through
such actions, citizens and stakeholders influence and control public life.40
The Bank adopts an interdisciplinary perspective in looking at accountability as a
principle of good governance. Accountability as an act of citizens’ empowerment is not only
political. Inasmuch as there is politics because human beings are rational and social beings,
accountability is also social. Social accountability involves association, resources, voice,

36. Willem Buiter, “'Country Ownership': A Term Whose Time Has Gone,” Development in Practice 17,
no. 4/5 (August 2007): 650-651. Accessed January 28, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548264
37. World Bank, Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 20.
38. In defining “Accountability,” the Bank recourses to the stem of the word itself, namely, “account”.
39. Joseph Bassette, ed. “Political Accountability,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and
Behavioral Sciences, vol.1, ed. N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (Oxford, UK: Pergamon, 2001), 38-39.
40. Deepa Narayan, “Conceptual Framework and Methodological Challenges,” in Measuring
Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives ed. Deepa Narayan (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 5.
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information, and negotiation. Association is ethical – precisely, it involves the freedom of
citizens to come together and function as groups. The availability of resources is an economic
concern in the function of associations. Groups must mobilize resources in order to attain their
objectives of holding government accountable through voice. Voice is power! For there to be
accountability in governance, there has to be a two-way communication between governors and
the governed, each being able to formulate and express opinions. To exercise voice, people need
access to information that they can use in the process of negotiation. Negotiation is not only a
socio-political act in the sense that it entertains spaces of debate and dialogue but also a legal
one; it likewise involves the rules of the game that must be formulated to ensure orderly
participation of stakeholders.41 Bank staffers Ana Bellver, Marcos Mediburu, and Maria Poli
observe that transparency is necessary to hold government accountable for its operations.42
The Bank speaks of transparency in terms of progress reviews and assurance that there is
conformity between the reviews and country conditions and capacities.43 For ActionAid
International, to speak of transparency simply in terms of project reviews and the correctness of
the reviews is to limit the scope of transparency.”44 Therefore, one must have recourse to other
sources to understand more broadly what the Bank perceives in terms of transparency as a
function of process conditionality. One such source is the works of World Bank staff member

41. Sina Odugbemi, “Public Opinion, the Public Sphere, and Quality of Governance,” in Governance
Reform: Under Real World Conditions, ed. Sina Odugbemi and Thomas Jacobson (Washington, DC: The World
Bank, 2008), 24.
42. Anna Bellver, Marcos Meduburu and Maria Poli, “Strengthening Transparency and Accountability
through Access to Information,” En Breve no. 131 (July 2008): 1.
En Breve or “en breve” is a publication of the Knowledge and Learning Team of the Operations Services
Department of the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank.
43. World Bank, Review of World Bank conditionality, 31.
44. ActionAid International, What Progress? Shadow Review of World Bank Conditionality (2006), 17.
Accessed November 14, 2013. http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/what_progress.pdf
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Lorenzo Bertolini who underlines clarity, autonomy, participation, and open access to
information as the key attributes of transparency as understood by the Bank.45
To the Bank, clarity means plainly stating the rules or laws, roles, and institutional
objectives in unambiguous terms. It involves providing a legislative framework and
straightforward guidelines for public resource management.46 Bertolini notes that autonomy
implies that regulators should be insulated and protected from interference from policy makers
and special interest groups. Participation emphasizes that stakeholders should be part of the
development decision-making process.47 Shah observes that external stakeholders (such as the
Bank) often chose to enhance national government transparency by amplifying the voice of
citizens in order to reduce corruption.48
Open access to information is a way of promoting voice. In fact, in physics a transparent
object is that which light can pass through and one can see through. In the philosophy of
knowledge, to “see a point” is to be enlightened or to possess knowledge about a thing. In
discussing Del McWhorter’s assertion that the power of identity recognition arises from
knowledge about bodies and pleasures, Charles E. Scott agrees with McWhorter that information
as the data of knowledge gives voice.49 Francis Trix and Andrea Sankar forcefully hold the same
view as Charles, namely, that both the absence of information and the presence of incorrect
information deny voice.50 These assertions highlight the importance of the availability and access

45. Lorenzo Bertolini, “How to Improve Regulatory Transparency,” Gridlines no.11 (July 2006): 1-2.
46. World Bank, Republic of Uzbekistan Assessment of the Primary Health Care Reform: Transparency,
Accountability and Effectiveness, Report no. 44530-UZ (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2009), nos. 14 and 31.
47. Bertolini, “How to Improve Regulatory Transparency,” 2.
48. Anwar Shah, “Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country Circumstances,” in Performance
Accountability and Combating Corruption ed. Anwar Shah (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 250.
49. Charles E. Scott, “The Birth of an Identity: A Response to Del McWhorter's Bodies and Pleasures,”
Hypatia 16, no.3 (Summer 2001): 108. Accessed January 2, 2014. Project Muse.
50. Frances Trix and Andrea Sankar, “Women's Voices and Experiences of the Hill-Thomas Hearings,”
American Anthropologist 100, no. 1 (March 1998): 38. Accessed January 2, 2014. www.jstor.org/stable/682806
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to information in giving voice to a people. Thus, Cohen insists that transparency ensures that
government shares with citizens the information that citizens deserve to know and that citizens
can organize themselves to pry information from government in the struggle to let their voices be
heard. Voice is an expression of power. Cohen also avows that transparency is not just about
information among government, stakeholders, and civil society; it also extends to the exercise of
voice in acts of power such as free and fair political elections. With respect to economics,
transparency demands that citizens should voice their rational choices in budgetary processes,
and their voices should count.51 However, it is worth giving a note of caution here: as it will be
shown later, to the Bank, the voice of citizens does not always mean the voice of “all” citizens.
The Bank uses different process conditionality measures to achieve transparency. Bruni
notes the Bank’s demand that there exist a legal framework and institutions necessary to enable
access to information between government and citizens in a country.52 Peters highlights the
presence of performance data as part of this information. These data provide the material for
scrutinizing government bureaucracy.53 John K. Johnson and F. Rick Stapenhurst iterate the role
of independent observers (IO) that are often commissions and international not-for profit
organizations that act as anticorruption bodies. From an institutional perspective, the Bank opts
for the decentralization of government so as to deprive bureaucrats the monopoly of power over
the civil society.54

51. David Cohen, “The Power of Organized Citizens: Fighting Public Integrity,” Governance Reform under
Real-World Conditions, ed. Sina Odugbemi and Thomas Jacobson (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008), 299300.
52. Michele Bruni, “Participation, Transparency, and Consensus Building in Support of Public Sector
Reform: The Case of Nicaragua,” in Governance Reform under Real-World Conditions, 343.
53. B. Guy Peters, “Performance-Based Accountabiltiy,” in Performance Accountability and Combating
Corruption, 15.
54. John K. Johnson and F. Rick Stapenhurst, “The Growth of Parliamentary Budget Offices,” in
Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption, 296.
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Speaking of decentralization, Purohit notes that when local governments have real power,
the authenticity and confidence with which they treat local interest issues and the checks that
they place on higher levels of governance give room for the reign of transparency. For gains to
outweigh costs in decentralization, local government must have the authority to generate and use
revenue (at least some) at the local level, and it must also be answerable to higher levels of
government. Electronic or E-government is one of the ways of reducing costs because it reduces
delays in the transmission of papers. It does not only reduce documents processing cost but
makes more available information that the public can access easily.55 Shah highlights the
economic tool for transparency: trade liberalization reduces circumstances in which government
officials can indiscriminately exercise unaccountable discretionary powers.56 Trade
liberalization is the heart of economic policy conditionality.
Economic Policy Conditionality: The Reign of Neoliberalism
Economic policy conditionality involves the World Bank’s prescription of conditions
that will favor economic “progress” in countries that turn to the Bank for financial aid and loans.
It hinges on “the Warren thesis”: the view, as Hettne explains, that economic progress is the
essence of the development of human society.57 The human being as homo oeconomicus is at the
center of this world. Ward Edwards iterates that such an “economic man” is assumed in the
rational choice theory to be completely informed, infinitely sensitive, and rational.58 Being
completely informed, homo oeconomicus knows both causes and outcome (predictable and real).
Being infinitely sensitive, economic man pays full attention to a continuous chain of alternatives
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that lie before him or her in the decision-making process. Being rational, homo oeconomicus
orders everything towards the maximization of utility.59
Robert A. Nisbet suggests that this conception of the human being in a society that
progresses because of the dynamic interaction of the forces of demand and supply is both the
foundation and visio summa of classical economics. In such a society, change is cumulative,
purposeful, marginalist, and directional.60 As classical economics suffers from what Ben Fine
describes as “esoteric and intellectually bankrupt technicism,”61 that has the risk of being out of
touch with the pace of necessary changes in the history of political economy, the World Bank
from the middle of the twentieth century endorsed the modernization theory that is attuned, as
Susan Engel notes, with the development ideology of the institution’s founders.62 The theory
presents societal development as evolutionary. This concept of evolution, Anthony D. Smith
notes, implies that the growth of human society is a concrete historical process that involves the
formulation and implementation of certain policies.63 In the provisions of the operational statutes
of the World Bank, decisions associated with such policies (precisely economic) must be
dissociated from all other spheres of a country’s life – “Only economic considerations shall be
relevant to their [Bank’s directors] decisions.”64

59. Ward Edwards, “The Theory of Decision Making,” 381.
60. Robert Nisbet, Social Change and History (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 7.
61. Ben Fine, “Development as Zombieconomics in the Age of Neoliberalism,” Third World Quarterly 30,
no.5 (2009): 886. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590902959073 accessed January 23, 2014
62. Susan Engel, The World Bank and the post-Washington Consensus in Vietnam and Indonesia:
Inheritance of Loss (Abington, OX: Routledge, 2010), 43.
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Tony Killick – from a global overview65 – and Festus Ugboaja Ohaegbulum – with
specific focus on Africa66 – observe that from the 1980s to the 1990s, neoliberalism became the
theoretical framework that has guided the Bank in prioritizing economics in its development
works. Economic policy conditionality, therefore, has aimed at fostering the reign of
neoliberalism. John William, however, suggests that to the Bank neoliberalism was simply a rebranding of neoclassical progressive or modern evolutionary development with greater emphasis
on the virtues of the market and the vices of the state in economic growth.
As a theory of political and economic practices, “neoliberalism,” writes David Harvey,
“proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial
freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual
liberty, free markets and free trade.”67 Practically, the Bank has used Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) to enforce this theory, which thrives on the self-interest psychology, social
individualism, legal deregulation, and political cooperation with financial institutions in order to
realize economic “growth.” Caroline A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Molly Bauer enumerate
the elements of SAPs: upholding privatization as a way of rolling back the state from steering the
national economy and enforcing the rapid removal of barriers to trade, capital flows, and foreign
direct investment (FDI) as a means of encouraging the reign of the global free market. It also
involves tight monetary policies such as increased interest rates, fiscal austerity measures like
currency devaluation and higher taxes, and economic contraction policies such as reduction in
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government services and subsidies. These measures are intended to correct disequilibrium in
balance of payments and to promote liberal economies, which Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer
define as “those in which governments play a very limited role in both the internal workings of
the economy (for example, setting wage rates) as well as in international economic activity (for
example, setting import quotas).”68 John Pender notes that the relationship between SAPs and
economic policy conditionality is in the fact that nations have to accept and implement these
neoliberal economic standards as requirements to receive loans or financial assistance from the
Bank.69 However, if the Bank is not satisfied that these measures have actually led to the
liberalization of a country’s economy, the Bank does not ipso facto withdraw its assistance. At
times, it proceeds with provision of aid within the context of outcome conditionality.
Outcome Conditionality: Focusing on Results
The nature of outcome conditionality can be understood via distinctions between it and
other types of conditionalities. As discussed above, fiduciary conditionality is based on variables
before the beginning of financial assistance for development projects. Economic conditionality is
concerned with input variables at the beginning of a development program. Both fiduciary
conditionality and economic conditionality are at the terminus ad quo part of a development
program or project. Process conditionality is concerned with the qualities such as transparency,
accountability, decentralization, and democracy in the course of program or project
implementation. Distinct from these three types of conditionality, outcome conditionality is at
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the terminus ad quem. It focuses on the results of policy implementation; in this regard, Angelina
Fisher also calls it “performance-based conditionality.”70
While the variables in fiduciary conditionality are discretionary (either the Bank takes the
risk to loan or avoids the risk), the variables in process conditionality are functional (the
government, for instance, should decentralized). While the variables in economic conditionality
are prescriptive (for example, the Bank tells a government either to privatize state parastatals or
forfeit financial aid from the Bank), those of outcome conditionality are inferential. That is, in
outcome conditionality, the assessment of outcome determines what conditions the borrowing
country needs to fulfill in order to proceed with the possibility of realizing ultimate policy
objectives. In outcome conditionality, the Bank infers the content and nature of financial
assistance conditions from the fate of previous policy implementation. Thus, fiduciary and
economic conditionalities look forward; process conditionality looks at the present; and outcome
conditionality looks backward. Figure 3 shows the ideal conditionality continuum.

Fiduciary
Conditionality

Process
Conditionality

Terminus ad quo of
development
program/project

Economic Conditionality

Terminus ad quem
of development
program/project

Outcome Conditionality

Broken line indicates that the donor/lender may take or not take the risk to give funds.
The fill nature of this line indicates that donor/lender has disbursed funds, the
development program/project has been initiated, and it is in progress.
Figure 3. A time-based representation of the ideal conditionality continuum
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Outcome conditionality occurs at the terminus ad quem. Following this position, Andrew
Mold picks up a succinct definition of outcome conditionality from the European Commission’s
EC Budget Support: An Innovative Approach to Conditionality, wherein outcome conditionality
is defined as providing aid on the basis of “progress attained for a number of indicators, mainly
of results in the reduction of aspects of poverty directly linked to service delivery and of public
financial management.”71
The rationale of this conditionality is multifold. Firstly, it covers the prediction gaps
associated with the imperfections of economic equations. The flexibility of human behavior in
the marketplace makes it difficult to predict with absolute certainty that specific inputs will
always yield particular results. A combination of structural adjustment measures, for example,
does not imply that balance of payments will be corrected exactly as predicted by Bank
economists. The economic outlook of a society is always influenced by non-economic forces –
geographical, political, cultural, and sociological - which do not occur and influence economics
in ways that can be determined by calculus. For example, following the application of structural
adjustment programs, the Global South has had disastrous economic results because of what
John Gatar terms “exogenous factors” that include natural disasters and political unrest, just to
name a few.72 Outcome conditionality serves should-in-case purpose against the presence and
influence of these non-economic factors. For example: in case natural disasters disorient the
progress of a program from desired outcome, then outcome conditionality reorients the current
results towards ultimate desired goals.
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Secondly, outcome conditionality enhances another policy of the World Bank (and IMF),
namely, country ownership. Quoting the IMF, Anna Ivanova writes that
outcome-based conditionality is viewed as “reducing the perception of micromanagement of countries’ economic policies and helping foster and build on country
ownership, by giving the authorities greater flexibility to design their own economic
policies. Drawing on the risk-sharing result of the standard principal-agent model with
unobservable action . . . making financing conditional on outcome would strengthen the
incentives of the authorities to achieve a better outcome.73
Ivanova’s words suggest that there are psychological, political, and moral dimensions to
outcome conditionality. Theodore Panayotou observes that developing countries perceive
conditionality with disdain because they consider it an infringement on their national
sovereignty.74 Outcome conditionality plays a game with the mind: it assuages such perception
by according to national governments the opportunity not to stick absolutely unto donorprescribed policy conditions but also to determine what policies they can pursue as a
consequence of the results of prior implementation of the Bank’s conditioned-development
programs. This determination is an act of political empowerment in which governments envision
themselves as being in control of the fate of their countries. Being in control likewise puts
governments in positions of moral responsibility for the chain of outcomes. Therefore, the
government as agent of policy implementation and collaborator with aid donor in the process of
policy design, enters into “risk-sharing” with the Bank as donor or principal policy-maker. To
grasp clearly this moral culpability and political empowerment of government in relation to
conditionality, one needs to pay closer attention to what country ownership is.
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Country Ownership: “A Term Whose Time has Gone?”
In discussing the implications of country ownership of reform programs for
conditionality, Omotunde E.G. Johnson claims:
‘Ownership’ from the perspective of the typical citizen, we believe, is more about (1) the
right of the country representatives to be heard in the process of diagnosis and program
design, and (2) the freedom and ability of the country to choose the program to be
implemented, without coercion, than about (3) who designs the program. Of course,
many among the educated elites in civil societies in “aid” recipient countries would
prefer that their nationals design the programs, if they have the requisite technical skills;
they would also want, over time, their own nationals to be fully equipped to design every
program. In the short term to medium term, however, these same elites will not typically
insist on a program being designed by local persons for the program to be deemed locally
owned. Hence, there is no necessary correlation between the degree of active country
participation in the program design (relative to participation of outsiders) and the extent
or degree of country ownership. In brief, the line of causation runs from country
ownership (ex ante) to participation in design and finally to implementation.75
Following the above dismissal of the designer of programs as an issue of concern in
country ownership, Omotunde thinks that there is country ownership when both citizens and
non-citizens believe that the representative of a country freely choose whatever program they
implement, and as such the full responsibility of the outcome of the program rests with the
country.76 The question that this definition does not answer is: who designs the program that the
country representatives chose? From the above claim, Omotunde may think that this question is
unimportant. However, the serious problem with his position is a belief in the power of
epistemology that obliterates the historical and political affirmation of sovereignty that has
characterized nations’ critique of conditionality vis-à-vis ownership. That is, Omotunde insists
on the value of expert knowledge to the point where he dismisses the fact that one reason that
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governments have insisted on “owning” their development programs is that they perceive World
Bank’s conditionality as a thread to their sovereignty.
Omotunde’s conception of ownership reflects a problem of clearly and completely stating
the essence of ownership that has plagued many scholars and policy analysts – a crisis that led
Buiter to assert that country ownership of Bank policies is a term “Whose time has gone”
because “it has been used and abused in so many ways to gloss over realities deemed uncomfortable
and to create a pleasant buzz to distract the uninformed and unwary, that it now needs to be put out of
its misery.”77 To redeem country ownership from “misery,” one will certainly need to look more
broadly at the different dimensions of ownership. To resolve the problem of incomplete expression

of “what constitutes adequate ownership,” 78 John H. Johnson and Sulaiman S. Wasty formulate
four dimensions of ownership that display the interdisciplinary richness of the term. These
dimensions include “locus of initiative,” intellectual conviction, political support, and
stakeholder involvement. It is necessary to expand on each of these dimensions because they
interact with the different types of conditionality.
Dimensions of Ownership
On page two of Borrower Ownership, Johnson and Wasty vividly enumerate the four
dimensions of ownership. The first dimension actualized in the Bank’s operations touches on the
political economy of planning: the “locus of initiative,” which focuses on who designs a
program, the extent of collaboration in the formulation and implementation of programs, and
whether reluctance based on arguments such as the demands of conditionality cause the Bank to
withhold the disbursement of funds to a country. The second dimension is psycho-
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epistemological: the “level of intellectual conviction among key policymakers,” which involves
the degree to which policy makers were in consensus about the nature and causes of problems,
the alternatives to resolve problems and the methodology to adopt in the problems solving
process. The third dimension is ethico-political: the “expression of political will by top
leadership” as evident in different political and moral statements and actions. Lastly, there is the
socio-political dimension: the “efforts toward consensus-building among constituencies” that is
often expressed in broad based citizen participation in campaigns to stimulate support,
participation, or resistance to certain programs.79
Johnson and Wasty’s articulation of the dimensions of ownership is preferable to that of
Omotunde because it expresses more expansively the ontological and functional complexities of
ownership. Furthermore, the Bank adopts Johnson and Wasty’s understanding of ownership as
the four criteria that one has to use to assess country ownership.80
However, as Janet Entwistle and Filippo Cavassini insinuate in assessing country
ownership of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs), Johnson and Wasty’s dimensional
elaboration of country ownership is difficult to operationalize because it fails to consider an
important external dimension, namely, ownership as a function of aid assistance from donors and
lenders such as the Bank.81 While one can conceptualize ownership as independent of aid
conditions, such is not the case in the real world of application. To use the words of Omotunde –
this is the “‘ultimate defining quality’ of country ownership”82 – that countries hardly ever act as
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they would “ideally” do under unrestricted liberty because they are affected by their own interest
and the behavior of other stakeholders in the enjoyment of their sovereign rights and in the
design and implementation of their own development policies.83 The Bank’s behavior, for
example, is visible in the prescriptions of conditions to financial aid and loans. Therefore,
ownership is not purely ownership in the practical world. Rather, it is modified by conditionality.
Also, because the Bank acknowledges its limitations in interfering in the sovereignty of nation
states, conditions attached to loans are not always fully implemented without the final decisions
resting with the country. In this regard, conditionality is also modified by ownership.
Consequently, what occurs in the real world is a combination of conditionality and ownership,84
wherein there is neither pure conditionality nor ideal ownership; rather, a heterozygous
phenomenon occurs in which there is both conditionality and ownership.
John Pander iterates the Bank’s claims in its Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP),
wherein the Bank posits that its CDP is not based on conditionality, “but on a relationship of
partnership between itself playing the re-positioned institutional role of ‘Knowledge Bank,’ and
the borrowing government, which has full ‘ownership’ of policies it chooses to pursue.”85
However, he also contends that conditionality still “constrains genuine ownership of
development policy.”86 Nevertheless, the prevailing Bank’s view of the relationship between
conditionality and ownership is neither in terms of conditionality as a constrain on ownership,
nor as a substitute for it. Rather conditionality is a policy that enhances countries’ ownership of
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agreements that they enter into with the Bank in order to receive financial assistance from the
Bank. Therefore, there is a sort of policy conduciveness in which conditionality and ownership
create space for their co-existence.
I contend theoretically in the next chapter that this space is one of interaction between
the two policies in development programs. In this interaction, each policy undergoes a
modification, and the result is a hybrid of the two. As will be evident in the discussion in the
chapter, the basic ontological and functional foundation of this hybridization is that the hybrid is
neither conditionality nor ownership – it has an identity of its own even if it resulted from
conditionality and ownership – and it does not advocate what conditionality and ownership
distintively advocate. Rather, this hybrid embodies certain elements of conditionality and
excludes others, and it embraces certain features of ownership and excludes others. I call this
hybrid the Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid (COH), and I label the process by which it is
formed as Conditionality-Ownership Hybridization (COHZN).
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CHAPTER 3
CONDITIONALITY-OWNERSHIP HYBRIDIZATION
As evident from the discussion in chapter one, conditionality and ownership are
conceptually distinct. However, in their application to real life issues, there is an interaction
between the two policies in order to attain some degree of stability in the process of policy
implementation – as opposed to total conflict and tension – for the purpose of resource
management and societal development. This state of stability involves both win-win and lossloss: the Bank and the financial aid recipient country both retain some of what they desire
through conditionality and ownership respectively; at the same time, they lose some of their
contentions in the process of interactions between these two policies. This is what I refer to as
the hybrid state.
Therefore, I define the Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid (COH) as the real-world
combined actualization of conditionality and ownership in which the nature and contentions of
one is modified interactively and pragmatically by the other in the transition from policy
conceptualization to policy outcome. The result of this policy fusion is not distinct, multiple
policies, but one phenomenon with its own unique aspects. These aspects, following the
dimensions of ownership, also involve the locus of policy formulation, intellectual conviction,
public or political support from leaders, and consensus among stakeholder constituencies,
structures, or institutions. The aspects can be viewed as distinct; however, in the life of the COH,
they are integrated into one species – the COH. The COH may have different accidental features
– as genes combine differently in different individual hybrid animals – but the COH remains a
hybrid in its own species identity. A discussion of these four aspects or tetradium is necessary to
unveil the identity of the COH.
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Locus of Policy Formulation
As earlier discussed, providers of funds are the agencies such as the World Bank that
formulate financial disbursement conditions, and they insist on the fiduciary necessity to posit
these conditions based on the need for trust, accountability, and transparency in the use of public
funds by borrower countries to implement a variety of policies and programs, and to carry out
development projects. According to ActionAid International, country ownership means that these
“policies are home grown, developed by countries themselves . . . .”1 This conception of
ownership is to some extent theoretically akin to that of the IMF, which places in the hands of
the country the responsibility to formulate and carry out policies.2 The position finds theoretical
support in the “Harmon Doctrine” or the absolute sovereignty theory, which says that a state or
country has absolute rights to do as it pleases within its territory.3 Johan G. Lammers insists that
this theory is subject to significant criticisms.4 Today’s globalized world is characterized, as
Betrand de la Chapelle observes, by a complex, inclusive, and dynamic transnational network
necessary to govern the “global polity.” 5 In this regard, the view that the locus of initiative in
country ownership is exclusively country-centered does not receive practical support from the
World Bank.6

1. ActionAid International, “What Progress? A Shadow Review of World Bank Conditionality,” 2006, 8.
ActionAid International. http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/what_progress.pdf (accessed December 31,
2013).
2. International Monetary Fund, Strengthening Country Ownership of Fund-Supported Programs
(Washington DC: IMF, 2001), 6.
3. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Recueil des Cours (Maubeuge, France: Triangle Blue, 2002), 432.
4. Johan Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhooff Publishers,
1984), 96.
5. Bertrand de la Chapelle, “Beyond Absolute Sovereignty: New Foundations for Global Polity” (analytical
paper prepared for the Global Environmental Governance: The Post-Johannesburg Agenda conference, Yale Center
for Environmental Law and Policy, New Haven, CT, October 23-25, 2003), 3.
http://www.yale.edu/gegdialogue/docs/dialogue/oct03/papers/07De%20La%20Chapelle%20final.pdf (accessed
December 2, 2013).
6. ActionAid International, for example, laments that following a more narrow definition of ownership in
practice, the World Bank has sidelined Pakistan as a nation that has to design its own development policies and

66

Linking ownership to conditionality, the Bank posits a limited concept of ownership in
which there is country ownership when a nation has a sound track record of implementing Bank
designed policies. Koeberle and Walliser iterate that the Bank unequivocally asserts that where
government designed policies are insufficient or weak, the Bank, instead of substituting
conditionality for ownership, prefers not to disburse development loans.7 The Bank, therefore,
acts as an economic institution that relies on information and social capital to determine adverse
selection (the kind of risk that an intent-borrower constitutes) and to avoid moral hazard.
Gleaning from Maitreesh Ghatak and Timothy W. Guinnanne, one can say that the reason why
the issue of moral hazard arises in the conditionality-ownership hybrid is that “the lender cannot
stipulate perfectly how the borrower should run the project.”8 Conscious of such limitation, the
Bank engages in what Judith Teichman terms “social learning:” “a deliberate attempt to adjust
goals and techniques of policy in response to past experiences and new information.”9 For this
end, the World Bank’s technical experts assist the borrower country in designing reform policies
and safeguarding the interest of the Bank. Paul Collier suggests that the implications of
conditionality put governments in positions in which they have to pay heed to the epistemic
insights provided by these technical experts so as to receive future assistance from the Bank. In
effect, there is a dépassement of the theory of absolute sovereignty to the community of interests
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theory that makes joint management the means of attaining the best possible administration.10
Thus, while the locus of the design of aid conditions is the Bank and the place where
development policies are designed in the light of ownership is theoretically the sovereign
country, the locus of initiative in the COH is both the World Bank and the finance recipient
country.
There is a point that is worth mentioning here, namely the place of power in this locus of
initiative of the COH. One of the mating animals from which a hybrid is produced may be more
powerful than the other, but that does not mean that they do not come together in the
reproductive process. The social context of conditionality admits power differential; however, it
is necessary to note different types of power. The anthropologist Eric R. Wolf, on page five of
his Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Governance (that was published in 1999 by the University
of California Press, Berkeley, California) identifies four different types of power. The first is
power in the sense that Friedrich Nietzsche used it. It refers to potency or capability that inheres
in individuals. The second is the ego power, or the ability of an ego to impose itself on others in
social action. This is the sort of power that Epstein talked about in terms of the “social context”.
The third power is exhibitive, that is, it involves individuals actually using the power they
possesses to control the context of interactions. The last power that Wolf talks about is tactical
power, by which institutions and groups circumscribe the actions of other individuals and groups
within determinate settings. From these four different modes of power, what is present in the
locus of initiative is the first mode – power as potency. There is power that inheres in the Bank
as an institution and in the government as a body polity. The power may differ in degree, but this
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difference is insignificant in determining whether the Bank or government participates in policy
formulation. In this participation, both the Bank and the government are simultaneously powerful
and weak; they have potency, but they cannot do without the other. The Bank cannot force the
government to sign a document else be extinct. The earlier cited case of Zimbabwe is an example
of this weakness of the Bank. The government also cannot force the Bank to sign a document. It
is at the level of the other three aspects of the COH such as intellectual conviction, canvassing
for political support, and stakeholders participation that the ability of an ego to impose its will on
the other sets; that one party begins to control the context of interaction; and that institutions and
bodies tactically organize and circumscribe the actions of others. In the aspect of the locus of
initiative, power is simply substantive – it inheres in the institution and body polity, but it is not
functional as is the case with other dimensions such as intellectual conviction.
Intellectual Conviction
To speak of country ownership in terms of intellectual conviction is to adopt an
anthropomorphic approach in the sense that intellectual conviction looks at a country as a human
being with an intellect, and therefore as one who can have mental attitudes such as conviction.
Katherine Marshall observes that for many years, the Bank sorely relied on development aid
conditionality as it perceived it without realizing that in the absence of conviction and
determination on the part of a country to act, development programs cannot be realized. The
main reason being that the Bank cannot go into a country and take over its control as a
government does. For example, the Bank can exert pressure on a government to privatize state
parastatals, but the Bank cannot put the parastatal on bid in the market. Only the government can
do that. The Bank can insist that IOs exist in the management of a sector in a country, but the
government can control the management terrain in such a way that the IOs are incapacitated to
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work. Without the determination of a country to act, the Bank can act and sanction, but its
development agenda will not be realized if a country absolutely resists. Consequently, in the last
two decades, the Bank has realized that there cannot be country ownership unless the country
believes that development policies and programs that it proposes together with the Bank will lead
to the realization of objectives.11 In his discourse on religious experience, William James posits
that belief is the intellectual function of cognizing, of being certain and convicted of a reality or
an idea.12 This understanding of belief seems to limit conviction to the mental sphere.
However, “intellectual conviction” is not restricted to mental attitude. As Alan R. White
notes, it is also a “disposition to behave”13 that entails a sense of moral commitment to both
ideology and practice. Gilbert Ryle lists five elements that are associated with this commitment:
the unhesitating utterance of what one is convinced of; other things that one says regularly,
relevantly and without hesitation presuppose what one is convinced of; one is ready to persuade
others to accept one’s conviction; where relevant, one behaves in accordance with one’s
conviction; and when one acts inconsistently with the object of one’s conviction, one feels a
certain lack of satisfaction, and thus seeks reforms.14
The above theoretical insight on intellectual conviction provides a framework for
understanding the Bank’s affirmation that country ownership is necessary to realize both policy
and institutional change in a nation.15 Through intellectual conviction, the country becomes

11. Katherine Marshall, The World Bank: From Reconstruction to Development to Equity ed. Thomas G.
Weiss (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 16.
12. William James, “The Psychology of Belief,” Mind 14, no.55 (July 1889): 321.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2247316 Accessed May 14, 2013.
13. Alan R. White, “Knowledge without Conviction,” Mind 86, no.342 (April 1977): 228.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253714 Accessed June 6, 2013.
14. Gilbert Ryle, “Conscience and Moral Convictions,” Analysis 7, no.2 (June 1940): 33.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326509 Accessed January 24, 2014.
15. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively: Applying the Comprehensive
Development Framework Principles: A Staff Guide (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), 7.

70

committed to the change – propounds it in its utterances; where relevant, basis other national
actions on the change; convinces other stakeholders in the country to accept reforms; and takes
action to realize the change and to reverse the state of affairs where such action is inconsistent
with the commitments of the country. This same attitude of adequate understanding and support
of a program also applies to the Bank in the pursuance of conditionality. In this regard, the Bank
unequivocally insists that although country ownership is necessary for development, it is not
sufficient in order for a country to receive assistance from the Bank. “Due diligence,” the Bank
tells its staff, “requires that the Bank be satisfied that any program, project or policy for which it
provides support will, in the Bank’s experience and judgment, contribute in a sustainable way to
the country’s development.”16 Although the Bank, as a general rule, defers to the knowledge
based intellectual conviction of a country, the Bank calls upon its staff to withhold such
deference where “Bank’s formal policies, technical knowledge, or international experience
strongly indicate otherwise.”17 Therefore, country ownership is never absolute; it is not a
guarantee that a country will have its way with the Bank with respect to policies that the nation is
intellectually convicted of. Rather, the Bank’s intellectual conviction associated with
conditionality, as a formal policy, sets opposing restrictions to the totality of ownership.
However, the fact that a country may be intellectually convicted of its ideologies, policies
and programs appropriate to its national context that may be in opposition to the content of Bank
assistance conditions does not imply that there cannot be agreement in the intellectual
convictions of the aid donor and recipient. Intellectual conviction vis-à-vis country ownership is
not a negation of flexibility on the part of a state’s commitment to country ownership. From a
political perspective, Charles Lockhart says that

16. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively, 7.
17. Ibid.
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[t]hese two stances, flexibility and commitment, do not always create conflicting
demands on the statesman; they may be complementary as well. An exceptionally clever
statesman may manage to appear committed to his adversary but achieve this appearance
in a subtle fashion which allows him to maintain options without the danger of losing
face . . . . A more common complementary relationship between flexibility and
commitment arises when the statesman is committed but wishes for the purpose of
furthering his commitment to appear flexible to the adversary. Creating doubt in the
adversary's mind about the time, place, and nature of a general's plans is an important
element of surprise attacks, for instance.18
The World Bank also admits of the union of commitment and flexibility in the
conditionality-ownership relationship. The Bank affirms “country dialogue and joint analytic
work” as the modus operandi in bridging the gap between intellectual conviction and
implementation of policies as Bank and nation desire within country contexts.19 Paul Nystrom
and William Starbuck avow that dialogue involves a hermeneutical process of unlearning what
one holds onto in a way that overcomes blindness and rigidity, without eliminating one’s core
values.20 Therefore, what really results from the dialogue-interaction between the country that is
intellectually convicted of its policies and programs and the Bank that is likewise intellectually
convicted of conditionality is a sort of what Donald Schon labels, “dynamic conservatism.”
Dynamic conservatism is both the tendency and the actuality of hanging onto what one is
convinced of, yet being open to reform in some areas.21
David Laskin beautifully explains the dynamic conservatism by reference to Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s 1939 radio address: if one must speak of a conservative as the man with two legs on
the ground who has never learnt how to walk, then one must also talk of the radical (progressive)

18. Charles Lockhart, “Flexibility and Commitment in International Conflicts,” International Studies
Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Dec., 1978): 547. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600166 Accessed June 24, 2013.
19. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively, 9.
20. Paul Nystrom and William Starbuck, “To Avoid Organizational Crisis, Unlearn” Organizational
Dynamics (Spring 1984): 60-61.
21. Donald Schon, Beyond the Stable State (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1973), 32.
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as the man whose both feet are walking “in the air.”22 Dynamic conservatism bridges these
extremes. It is dynamic because it avoids well-conceived and planned schemes of resistance, so
as to give room for connections among special interests. It is conservative because it retains the
inertial or the core issues of a social system. Historically, it was America’s President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s economic philosophy, which purported to continue chief New Deal programs
combined with the attempt to reform certain aspects of the federal government.23 Les Metcalfe is
of the opinion that reforms must cope with this policy philosophy through a process of beliefs
and attitudes transformation within a unit such as a political body. 24
At the heart of this transformation in beliefs and attitudes is the ability of the Bank to
trust the development knowledge of the financial assistance recipient government, and the
potency of the country to trust the knowledge that the Bank possesses. Truly, fiduciary
conditionality raises questions of whether the Bank trusts the country to work with it in
implementing policies and programs. However, the fact that the same Bank propounds
ownership puts on the Bank the onus to trust the borrowing government’s conviction of
development policies that can work in the country. That is, the fact that the Bank supports the
policy of ownership indicates the Bank’s acceptance of its own limitation in knowledge and
power to implement development programs in a country based only on conditionality measures;
the Bank, therefore, must have some trust in the knowledge and power that a government
possesses in order to foster country ownership. This trust does not mean that the Bank forfeits all
rationalizations that determine whether it can trust a borrower, but that in dynamic conservatism,

22. David Laskin, “Introduction,” in George Sledes, The Great Thoughts (New York Ballantine Books,
1996), vii.
23. Laskin, “Introduction,” vii.
24. Les Metcalfe, “Conviction Politics and Dynamic Conservatism: Mrs. Thatcher’s Managerial
Revolution,” International Political Science Review 14, no. 4 (October 1993): 354.
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trust is transformed: it is a transformation from a self-centered, individualistic psychological
factor that favors exclusive reliance on one’s self-interest and intellectual conviction, to what
John Dunn envisions as “a modality of action” that gives room for people to “cope with
uncertainty over time.”25
If one labels the stakeholders’ knowledge as light and the uncertainty they have to deal
with as darkness, then dynamic conservatism means that the Bank and the country stand in the
zone between light and darkness in which they each have some power, but are not absolutely in
control of the policy-making process. In a beautiful figurative imagery, Guido Möllering
captures this paradox of light and darkness or known and unknown with respect to trust in his
review of Piotr Sztompka’s book, titled Trust: A Sociological Theory:
Finally, consider once more the sculpture of the ‘Illuminated Crowd’ shown on the cover
of the book. One interpretation was that the light guides the crowd away from darkness;
and Sztompka’s theory suggests that trust can be part of the classic source enlightenment
– human reason. Related to this is the notion of human control: if trust is functionally and
instrumentally rational, then it is also controlling and controlled. However, is there not
another view that conceptualizes trust as a response to the impossibility of control? In the
words of Lewis and Weigert (1985:976): ‘Trust begins where prediction ends’. This is
not the place to begin an alternative theory of trust, so let me just hint at what it might
entail by referring to another interpretation of Mason’s sculpture (one close to the artist’s
own interpretation). The illuminated crowd does not move towards the light, but
undulates between light and darkness along ‘degrees of emotion’: illumination, hope,
interest, hilarity, irritation, fear, sickness, hunger, violence, murder, and death (Edwards
1994:163). Trust is a phenomenon that embodies this human condition: the availability of
some knowledge (light) on the one hand, and ‘the power of the unknown [shadows] in
everyday reality’ (Edwards 1994:164) on the other.26
In this zone of light and darkness, of courage to act and fear of the other’s control of
policy implementation circumstances, of hope that things can be done in one’s interest and
irritation at the other’s different priorities, and of the opposition between one’s intellectual

25. John Dunn, “Trust and Political Agency,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed.
Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 74.
26. Guido Mollering, “Book Review of P. Sztompka,Trust: A Sociological Theory,” in Organization
Studies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,1999), 116.
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conviction and the other’s beliefs, the paradoxical nature of trust transforms conditionality and
ownership. For the sake of action, the Bank journeys from the lack of trust that characterizes
fiduciary conditionality to the readiness to trust the borrowing country without losing these two
values: there should be transparency and liability in the use of financial aid provided by the Bank
for the development course that the disbursement was made. It is a journey into the hybridization
of conditionality in the provision of loans and a country’s intellectual conviction of the national
context that should configure the use of funds. The knowledge associated with intellectual
conviction as a dimension of country ownership also undergoes a transformation. As the light of
a country’s knowledge comes in contact with some other knowledge from the Bank, the country
finds that it both knows and does not know – the country enters the moment of dusk and dawn
where daylight and darkness mix. This is the moment of trust – where the intellectual conviction
associated with country ownership causes the nation to hang onto the country’s values, and, yet,
pushes the nation to open up to technical development knowledge from the Bank (knowledge
that the Bank enforces through conditionality). It is the moment of conditionality-ownership
hybridization. When this hybrid occurs under trust, national political leaders can support policies
that the country proposes together with the Bank.
Political Leadership and Support
The most salient meaning of country ownership posited by the World Bank is this:
“[c]ountry ownership means that there is sufficient political support within a country to
implement its development strategy, including the projects, programs, and policies for which
external partners provide assistance”27 When Tony Killick talks of country ownership as
“government ownership,” he is really speaking of this one dimension of country ownership,

27. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively, 8.
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namely, political support.28 The Bank does not provide an explicit definition of what it means by
“political support.” This is not an unfamiliar phenomenon. David Easton observes that often, the
expression “political support” is used very loosely without a technical meaning. However, he
formulates political support as a politics-based attitude by which persons favorably, unfavorably,
positively, or negatively orient themselves to an object.29
Political support is necessary based on an argument that has been made by
anthropologists such as David Mosse. Although most international institutions are creations of
sovereign states, people so easily question the authority that these institutions without sovereign
territorial boundaries (such as the Bank) have over them because human beings do not naturally
devolve from such institutions.30 Amidst this legitimacy crisis,31 Samuel P. Huntington observes
that in world politics, “every international organization at some points finds itself
limited by the very principle which gives it being.”32 Conscious of this problem, the Bank has to
rely on political support from within sovereign nations in order to realize development policies
and programs.
Anna Ivanova et al. in an econometric study of variables that affect the implementation
of IMF-supported programs found that political support is negatively affected by “strong vested
interests” in the legislative organs of countries (parliament, for example) with respect to
development policies, by lack of political cohesion around development programs, by weak
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bureaucracy, and by ethnic divisions.33 Conditionality serves to overcome these negativities.
Transparency and accountability enforced in process conditionality, for example, combats vested
interests. Also, it is hard to deny totally Joseph Stiglitz’s note that through economic
conditionality, the Bank address not only market failures but also the ability of political
institutions to reverse the path of economic downtown.34 One can read in this Stiglitz’s
observation that although the World Bank’s Article of Agreement demands that the Bank should
function without consideration for country politics, the combination of political support
dimension of ownership and economic conditionality indicates that economics and politics
cannot be separated in the implementation of policies at country level.35 Ironically, the Bank is
aware of this fact as evident in this statement from its report team: “Macroeconomic reforms, for
example, can increase pressure and support for SOE [State-Owned Enterprise] reform, thus
making it politically more desirable.”36
This inalienability of economics from politics at the level of policy implementation is
supported by public choice theory and a government’s fiduciary responsibility to its citizens.
Michan Andrew Connor iterates that this theory emphasizes that despite people’s rational
choices to maximize economic efficiency and productivity (as Frederick Taylor affirmed in
scientific management theory), people also bond and act together according to shared
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preferences (the position advanced by political sociology).37 With respect to the responsibility
that governments have to the citizens, M. Stephen Weatherford argues that one central element is
often the national macroeconomic outlook. A government as a political unit that fails to take
seriously economic issues is at the risk of being disempowered by the citizens.38 Thus, the
economic conditionality of the Bank has currency value to a government: it can either purchase
favor or defeat from the citizens. Consequently, the application of economic conditionality will
be out of touch with human sociopolitical behavior if the Bank fails to appreciate country politics
as a determinant in the support given to development programs.
It can, therefore, be said that while country ownership seeks political support as means
for policy implementation and conditionality aims at transparency, accountability, efficiency and
productivity as ends, the COH embraces political support as means to realize the four-fold ends.
Political support, nevertheless, is not limited to the political leaders of a country. Politics is
primarily the life of the polis – the city. Citizens are part of this life, and they hold the power to
sanction their political leaders through ballot boxes and serious political strikes. Thus, the civil
society is also part of the body that needs to grant political support to development policies and
programs. Multiple institutions and representatives of the civil society such as common initiative
groups (NGOs) need to become part of the process of policy formulation and implementation. In
this regard, the COH embodies stakeholder consensus.
Stakeholders Consensus
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In 1999, the World Bank’s president, James Wolfensohn (1995-2005), called for the
inclusion and active involvement of not only borrowing governments, but also their civil
societies and other international agencies in the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) of the
Bank. To the Bank, this represented a “major shift” – a shift from ownership confused as
government ownership to country ownership.39 There is country ownership when governments
receive sufficient support for strategies among stakeholders such as ministries, parliament,
subnational governments, civil society organizations, and private sector groups.40 A people are
psychologically more comfortable with reforms and they feel morally responsible for the reforms
when their participation matters in the design and implementation of programs. Paul Victor
Obeng, speaking of the benefits of the involvement of all parties in the implementation of SAPS
in Ghana, supports this contention: “as a people,” he writes, “we achieved a sense of ownership
of the economic program, a greater acceptance of the consequences of the program, and a
stronger commitment to implement.”41
This advocacy for the involvement of multiple civil society stakeholders in the private
and public sectors indicates the Bank’s embrace of an idea that historians have held for many
years. This idea, as Rick Szostak summarizes it, is that institutional changes have not resulted
from a single innovator working in isolation.42 Rather, it has involved multiple groups working
together. In this regard, a common recommendation within the Bank has been that such entities
as corporations should work in partnership with not-for-profit organizations, governments, and
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local communities so as to promote ownership.43 However, differences in perception of policy
outcome have often provoked resentment and discontent among stakeholders.
Buiter observes that the main factor that often influences stakeholders’ attitudes with
respect to country ownership is the outcome of the implementation of ideas, policies, and
programs within the context of the prevailing circumstances of a country.44 As James A.
Sheppherd and James K. McNulty posit in the decision affect theory of psychology, differences
in outcome perception can disband stakeholders because people feel displeasure when outcome
is not consistent with their intentions and contributions and elated when outcome is in accord
with their desires.45 Conditionality can resolve this risk of stakeholders falling apart by creating
common ground between them from two perspectives: one advanced by the public policies
enhancement-incentive theory, and the other proposed by the dialogue network theory.
The enhancement-incentive theory proposed by Buiter touches on the role of process and
outcome conditionalities in enhancing ownership. Conditionality, especially process
conditionality through its emphasis on transparency, representativeness, and democratic
participation does not oppose ownership; rather, conditionality fosters ownership. Furthermore,
stakeholders can jointly participate in policy formulation and development programs
implementation when they are motivated by common incentive. Conditionality, therefore, can
serve as “a means of enhancing the incentive compatibility and thus the credibility of
programs.”46 Program incentives are the concerns in outcome conditionality. This implies that
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outcome conditionality can be the impetus pushing stakeholders to find common ground in their
incentives, and it can make stakeholders look at development programs as credible. When there
is a sense of commonality in incentives and the belief that programs are worthy of
implementation, stakeholders will likely continue to work together.
How can working together possibly result from what people believe? Marily Motz in
pointing out the usefulness of folklore scholarship asserts that folklore is not useful simply
because it collects and categorizes what people believe, but it explores what people do with what
they believe. She speaks of the link between the mental category of belief and the action
category of belief in words that can be simply put: if one wants to know what people really
believe, one simply needs to see what they do in their daily life of interpersonal and intergroup
interaction.47 This means that there is a link between belief and action. Motz suggests that belief
provides the framework for creating the point of interaction between individuals, groups, and
ideas – in the context of this work, different development stakeholders.
Interaction does not imply homogenization. Stakeholders do not have to homogenize
their beliefs before development policy common ground can be possible among them. In fact, as
theologians and philosophers have long posited, unity neither implies sameness nor denies
diversity. In a religious analysis of Keith Dixon’s sociology of belief, Robert W. Friedrichs
makes it clear that the ultimate product at the point of intersection between participants in a
belief system is reasonable paradox48 - in which though there is disagreement, there is also
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common ground that allows the parties to work together. In this regard, although a country’s
intellectual conviction in the objectives of a program (ownership) may not fully fall in line with
what it thinks the Bank believes in and prescribes as policy conditions to arrive at certain
outcome (conditionality), the objectives of the program can provide a unifying point in this
belief-system paradox that gives room for policies to be implemented.
According to the dialogue network postulated by Christopher Gilbert, Andrew Powell,
and David Vines, development epistemic insights from the Bank create an understanding of
“good policies” outcome between stakeholders, thereby bridging them.49 There is what Herbert
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow call, “system of relations”50 when interested parties approach
outcome with a sense of dynamic conservatism in a process of dialogue and joint work that is
characterized by fidelity to core values and learning and unlearning.
From the foregoing discussion, country ownership involves stakeholder involvement and
collaboration in the implementation of ideologies, policies, and programs. Conditionality
measures can bond stakeholders and cause them to work together – after all, failure to do so will
be grounds for the stakeholders not to benefit from financial aid from the Bank. This reasoning,
nevertheless, must be made with some reservations.
In a contention that brings conditionality into stakeholders’ involvement in country
ownership, the Bank holds that to consult with different stakeholders in the design of
development strategies does not mean that they all have to be of one mind before policies and
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programs are adopted and implemented. According to the World Bank, in the presence of
opposition from some stakeholder in the midst of “sufficient support” from other stakeholders
within and outside the government, governments can proceed with major policy reforms. In fact,
in moments where different factions arise within the government itself because of World Bank’s
development policies, branches of government that support the Bank can proceed with the
reforms. 51
This position of the Bank is the way Bank controls the context of the abilities of people to
exhibit their own capabilities. To employ Wolf’s types of power, this position is the Bank’s
tactical power at work; it is the institution’s acknowledgement that the common public sphere is
not always common. The implication behind this standpoint is that despite the need for
collaboration between stakeholders to realize development programs, the Bank does not want
subaltern counterpublics. Nancy Fraser posits this concept of subaltern counterpublics, which
affirms that in a system of social inequality, it is common for subordinated members to group
themselves, circulate discourses against the dominant group, and formulate interpretations that
will defend their own interests, identities, and needs and enable them to achieve voice.52 This is
akin to the contention that Chester Bernard makes in his inducements-contribution theory of
organizational systems. Temkins notes that in this theory, Bernard posits that when
organizational members and institutions do not make gains from what they contribute to a system
(such as a body polity), they are most likely to withdraw their participation in, and consent to
issues, of the system.53
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Newton’s second law of thermodynamics provides insight on how to proceed amidst such
discontent. According to this law, energy is continuously dissipated in a system, generating
randomness or disorder (entropy) until the system attains equilibrium. In order to get work done,
entropy has to be kept constantly low; otherwise, as Erwin Schrödinger notes, there will arise
“the dangerous state of maximum entropy, which is death”54 of the system. To prevent this state
of disintegration in social systems, conflicts, and strains that generate entropy must be reduced to
a minimum or eliminated. How to do this can be extrapolated from the relative entropy function
of a multinomial system involving different entities or stakeholders (N), which Robert K.
Niven55 defines as
s

Ƞ = − ∑ 𝑃𝑖ln
𝑖=1

𝑃𝑖
𝑞𝑖

where s is the equiprobable to which an entity is allocated, the most probable position in the
asymptotic limit ( N→ ∞), where Pi is the probability of an entity in the ith category, qi is the
source or ‘prior’ probability of category i, and ln is the natural logarithm. From the above
equation, one way to control the magnitude or amount of entropy is to limit N. Therefore,
dissatisfied groups or individuals whose actions generate entropy need to be minimized or kept
out of the system in order for the system to functional steadily or for work to be done.
However, if N becomes zero, the system will cease to function. For perpetual existence,
Bernard advises that organization structures and systems (such as a system of government and
national stakeholders constructed to formulate and implement development programs) should
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turn to the world outside of the system for resources.56 This solution is reflected in the Bank’s
assertion that where there is sufficient support from international agencies such as the Bank itself
for the government to proceed with a development plan, the latter can do so.
To proceed as such really means that the government becomes a subaltern that embraces
the Bank’s conditionality measures and forsakes certain voices of contest arising from within the
country, so as to receive assistance from the Bank. In this vein, “ownership” seems to be a term
that masks the Bank’s control of the public sphere in which the Bank interacts with national
governments. As a subaltern, the Cameroonian governmnet formulates a counterpublic discourse
in terms such as “majorité Presidentielle.” Oben Timothy Mbuagbo and Robert Mbe Akoko
iterate that this term is “equally designed to forestall any alternative political discourse on the
future of Cameroon.”57 Through national media outlets such as the national daily newspaper,
namely the Cameroon Tribune, and the national radio and television, namely the Cameroon
Radio and Television (CRTV), which are owned and controlled by the government, the
government defines itself in the public sphere as the “majority” that has the voice and power to
shape the national political economy irrespective of conditionality measures. In cases where the
Bank calls for the democratization of resource management in the country, for example, such
democratization has to favor the interest of the majority – the presidential majority.
Considering that some of the opposition that the government might face can, and easily
arises from some citizens disgruntled over the functioning of the government, the Bank calls on
governments to “link participatory processes to permanent institutions, i.e., to favor

56. Tompkins, Organization Theory and Public Management, 191.
57. Oben Timithy Mbuagbo and Robert Mbe Ekoko, “Roll-Back: Democratization and Social
Fragmentation in Cameroon,” Nordic Journal of African-Studies 13, no. 1 (2004): 6. Accessed April 3, 2014.
http://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/vol13num1/mbuagbo.pdf
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institutionalized rather than ad hoc processes that might undermine such institutions.”58 As a
function of prior action conditionality, the Bank often requires that governments put in place
such institutions before it can receive financial assistance from the international lender.59Under
the banner of country ownership, this demand from the Bank does not stop the country from
adding other institutions to what the Bank deems most essential. The resultant of this addition
cannot be in contradiction with what the Bank desires. Stakeholders who find it difficult to cope
with the Bank’s procedures and therefore prefer to function in a way at odds with the Bank, for
example, will be eliminated from the pool of stakeholders in the COH. It is worth noting that the
Bank and other international donors with which it cooperates in funding development projects
are also categorized as stakeholders. Conditionality, therefore, is a policy that selects bona fide
(with respect to Bank’s ideas and procedures) stakeholders from the total pull of n stakeholders
included under the policy of ownership.
From the above discussion, the COH with respect to stakeholders’ inclusion in the
country-Bank formulation and implementation of development policies and programs can be
mathematically represented in the following equations:
Ownership (𝑥1 ) = 𝑥11 + 𝑥11 *+ 𝑥12 + 𝑥13 + 𝑥13 * + 𝑥14 + 𝑥15 + 𝑥15 * + 𝑥16 + 𝑥17 ----------------------------(1)
Conditionality (𝑥2 ) = 𝑥11 + 𝑥13 * + 𝑥15 * -------------------------------------------------------------------(2)
Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid or COH (x) = 𝑥11 + 𝑥12 + 𝑥13 * + 𝑥14 + 𝑥15 * + 𝑥16 + 𝑥17 + E ------(3)
Now, COH involves changes in 𝑥1 (𝑑𝑥1 ) because of the influence of 𝑥2 on 𝑥1
58. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively,10.
59. The mainly agriculture-based Women-in-Development (WID) project in the Gambia is an example of
this requirement. In 1987, the World Bank began the design of this project, and it insisted on the participation of
non-governmental organizations in the government led process to realize the project. One of the conditions that the
Bank attached to the project loan was that the government must have a "statement of government policy” that is
satisfactory to the Bank with respect to the participation of institutions as NGOs. See Deborah A. Bräutigam and
Monique Segarra, “Difficult Partnerships: The World Bank, States, and NGOs,” Latin American Politics and
Society, 49, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 159. Accessed January 1, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30130827
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Also, COH involves changes in 𝑥2 (𝑑𝑥2 ) because of the influence of 𝑥1 on 𝑥2
The interaction between 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 is also influenced by the special interests of groups (E), and
the presence and interests of groups in the interaction can neither be strictly attributed to the
Bank nor the financial aid recipient country.
∴ COH → f (𝑑𝑥1 + 𝑑𝑥2 + E)
i.e x = 𝑑𝑥1 + 𝑑𝑥2 + E---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(4)
Where 𝑥11 , 𝑥11 *, 𝑥12 , 𝑥13 , 𝑥13 *, 𝑥14 , 𝑥15 , 𝑥15 *, 𝑥16 and 𝑥17 are different stakeholders;
𝑑𝑥1 and 𝑑𝑥2 are changes in country ownership and conditionality respectively; and
𝑥11 and 𝑥11 * conflict and are mutually exclusive, just as 𝑥13 and 𝑥13 *, and 𝑥15 and 𝑥15 *
From the discussion in the second chapter of this work, conditionality and country
ownership can be theoretically conceived and analyzed as distinct and alienable from each other.
The present chapter shows that they are also theoretically related as hybrids. Inasmuch as these
are policies that affect international development in practice, this hybrid cannot be restricted to
the sphere of intellectual conceptualization. It has to be part of the practical reality or actions that
are part of the Bank’s development function. One such action is forest management as in the case
of Cameroon. In other words, in the management of forest in Cameroon, the modified forms of
conditionality and ownership are operationalized together as conditionality-ownership hybrid.
The next chapter focuses on this implementation, presence, or practical operationalization of the
COH in the management of forests in Cameroon.
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CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONDITIONALITY-OWNERSHIP HYBRID IN
CAMEROON’S FOREST SECTOR
While conditionality and country ownership are two distinct and theoretically alienable
Bank development policies, chapter three contended that these policies are related as COH.
Table 2 displays these differences and hybridization.
Table 2. Differences between conditionality and ownership and their hybridization.
Feature
Policies designer

Conditionality
World Bank

Intellectual
conviction

The Bank possesses
the technical
knowledge and
experience to manage
resources and
develop human
society

Political Support

Political support is
aimed at causing
country to support
Bank’s motion to
ensure transparency,
accountability, and
neoliberal efficiency
and productivity in
resource management
Policies’ design and
implementation
proceeds with
consensus among
stakeholders in
accord with the
Bank’s vision and
interest

Stakeholders
Consensus

Ownership
Country

COH
Bank

World
and
country
Governments are
Through dynamic
most knowledgeable
conservatism and social
about their national
learning, both the Bank
contexts, and can best and national
determine what
governments have
managerial and
some trust in each
development policies other’s knowledge of
suit their countries
policies appropriate to
manage resources and
develop a country.
Political support is
Political support aimed
aimed at causing
at uniting political
political factions to
factions over laws and
unite over specific
policies to ensure
managerial laws and
transparency,
policies
accountability, and
neoliberal efficiency
and productivity in
resource management
Policies’ design and
Policies’ design and
implementation
implementation
proceeds with
proceeds with selective
consensus among
inclusion of
stakeholders in
stakeholders who are in
accord with the
consensus with country
country government’s governments’ vision
vision and interest
and interest and
without hindrance to
the interest and vision
of the Bank
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In the last three decades, the management of forest resources in Cameroon has involved
the application of each of these features of the COH. First, both the World Bank and the
government of Cameroon designed the laws and policies that direct the management of forest in
the country. Second, in the design and implementation of forest management laws and policies,
the Bank and the Cameroonian government embraced dynamic conservatism and social learning.
Third, in the process of designing and applying the laws and policies, political support remained
and remains very necessary to foster transparency, accountability, the neoliberal model of
efficiency (absolute freedom of the market) and the neoliberal paradigm of productivity
(ceaseless accumulation of capital) in the forest sector. Lastly, both the design and
implementation of the laws and policies governing forest management in Cameroon involved,
and continue to involve, selective inclusion of stakeholders. Forest management in Cameroon
involves the application of the COH in all its four dimensions.
Designers of Forest Management Laws and Policies
The principles, regulations, and course of action that govern the management of forest in
Cameroon today are explicitly enshrined in, and one can infer them from the Cameroon Forest
Policy of 1993 and Law no. 94/01 of 20 January 1994.1 The enactment of this law goes beyond
absolute country sovereignty, and it shows the Bank’s limitation in policy stipulation. Rather, it
involves both the Bank’s and the Cameroonian government’s jointly making policies and laws in
accordance with the locus of policy formulation dimension of the COH. Speaking of the parties
involved in the formulation of the articles of this law, the political anthropologist Peter Geschiere
says, “it is clear that this law carries the signature of the World Bank . . . . The Cameroon

1. The forest policy designed by the Cameroon government and published in 1993 served as the foundation
for drafting the 1994 Forest Law of the country. The 1993 policy was a revision of the 1981 forest management law
with the intention of aligning forest management in the country to Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Summit.
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legislative institutions – notably the parliament – only accepted the law after prolonged
resistance and under heavy pressure of the World Bank with financial sanctions.”2
Geschiere’s observation indicates that the Bank used conditionality as a policy leverage
to influence the design of this law. However, what does it mean to say that Cameroon only
“accepted” the law after conditionality threats from the Bank? Does it mean the Cameroonian
government was simply a passive recipient of the law that played no role in the design of the
forest management regulations and policies? One must be skeptical about responding to this
second question in the affirmative, because Forest Monitor refers to the role of the Bank in
designing the forest management regulations and policies as “assistance”.3 Assistance places the
primary responsibility of policy formulation in the hands of the Cameroon government and puts
the Bank and the government on the platform of collaboration. Assistance suggests that the
government of Cameroon was actively involved in formulating the law and polices. Therefore, to
respond to what “acceptance” means in the context of the formulation of the 1994 Forest Law
and associated forest management policies, one must resort to the history of the enactment of the
law. This reference is important because, as Frederick A Olafson asserts, historical life or past
events provide a significant framework for a proper understanding of the content of
promulgations.4
In over one and a half decade prior to 1994, forest management in Cameroon was guided
by Forest Law No. 81-13 of 27 November, 1981. According to Eavan O’Halloran and Ferrer
Vicente, this law opened channels for government officials to practice corruption in forest
2. Peter Geschiere, “The 1994 Forest Law in Cameroon: Neoliberals Betting on “the” Community,” (2011):
478. Universitat van Amsterdam. Accessed October 2, 2013. http://dare.uva.nl/document/459421
3. Forests Monitor, “Part II: Country Profiles – Cameroon: Political, Social and Economic Framework.”
Forests Monitor. Accessed January 13, 2014. www.forestsmonitor.org/fr/reports/540539/549935
4. Frederick A. Olafson, “Hermeneutics: ‘Analytical’ and ‘Dialectical,’” History and Theory 25, no. 4
(December 1986): 30-31. Accessed January 10, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505130.
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management by failing to treat issues of conflict of interest in personnel who approved forest
exploitation licenses. It encouraged “quick-cut-and-run” as companies were only awarded
logging licenses for five years, and the government lost significant revenue from forest resources
because of low tax collection from the forest sector. In fact, the net effects of the law were waste
of resources, fast deforestation, low revenue to government from forest exploitation, and deep
inefficiencies and corruption in forest management.5 In 1994, the World Bank stepped in to
arrest this crisis as part of the SAPs package.
Cameroonian government’s protest of the conditions of first generation structural
adjustment programs at the end of the 1980s and in the early years of the 1990s (as explained in
footnote 73 herein) caused the Bank to distrust the government. With fiduciary conditionality at
stake, the Bank resorted to process conditionality – as Guiseppe Topa et al. note, by tying the
disbursement of the Economic Recovery Credit of 1994 and the third structural adjustment credit
(SAC-III) to the government’s reform of the management of the nations’ forest resources.6
Herwig Cleuren observes that the Bank soon found itself limited in using conditionality to
enforce reforms because “MPs [members of parliament] and other powerful people earning
money from the logging industry were not impressed by the World Bank’s threats to cancel
credit lines and pushed through their own will on crucial issues.”7

5. Eavan O’Halloran and Ferrer Vicente, The Evolution of Cameroon’s New Forestry Legal, Regulatory
and Taxation System (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), 1.
6. Guiseppe Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon: Experience and Evidence from a Decade of Reform
(Washington, DC, World Bank, 2009), 23.
SAC-III was a credit of US$180 million from the Bank to Cameroon. One of the six tranches in which this credit
was disbursed was tied to reforms in the country’s forest sector. See World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural
Adjustment Credit Project (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), no.12. Accessed February 1, 2014.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/04/693591/cameroon-third-structural-adjustment-credit-project
7. Herwig Cleuren, Paving the Road for Forest Destruction: Key Actors and Driving Forces of Tropical
Deforestation in Brazil, Ecuador and Cameroon (Leiden: Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian
Studies, 2001), 143. Universiteit Leiden. Accessed December 31, 2013.

https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/8389
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This initial phase of the reforms process underlined the difference between conditionality
and ownership. Cameroon government’s ownership of the reforms was further strengthened by
the vested interests of a foreign stakeholder, namely, the French government. For instance,
Frances Seymour and Navroz Dubash take note of the indications that in November 1993, the
French government lobbied the Cameroon parliament against the Bank’s reform agenda so as to
protect the interest of French logging companies against the Bank’s suggested log export ban.8
The MPs waged a media war against the Bank. In rebuttal, the Bank also engaged in a media
campaign to explain to Cameroonians the benefits of the law.9
The way out of this tense situation was negotiation. While the Bank’s forest and
environment team engaged in dialogue with the Cameroon government, another team in
Washington, DC began working on a new forest law. In the meantime, frustrated by the inability
of the Cameroon’s executive branch to persuade the nation’s parliament to formulate forest
management policies that were totally in line with the Bank’s draft, the Bank engaged in an
alternating-offer game with the government. Seymour and Dubash capture this game and its
raison d'être in these words:
The National Assembly’s [of Cameroon] amendments to the draft law were inconsistent
with what the World Bank considered to be sound forest policy. . . . The World Bank
realized that any effort to persuade the government to challenge the Assembly and
reverse the most serious changes in the law would be futile. It therefore asked MINEF
[Ministry of Environment and Forestry] to draft an Implementation Decree that would
interpret the law in line with the draft that the World Bank had originally agreed to. The
Ministry submitted a draft version of the decree to the World Bank in July 1994. The
World Bank rejected this version and several staff spent over a year revising the decree
line by line. A final version, acceptable to the Bank, was issued in August 1995.10

8. Frances Seymour and Navroz Dubash, The Right Conditions: The World Bank, Structural Adjustment,
and Forest Policy Reform, eds. Jake Brunner et al. (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2000), 66.
Accessed October 23, 2013. http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/iffeforest.pdf
9. Ibid., 62-64.
10. Ibid., 67-68.
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This vivid description of the negotiations between the Bank and the government indicates
that the laws and policies that govern forest management in Cameroon have the design hand of
the Bank and the Cameroon government in it. Furthermore, it shows that the law is not only
acceptable to the government but also to the Bank. Acceptance by the government implies
country ownership of the forest management policies and laws, and acceptance by the Bank
highlights that the Bank, through conditionality, was actively involved in the design of the forest
management policies and laws. In this application of the locus of policy formulation dimension
of the COH, both the government and Bank staff embraced dynamic conservatism and social
learning in designing the forest management laws and policies.
Dynamic Conservatism and Social Learning in Forest Management Policies and Laws
Formulation
In the era after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 3 to 14 June 1992, both the government of
Cameroon and the World Bank embraced dynamic conservatism and social learning in the
formulation of the policies and laws that govern the management of forest resources in
Cameroon. This is evident from two perspectives. Firstly, the 1993 forest management policies
propounded by the Cameroon government were intended to align forest management in the
country to Agenda 21 of the Conference.11 It is necessary to note that whoever accepted or
rejected Agenda 21 indirectly embraced or shunned respectively the World Bank because the
Bank’s 1991 forest paper and associated Operational Policy 4.36 of 1993 squared with the
principles of Agenda 21. The 1994 Forest Law was necessary because this alignment of policies
to Agenda 21 was not absolute: the government embraced certain tenets of the Agenda but failed

11. Agenda 21 is the product of the said conference that spells out the principles and course of action for
environmental sustainability. It was so called because it purported to be a global agenda for the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
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to include others. This represents dynamic conservatism and social learning in country
ownership. Secondly, while some Articles of the 1994 Forest Law are in conformity with the
values and knowledge of the Bank and the government alike, others are in conformity with the
mind of the government but at variance with the original mind of the Bank, or in line with the
mind of the Bank but at odds with that of the government. This also represents dynamic
conservatism and social learning in the COH. Each of these perspectives deserves close
examination.
The 1993 Forest Policy
The World Development Report 1992 published by the World Bank focused on the link
between development and the environment. In this report, the Bank pushed for sustainable
development by adopting the definition of “sustainability” in the Brundtland Commission’s
report of 1987. The Commission conceived sustainability as “[m]eeting the needs of the present
generation without compromising the needs of future generations.”12 Richard F. Kosobud notes
that as an essential aspect of this definition, the Bank added meeting the needs of the poor.
Having called attention to the needs of the poor, the Bank resorted to economic models to
environmental management such as pricing social costs, top-to-bottom command and control
technologies or regulations, and leaving control decisions to enterprises, communities, and
households on condition that governments levy Pigouvian taxes or issue effluent permits.13 The
same ideas of sustainability and cost-benefit approach to environmental management are present
in Agenda 21. Bruce Rich observes that as the Bank had the dominant knowledge and experience

12. World Bank, World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 8.
13. Richard F. Kosobud, review of World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment,
by International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic Development and Cultural Change 43, no. 2
(January 1995): 437-438.Accessed February 2, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1154507
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in global environmental governance through its Global Environment Facility (GEF) in the one to
two years prior to Rio, the agreements of the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro were key “in
strengthening the Bank’s role as money manager for the global environment.”14 Thus, it is
logical for the Bank to say that it ties its non-lending activities such as promotion of global
partnerships and initiatives, technical support, capacity building, and analytical and advisory
work across sectors and counties to support for the principles of Agenda 21.15
Although Cameroon was present at the UNCED and agreed to the principles of Agenda
21,16 it partially abandoned this Agenda by basing its 1993 forestry policy on the forest
management principles in the Guidelines on the Conservation of Biological Diversity in Tropical
Production Forests produced by the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) in
1993.17 Some of the policies that the government adopted from the Guidelines were also in
Agenda 21. Therefore, in this forest policy, the government essentially “owned” its forest policy
by adopting only some of the forest management values in Agenda 21. In this regard, Cameroon
partially aligned itself with the mind or values of the Bank in global environmental management.
As evident in Table 3, which displays the comparison between the conditions for Bank’s
financing with respect to its clients’ forest sector management and the tenets of the 1993 forest
policy in Cameroon, this partial alignment did not totally fulfil the conditions that the Bank
prescribed for receiving financial support from the Bank.

14. Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of
Development (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 245 and 257-258.
15. World Bank, The World Bank and Agenda 21 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), 12.
16. United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development,” A/CONF.151/26 (vol.IV) (September 26, 1992): Chapter II (C3). Accessed January 9, 2014.
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-4.htm
17. Bernard Foahom, “Integrating Biodiversity into the Forestry Sector: Cameroon Case Study,” Paper
Prepared for an International Workshop on Integration of Biodiversity in National Forestry Planning Programme,
CIFOR Headquarters, Bogor, Indonesia (13-16 August, 2001): 9-10.
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Table 3. A comparison between the conditions for Bank’s financing with respect to its clients’
forest sector management and the tenets of the 1993 forest policy in Cameroon18
World Bank’s forest policy
conditions for Bank’s financed
activities
No Bank Group financing for
commercial logging in primary
tropical moist forests
The adoption of policies and an
institutional framework consistent
with sustainability
A participatory approach to the
management of natural forests
The adoption of comprehensive
and environmentally sound
conservation and development
plans,
A clear definition of the roles and
rights of key stakeholders,
including local people, in forest
exploitation and management
Basing commercial use of forests
on adequate social, environmental,
and economic assessments

Making adequate provisions to
maintain biodiversity
Safeguard the interests of local
people, including forest dwellers
and indigenous peoples
Establishing adequate enforcement
mechanism

Tenets of Cameroon’s 1993 forest
policy

Comparison
between Bank’s

Policy failed to check the
continuous logging in Cameroon’s
tropical rain forests
Revitalize the forest sector by
setting up efficient institutional
framework. No specific policy to
enforcement strongly sustainability
Improve the participation of local
populations in forest conservation
and management
Policy attempted to ensure the
regeneration of forest resources by
plantations, but no comprehensive
plan was put in place for this end
No specific roles and rights ascribed
clearly to stakeholders and local
peoples with respect to forest
management
Encouraged trade in forest
products, but did not put in place
adequate social, environmental and
economic assessment mechanisms
for forests’ exploitation
Sought the preservation of
biodiversity
Did not safeguard the interests of
indigenous peoples and forest
dwellers in forest exploitation
No regulatory mechanism was put
in place for planning land use ,
forest protection and production

Mismatch

Partial match

Match

Partial mismatch

Mismatch

Partial match

Match
Mismatch

Mismatch

18. For a list of these conditions used in this table, see Uma Lele et al.. The World Bank Forest Strategy:
Striking the Right Balance (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), Box 1.2. The conditions are detailed in the Bank’s
The Forest Sector: A World Bank Policy Paper that the Bank produced in September 1991, and in the Bank’s 1993
Operation Policy 4.39 (was revised in April 2013), which Lele et al. document as Appendix A in their work cited
above.
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With up to 44.7% mismatch, over 33.3% partial match, and only 22% match between the
Bank’s conditions and the forest management policies that the Cameroon government “owned”
in 1993, the World Bank resorted to fiduciary and process conditionalities in order to cause the
Cameroon government to reform its forest sector. In fiduciary conditionality, the Bank distrusted
Cameroon’s forest policies, and it halted the disbursement of SAC-II. However, in the 1993
forest policy, the government underwent dynamic conservatism and social learning in a
simultaneous conservation and change of values as shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Values conservation and changes in Cameroon’s 1993 forest management policy
Values of Forest
Management from
Independence to 199219
Top-down state centered
forest management
All lands under the
guardian of the state22
Local communities
excluded from forests
management23
Maximization of forest
resource exploitation
Forest valued in terms of
profits making

Values of Forest Management
According to Agenda 21 and
World Bank20
Decentralized, multisectoral
approach to forest management
Lands owned by both
governments, local communities
and private individuals
Local peoples included in forest
management

Values of Forest Management in
the 1993 Forest Policy of
Cameroon21
State-centered approach to forest
management
Lands owned by governments and
private individuals

Sustainability privileged over
maximization of forest
exploitation
Forest has ecological, economic,
social, spiritual, scientific, and
cultural values

Exploitation of forest with some
concern for sustainability

Local peoples limitedly included in
forest management

Forest has ecological, economic,
and political values

19. For an expanded discussion on Cameroon’s forest policy in the era from independence in the early
1960s to Rio in 1992, see Richard Mbatu, “Forest Exploitation in Cameroon (1884-1994): An Oxymoron of TopDown and Bottom-up Forest Management Policy Approaches,” International Journal of Environmental Studies 66,
no. 6 (December 2009): 753-755.
20. For selected values of forest management according to Agenda 21 and the World Bank used in this
table, see United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development,” 3, 8-9, 11 and 16. Also see Lele et al.. The World Bank Forest Strategy, 6-7.
21. For values of the 1993 Forest policy used in this table, see
22. Ordinance No. 74/01 of 6 July 1974 states: “The State shall be the guardian of all lands. It may, in this
capacity, intervene to ensure the rational uses of lands in the imperative defense of the interest and the economic
policies of the nation.” See Republic of Cameroon, Land Tenure and State Lands (Yaoundé: Les Editions de
I’Imprimerie Nationale, 1974): 4.
23. See Phil Oyono, 2005. “The Foundations of the Conflit de Langage over Land and Forests in Southern
Cameroon,” African Study Monographs 26 n.3 (2005): 116.
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The 1993 forest policy preserved some of the values of forest management that were
active in the country from post-independence to the Rio Earth Summit, and the government
learned new forest management principles from its social interaction with the Bank. 24 According
to Marvin D. Krohn et al., social interaction is often characterized by differential reinforcement.
Differential reinforcement is the aspect of social learning theory in which rewards and
punishment condition the appropriation of knowledge and the behavior of groups and individuals
in daily interactions.25 In discussing motivation theory as constitutive of the cause-effect
relationship, Thomas E. Wren suggests that this appropriation can be understood in terms of
psychological attraction and deviation from desires and pain caused by both perceived and actual
rewards and punishment. Inasmuch as prosocial actions are coextensive with psychological
aspirations and value-based actions, both desire and pain are motivations for knowledge
acquisition and actions.26 In fact, Charles Darwin in his evolution theory and other deductive
theorists such as Karl Popper and Eric Beinhocker posit that perceived hurt or threat is a cause
for entering the mode of aversion wherein one of the determinants of survival is the ability of the
threatened to adapt by conservation of what it possesses within itself for survival and/or by
acquisition of new knowledge and values from the entities with which it interacts in its

24. Social interaction in this statement has the same meaning as Guy E. Swanson understands it. It refers to
the “process in which individuals relate to their own minds or the minds of others; the process, that is, in which
individuals take account of their own or their fellows' motives, needs, desires, means and ends, knowledge, and the
like.” Guy E. Swanson, “On Explanations of Social Interaction,” Sociometry 28, no. 2 (June 1965): 102. Accessed
February 13, 2914. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2785645
25. Marvin D. Krohn et al., “Social Learning Theory and Adolescent Cigarette Smoking: A Longitudinal
Study,” Social Problems, 32, no. 5 (June 1985): 456. Accessed February 4, 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/800775
26. Thomas E. Wren, “Social Learning Theory, Self-Regulation, and Morality,” Ethics 92, no. 3 (April
1982): 410-412. Accessed December 29, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380729 .
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environment.27 This insight provides a framework to understand the behavior of governments in
general and the Cameroon government in particular with respect to the forest management
reforms of 1994 in the country.
The assertion of Darwin, Popper, and Beinhocker implies that when governments
perceive adversarial conditions, they adjust themselves to avoid circumstances that can hurt their
wellbeing. In this adjustment, governments resort to their capabilities and/or acquire new
knowledge from its milieu of interaction with other governments and institutions. If one of such
institutions constitutes the threat to the government’s wellbeing, the adjustment by knowledge
acquisition can simply involve the government’s adoption or acceptance of the standpoint that
the institution favors.
With respect to forest management in Cameroon, the Cameroon government perceived
the World Bank as an institution that could significantly hurt the government by making the
provision of Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) dependent on Cameroon’s reform of its forest
sector. John Tazifor Tajoche narrates that in early 1990, Cameroon suffered terribly from
economic crisis under World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs that paralyzed the
government. Most urban places in the country became sites of popular protest that were known
as “operation ghost towns,” which involved citizens’ engagement in violent demonstrations that
seriously destroyed government’s infrastructure. The weak economy put the government of
President Paul Biya at the risk of political collapse.28 SAC-III was absolutely necessary for the
government to avoid this fall and to recover the economy. Therefore, when the Bank made the

27. For a discussion that inserts knowledge conservation and acquisition into the formulation of public
policies so as to understand institutional dynamics in the light of Darwin, Popper and Beinhocker’s ideas of
evolution, see Orion A. Lewis and Sven Steinmo, “How Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary Theory and Institutional
Change,” Polity 44, no.3 (July 2012): 316-318.Accessed February 1, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41684491
28. John Tazifor Tajoche, Cameroon History in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Buea: Education Book Center,
2003), 248.
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disbursement of SAC-III dependent on Cameroon government’s reform of the forest sector, the
later perceived this Bank’s conditionality measure as politically hurtful. The government averted
the adversity by learning and adopting some new forest management values in its interaction
with the Bank. This learning and adoption led to the grand forest reforms that resulted in the
promulgation of the 1994 forest law – a law that contains both the World Bank’s forest
management values and Cameroon government’s conservation of some of its pre-1994 forest
management approaches.
The Forest Law of 1994
The forest law of 1994 is a good example of the product of the combination of country
ownership and conditionality that results in a modification of what both policies stand for in
particular context. Taken in its entirety, this law is neither what the government wanted in
country ownership nor what the Bank wanted in conditionality measures. Rather, it is a model of
the simultaneous union and exclusion of conditionality and ownership in the sense that it
includes certain elements that the government wanted in the law while excluding others, and it
includes some elements that the Bank wanted while excluding others. In this regard, the law is an
exemplar of the COH in action. These elements can be examined under the strength of the legal
framework for forest management, the allocation of logging concessions, requirement of the
forest management plan, forest zones, and highly politically debated incentives for forest
sustainability and economic enrichment from forest exploitation.
One can hardly deny Seymour and Dubash’s contention that the 1981 Forest Law that
constituted Cameroon’s “ownership” of its legal framework for forest management was weak,
and as such could not serve as a strong regulatory tool for planning land use, protecting the
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forest, and guiding forest resource exploitation in Cameroon.29 One evidence of Seymour and
Dubash’s assertion can be gleaned from Jolanda van den Berg’s disappointment that “this law
provided for a system of local taxes to be paid in a national fund, which in theory should have
financed development activities throughout Cameroon, but in practice hardly served as such.”30
It was a law that failed to consider eminent corruption in the country by making stipulations
without consideration for enforcement mechanisms. The law also abolished direct negotiations
between logging companies and local peoples,31 and provided for the creation of national forest
reserve that served for economic enrichment of the nation and as a tool for political maneuvers
(see earlier discussion on prebendalism).32 M. P. E. Parren et al. note further evidence of this
lack of enforcement provisions in the law. The 1981 law allocated 20% of the national territory
to gazette forest, the equivalent pf 1.9 million ha of forest reserve. However, annual production
from unreserved forest alone stood at 3.7 million m3.33 These weaknesses were the results of a
sovereign nation’s formulation of its forest management regulations as it deems fir for itself – the
spirit of country ownership.
Through conditionality, the Bank sought to roll-back the state from this high involvement
in forest management. It called for the restoration of direct negotiation links between forest
companies and local peoples, and this was inserted in the 1994 forest law. It insisted on legal

29. Seymour and Dubash, “The Right Conditions,” 63.
30. Jolanda van den Berg, “Promotion, Recognition and Respect of Customary Claims on Forest
Resources,” Seminar Proceedings “Sustainable Management of African Rain Forest,” held in Kribi, Cameroon,
November 1999. Part I. Workshops, eds. Jonkers B. Foahom et al., (Wageningen: The Tropenbos Foundation,
2001), 227.
31. Ibid, 227.
32. Ibid., 224.
33. M.P.E. Parren et al., “A Collaborative Approach to Forest Management: The Case of Production
Forests in South Cameroon,” Seminar Proceedings “Sustainable Management of African Rain Forest,” held in
Kribi, Cameroon, November 1999. Part I. Workshops, eds. Jonkers B. Foahom et al., (Wageningen: The Tropenbos
Foundation, 2001), 18.
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provisions for enforcing the law.34 However, the Law retained the creation of national forest
reserve (30% of national surface area), and it re-positioned the government at the center of all
forest management as the state valued in the 1981 forest Law.35 Although the law put in place
mechanisms for enforcement of the forest management regulations,36 it ended up being neither as
strong as the Bank wanted through conditionality nor as weak as the government wanted through
ownership that sought to preserve the status quo. Therefore, although the World Resources
Institute and Biodiversity Support Program attempt to make one believe that the law introduced
“far reaching changes,”37 Gregore Sieböck is also somewhat right in describing the law as “a
significantly watered-down forestry law [that] was eventually passed in 1994.”38 The allocation
of forest concessions is one area that embodies this strength and weakness.
Seymour and Dubash note that prior to the promulgation of the 1994 Forest Law, the
Prime Minister of Cameroon had the sole discretion over the allocation of logging concessions in
the country. The Minister of Agriculture, and later the Minister of Environment and Forestry,
was responsible for granting small “Sales of Standing Volume” (Ventes de Coupe), which are
logging permits issued only to Cameroonians for forest exploitation within 2,500 ha. Licenses
were awarded for larger concessions. These licenses were renewable when logging companies
wanted.39

34. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No: 29996 (Washington,
DC: World Bank, 2004), no. 4.1.12(i). Accessed February 1, 2014.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/11/5541915/cameroon-third-structural-adjustment-credit-project
35. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994, Section 8(2) and Section 20, and
Section 40 (1) and (3).
36. Ibid., Section 1, and Part VI (Prosecution of Offenses).
37. World Resource Institute and Biodiversity Support Program, “The World Bank, Conditionalities, and
Forest Sector Reform,” 1.
38. Gregore Sieböck, “A Political, Legal and Economic Framework for Sustainable Forest Management in
Cameroon: Concerted Initiatives to Save the Rainforests,” A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master in Science, Lund University (November 2002), 15.
39. Seymour and Dubash, The Right Conditions, 63.
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Topa et al. write that the Bank sought through the process conditionality measures in
SAC-III to take away this discretionary power from the Prime Minister. Precisely, the Bank
called for the “adoption of new, detailed regulations for awarding harvesting rights, including
revised selection criteria and an external validation mechanism involving an independent
observer.”40 The law ended up introducing public auction as the method of allocating forest
concessions. This approach found favor with the Bank as the institution considered the method to
be based on transparent, more revenue generating, and less corruption-susceptible.41 It also
received the favor of the government on two grounds. Firstly, the approach enables the
government to capture more income from the sales of standing volumes.42 Secondly, although
the 1994 forest law takes away discretionary concession allocation powers from the Prime
Minister by introducing public auction, the government maintains the right to overrule allocation
committee’s recommendations in cases where it thinks that the national interest is under threat.43
Topa et al. also observe that the Bank saw the law as a step forward but not satisfactory because
despite the introduction of auctions that the government resisted, there were potential
transparency crisis because the government still had a role that the Bank perceived as excessive
in the allocation of concessions and guarantee of sustainable forest management .44 Yet,
Cameroon owned the law as the President signed it into effect, and the Bank eventually approved
SAC-III.
Sustainable forest management was one of the key issues in the 1994 forest law. Prior to
1994, the government enforced sustainability under the system of licenses that were issued

40. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 28.
41. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project (Washington, DC: World Bank,
1998), Box 10. Accessed February 1, 2014. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/06/731427/cameroonthird-structural-adjustment-credit-project
42. Ibid., no.94.
43. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94/01 of 20 January, 1994, Section 47 (3).
44. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 22-24.
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following agreement between forest exploiters and the government. The Independent Observer,
Global Witness, iterates that under this system, holders of licenses had the right to log
exclusively for export or for local processing with restrictions on some species.45 According to
Seymour and Dubash, there were no management requirements for ventes de coupe and
licenses.46 Against this oxymoron of sustainability measures that the Cameroonian government
“owned,” The World Bank in SAC-III required that there should be procedures for preparing,
approving, and monitoring forest management. The role of monitoring and assessing the
implementation of forest management plans would be performed by international
nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, there should be a guarantee system to ensure
compliance with forest management plans.47 The net effect of the interactions between country
ownership and conditionality with respect to sustainability was the introduction of forest
management plans, with the Forest Administrator (state services in charge of the forest)
reserving the right to determine whether a plan is observed or not.48 The requirement of
management plans in the law satisfied a government interested in capturing revenue from its
approval of such plans, and it pleased the Bank in its hope that the implementation of such plans
“will make more transparent a process [of forest zones management] which in the past contained
serious abuses.”49
Forest zones in the 1994 forest law were also different from previous land use plan.
Cyprian Jum et al. remark that from the colonial days to the promulgation of this law, the top-tobottom directed structure and process of forest management characterized by the state-centered

45. Global Witness, Project of Independent Observation in Support of Forest Law Enforcement in
Cameroon, Report No. 017 En (July 2002), 2. Global Witness. Accessed January 19, 2014.
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/017En-F.pdf
46. Seymour and Dubash, The Right Conditions, 63.
47. Topa et al., The Rainforest of Cameroon, 28.
48. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994, Sections 22(2), 29(5), 31(1) and 37(2).
49. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project. nos. 15 and 16.
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expropriation of natural wealth in Cameroon excluded local communities from rights to
controlling specific forest spaces. Villages as collective entities could not access and benefit
economically from forest resources.50 The national context that called for this exclusion was the
consolidation of post-colonial affiliation of citizens to the unifying identity of the state. In the
first two decades after independence, 51 most African states were nations in transition from
fidelity to colonial masters to faithfulness to a collective identity as a state. Consequently, most
regulations and modus operandi of African governments privileged the role of the state in
ensuring national prosperity – a role that had the psychological effect of causing citizens to
identify themselves with the state.
No wonder then, as Mbatus observes, that the 1972 constitution of Cameroon amplified
the politico-material vision of the state as an organism that is intended to “exploit its natural
wealth in order to ensure the well-being of every citizen by raising living standards.”52 The
mention of “every citizen” implied the minimization of the exploitation of natural resources by
local communities for their own benefits. Consequently, the government in Law No. 81-13 of 27
November 1981 zoned forests as state, local councils, private and communal (communes)
forests.53 Oyono makes it clear that communes simply implies basic territorial units of the
decentralization of the national government. Therefore, “communes” forest gazette does not
imply any loss of forest control by the state.54

50. Cyprian Jum et al., “Building Broad-Based Partnership for Sustainable Forest Management: The Forest
Experience in Cameroon,” International Journal of Environmental Studies 64, no.5 (October 2007): 626. Accessed
November 23, 2013. doi: 10.1080/00207230701645503
51. Most African states achieved independence from colonial and mandated masters’ rule in the 1960s.
52. Mbatu, “Forest Exploitation in Cameroon (1884-1994),” 755.
53. World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Protected Areas of the World, 33.
54. Phil R. Oyono, “One Step orward, Two Steps Back? Paradoxes of Natural Resources Management
Decentralisation in Cameroon,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 1 (March 2004): 94 and 100.
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In this esprit de l'état, local peoples had little or no bargaining rights with logging
companies over the use of the forest that “belonged” to the former. Geschiere invokes sympathy
for the local communities when he dramatizes their fate under this system:
Under the former rules [before the 1994 law], a company was held to come to some sort
of agreement with the population that took mostly the form of a cahier des charges (a
written list of obligations). In practice these amounted to a series of ad hoc cadeaux
(food, palm-wine, shirts for the local soccer team, etc) and sometimes assistance for
constructing a school or a bridge. However, the villagers could hardly exercise pressure
on the company in case of differences of opinion regarding these charges. When a
conflict threatened, the administration invariably sided with the company, and in those
days the gendarmes knew how to quench any resistance. After all, a fixed principle of all
the legislation concerning the forest, ever since the colonial state imposed its authority on
the area was that all forest, as far as it was not cleared and cultivated, belonged to the
state. . . . 55
The World Bank, having considered these exclusion and drama as a hindrance to
“rational and sustainable management of the forests,”56 sought to end the crisis by using the
approval of SAC-III as a process conditionality measure to demand the “the designation of areas
in nonpermanent forests for future community forests.”57 Following this conditionality request,
the government modified its stand on the forest zone and began looking at community forest as
economically beneficial to local peoples. Consequently, “forestry blocks” became attributable to
local peoples based on simplified management plans.58 However, the management of such forest
continues to respect the centrality of the state. This is because according to the reference that
Section 37 (6) makes to Section 16 of Law No.94-1 of January 20, 1994, community forest
management remains bounded by the state’s master plan for regional development. On another
note, in the said Law, the government did not entirely abrogate the old forest classification;
55. Geschiere, “The 1994 Forest Law in Cameroon,” 479.
56. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No: 29996, no. 3.3.12.
57. Ibid., no. 3.3.13.
58. Republic of Cameroon, Law No. 94-01, Section 37. Also see Republic of Cameroon, “Letter of
Development Policy,” in World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No. P-7244CM (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), no.94. Accessed February 1, 2014.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/06/731427/cameroon-third-structural-adjustment-credit-project
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rather, community forest was simply added as one other forest zone into the old politically
crafted classification. The effect of this integration is multiple forest zones as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Forest zones of Cameroon
NATIONAL FOREST ESTATE

Nonpermanent Forests
(unclassified forests)

Permanent Forests
(30% of total area of national territory)

State
Forests

Council
Forests

Communal
forests

Community
forests

Private
forests

Areas protected for
wildlife:
*national parks
*game reserves
*hunting areas
*state’s game ranches
*wildlife sanctuaries
*buffer zones
*state’s zoological
gardens

Forest Reserves Proper
*integral ecological reserves
*production forests
*protection forests
*recreation forests
*teaching and research forests
*plant life sanctuaries
*botanical gardens
*forest plantation
Source: Based on the provisions of Sections 20, 22, 24, and 34 of Forest Law No.94-01 of
January 20, 1994.
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Political Bandwagonism for Forest Reforms
From the rationale of conditionality, one can say that conditionality is characterized by
the bandwagon effect. Scott G. Dacko describes the bandwagon effect as a social science
behavior theory that asserts that as the number of people who embrace a view increases, others
will jump onto the bandwagon. This theory assumes that the acceptance of ideas diffuses as
previous success in spreading the idea creates group pressure.59 In political terms, more political
actors will accept propositions as the number of people who have already done so increases. In
the context of forest reforms in Cameroon, , the theory implies that as the Bank politically asserts
its reform vision and galvanizes support around it, politicians in Cameroon will eventually
become unable to resist the Bank’s vision; rather, they will succumb to what the Bank wants.
However, absolute sovereignty theory suggests that nations tenaciously defend
themselves against external compulsions in order to uphold their legitimacy. One thing that is
common between the assumption of the bandwagon effect theory and the absolute sovereignty
theory is balance theory. As Dacko notes, this theory affirms that the strength of the relationship
between marketers and customers is directly proportional to the extent to which marketing actors
satisfy deep-rooted individual desires and motives.60 With respect to the place of the COH in
reforms associated with political support, this theory implies that national politicians will hop
unto the bandwagon only when the bandwagon, in one way or another, favors their personal
interest. This is the theoretical foundation of the legal and policy based national political support
for the Bank’s view of efficiency, transparency, accountability, and productivity in forest
management in Cameroon.

59. Scott G. Dacko, “Bandwagon Effect,” in The Advanced Dictionary of Marketing: Putting Theory to Use
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 44.
60. Ibid., 42.
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Support for Productivity with Sustainability
One of the novelties of the 1994 Forest Law is the introduction of concession or Forestry
Management Unit (FMU), popularly known by the French acronym UFA (unités forestières
d’aménagement). A concession is essentially a forest land in which a license-holder “is granted
the right to collect a specific volume of wood . . . for the long-term supply of his woodprocessing industry or industries.”61 Concessions are granted to both Cameroon nationals and
foreigners. The Bank argues that before concessions came into existence, companies had no
incentives to manage forest sustainably because no benefits were allocated as reward for good
forest management. This is because the pre-1994 legislation did not allow the transfer of
contracted exploitable forest spaces, and access to these maximum 200,000 ha concessions was
only limited to five years. Consequently, companies could not benefit from previous practices
during subsequent felling cycles. According to Rob Glastra, the effect of this was that
companies engaged in quick deforestation to maximize profits within the allowable short-term.62
Sieböck iterates that as a solution to this sustainability problem, the Bank conditioned the
approval of SAC-III on the government’s legalization of forty years concession life-span.63
Furthermore, as Seymour and Dubash observe, the Bank also requested that the concessions size
should cover a maximum area of 500,000 ha.64
Cameroonian politicians at the National Assembly vehemently objected to both
conditions. According to Seymour and Dubash, the forty years concession life span would have
limited the amount of bribe-money that the politicians made from frequent approval of the

61. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94-01, Section 46.
62. Rob Glastra, Cut and Run: Illegal Logging and Timber Trade in the Tropics (Ottawa: Friends of the
Earth International, 1999), 49.
63. Sieböck, “A Political, Legal and Economic Framework for Sustainable Forest Management in
Cameroon,” footnote 20.
64. Seymour and Dubash, Right Conditions, 66.
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renewal of concessions. They also argued to the public that the 500,000 ha concession size
would open vast areas of Cameroon forests to plundering. However, some of these politicians
owned shares in concessions.65 Thus, their personal pecuniary interest could not permit a total
ban on concessions. Therefore, owning its own reforms amidst conditionality pressure from the
Bank, the National Assembly promulgated a law, which allows that concessions in the
permanent domain shall last for fifteen years renewable (also assessed every three years), and the
maximum concession size remains 200,000 ha.66 Within the active concession timeframe,
companies still could not export logs.
Another productivity measure that brought conditionality into contact with the political
dimension of country ownership was the issue of log export ban. It was the one issue in which
the prescriptive character of conditionality became reactive, and the reactive nature of ownership
in these reforms became prescriptive. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James Jerome Gockowski are
of the opinion that Cameroon has always believed that it benefits from its natural resources when
they are processed locally. This is the reason why in 1981 the government limited the exportation
of timber to 40% of the entire production. During the forest reforms debates of the 1990s, the
Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) submitted a bill to the National Assembly

65. Seymour and Dubash, Right Conditions, 66.
66. Government of Cameroon, Law No.94-01, Section 46 (2) and Section 49.
It is worthy to note that although the Bank approved of this middle ground as a step in the satisfaction of its
conditionality measures, the Bank now pushes for a complete elimination of any limits to the life span of a
concession. It now wants concessions to be granted for life. However, the Bank laments that both the Presidency of
the Republic of Cameroon (in a February 2011 meeting) and the Minister of Finance (during the 2011 spring
meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and on other occasions) are not totally resistant to
such allocation of concessions for an indefinite period. Their stand is that they do not see the permanent allocation
of land to timber companies as a move that will bring sufficient economic benefits to the state (versus other options
such as renewal of concession exploitation-contracts or permits. See World Bank. Cameroon - Forest and
Environment Development Program Project: Report No: ICR2223 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), no. 27.
Accessed February 1, 2014. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/16388332/cameroon-forestenvironment-development-program-project-cameroon-forest-environment-development-program-project
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that called for a complete ban on log exportation – a 100% local processing of all logs prior to
export. The party viewed a total ban as a clear-cut policy that is easier to implement.67
As David Harvey indicates, the principle of comparative advantage on which
neoliberalists base their glorification of the market favors not just the liberalization of trade, but
also the elimination of export controls.68 It is obvious, therefore, that the neoliberal World Bank
reacted by opposing this total log ban view of the government. The Bank argues that this idea
fosters “the establishment of industries that can survive only because they have access to raw
timber at preferential prices, resulting in significant lower forestry revenue.”69
Considering that real life policy decision and application neither always follows country
ownership nor conditionality, but the COH, a compromise position was found in the forestry law.
This position requires that 70% of all production of each species of log shall be processed locally
for a transitional period of five years (1994 to 1999), after which a total ban on log exportation
will take effect as the government wanted.70 After June 30, 1999, when a complete ban on log
exportation was imposed on rare hardwoods such as iroko (Milicia excels), moabi (Baillonella
toxisperma), and bubinga species (Guibourtia demeusei, Guibourtia pellegriniana, and
Guibourtia tessmannii), the law continuously opens a loophole to accommodate subsequent log
export by giving room for the payment of graduated surtax on unprocessed forest exports.71 This
loophole generates revenue for the state and partially falls in line with the export economics
argument of the Bank. The Bank’s valuation of forest resources in Cameroon is not limited to

67. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James Jerome Gockowski, Cameroon Forest Sector in a Difficult Political
Economy: Evaluation Country Case Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), 26-27.
68. Charles Harvey, “Recovery from Macro-economic Disaster in Sub-Saharan Africa,” States or Markets?
Neoliberalism and the Development Policy Debate eds. Christopher Coclough and James Manor (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), 9-10.
69. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No. P-7244-CM , no. 58.
70. Government of Cameroon, Law No.94-01, Section 71 (1) and (2).
71. Ibid., Section 66.
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revenue from log export but also to a wider variety of economic practices such as market based
auction of concessions and the tax system.
Support for Neoliberal Efficiency and Transparency: Auction and Independent Observer
It had earlier been stated that the current economic model of the World Bank is
neoliberalism. Rosario Espinal avows that neoliberals bet economic efficiency on the free market
and their exalted market is “the optimal space for the production and distribution of wealth and .
. . the optimal vehicle for social mobility.”72 Therefore, to them the subjection of forest resources
to market forces guarantees the efficient use of the resources for economic progress. Espinal
further insinuates that in as much as privileging the market challenges state led
developmentalism, neoliberal economics often finds itself at daggers drawn with the political
centralization of the state in national governance.73
Despite this contrast between valorized free market and state interventionist development
vilified as inefficient, the possibility of converting political capital into economic capital and
vice-versa unite the two frontiers. Richard H. Robbins says that a J.P. Morgan currency strategist
faced with the question of what political system (authoritarian or democratic) better fostered
economic growth suggested that “rules that encourage the centralization of power and the
depletion of political capital also allow for greater accumulation of economic capital”74 because
such rules can be easily applied to measures that generate revenue. It is through this conversion
dynamism between political and economic capitals that auction became the method of awarding

72. Rosario Espinal, “Development, Neoliberalism and Electoral Politics in Latin America,” Development
and Change 23, no.4 (1992): 32.
73. Ibid., 33.
74. Richard H. Robbins, Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002),
373.
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concessions, and independent observer became part of the forest management process to
guarantee transparency, and a system of taxation was introduced into the forestry sector.
The government had always preferred to award concession unilaterally to companies,
because it provides the opportunity for politicians to benefit from large sums of money from the
corporations. Seymour and Dubash narrate that such was the case in 1997 when the government
defied the public bidding system introduced in the 1994 forest law and granted two concessions
to French logging companies. Although the World Bank at the time had a fragile dialogue
relationship with the government over economic conditionality issues such as privatization, the
Bank reacted strongly against this move by stacking the approval of SAC-III on the annulment of
the provisional concessions. Proper market-based auction, the Bank argued, would generate more
revenue for the state as the highest bidder will receive the concession award. Furthermore, the
Bank required that the government put in place an independent observer (IO) of the forest
management process as condition for the disbursement of the second tranche of SAC-III. 75 The
international IO will adjudicate the attribution of concessions, monitor and publish on activities
in the forest sector so as to prevent unlawful award of concessions, illegal logging, and to foster
transparency in forest management.76
Following interactions between conditionality and ownership, the competitive bidding
approach became lawful, although the free-market is really not “free” in this process. This is
because as Topa et al. indicate, there is an Interministerial Commission for Awarding Forest
Concessions that also examines the technical capacity of the bidder to determine eligibility. An
IO is part of this Commission and it reports to the Minister of Forest on the integrity of the

75. World Bank. Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No. P-7244-CM, no.60.
76. Ibid., Annex C: 82.
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auction process.77 In the person of the IO, the government loses political capital, but it gains
economic capital in the auction process. From this economic capital, the government regains its
political capital by sponsoring its own State Forest Service that the IO advises. This Service
monitors forest activities at the levels of FMU, regional and national forests. Within the Ministry
of Environment and Forest (MINEF), there is a Central Control Unit (CCU) linked to the
Minister’s office. As Philippe Auzel et al. list, the CCU collects and centralizes data from its
provincial offices, undertakes control missions, compares field date with the National Forestry
Database System (SIGIF), and proposes sanctions against defaulters in the management of
concessions by different stakeholders.78
Stakeholders Involvement in Forest Management
Stakeholders’ involvement in forest management in Cameroon can be looked at from two
perspectives: the participation of stakeholders in the formulation of regulations and policies and
the inclusion of stakeholders in the forest activities such as logging, clearing, and afforestation.
In the first case, stakeholders are agent causal-beneficiaries in the sense that they create or put in
place underlying frameworks such as regulations from which they can derive certain benefits. In
the second perspective, stakeholders are direct causal actors in the sense that their actions have
direct effects on recipients. In the first case, for example, stakeholders make or influence the
making of forest laws; in the second, stakeholders act within the physical limits of forests, and
their actions have effects on the forests.79

77. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 39-40.
78. Philippe Auzel, “Social and Environmental Costs of Illegal Logging in a Forest Management Unit in
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Agency theory in sociology emphasizes the first perspective by focusing on the causal
agent, while the transaction cost theory in economics capitalizes on the second by insisting on
the effects of action. However, these two perspective are related by the fact that the effect is
really the result of a trans-action (from one actor to another) posited by agents. As one can
comprehend from reading Jill Solomon, this link is the standpoint of stakeholder theory.80 It is
also the theoretical foundation for stakeholders’ involvement as perceived by the Bank and the
government in shaping forest management in Cameroon. Liviu Amariei provides a long list of
these stakeholders. He writes:
At national level, the most important stakeholder groups are the Government, as
the owner of the forest resource base; the private sector, represented through three
Professional Associations of Forest Extraction Companies, (representing international,
national, and national young entrepreneurs’ interests, respectively: Groupement de la
Filière de Bois Camerounaise, Syndicat des Exploitants Forestiers du Cameroun and le
Syndicat des Jeunes Exploitants forestiers du Cameroun); the local communities that are
represented in the National Assembly; and the civil society, including NGOs and
universities. An additional stakeholder group that has been very active in shaping the
policy and legal framework during the last decade is the international donor community,
acting through organisations such as the World Bank, the European Union, FAO, UNDP,
IMF; NGOs such as IUCN, WWF and Global Witness, and national overseas
development agencies such as DFID, GTZ, AFD, CIDA/ACDI and SNV.
At the local level the most important stakeholder groups are the administrations at
district and sub-district level, while the business sector is represented through individual
processing companies, concessionaires and loggers. Local communities are also active at
this level through Local administrations and village chiefs. The civil society is not well
organised at the local level, for example, NGOs do not play an important role at this
level. The international community is present also at local level through individual donordriven projects and their management teams.81

80. Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (West Sussex: John Willey and Sons Ltd.,
2010), 16.
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http://www.fao.org/forestry/195800b266e69b6880da012e1a1875f2319a15.pdf
The full names of the abbreviated stakeholders are as follows: FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations), UNDP (United Nations Development Program), IUCN (International Union of the Conservation of
Nature), WWF (World Wildlife Fund), AFD (Agence Française de Développment, known in English as French
Development Agency), GTZ (German Technical Cooperation), CIDA/ACDI (Canadian International Development
Agency) and SNV (Netherlands Development Organization). To the donor community that included the World
Bank, the FAO, UNDP, WWF, SNV, and IUCN, Topa et al. add the ADA (African Development Bank) and the
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From the above list, a few points need to be pointed out. The first concerns the Bank’s
stakeholder selection. In the causal-beneficiaries micro-cycle, the Bank conditioned the approval
of SAC-III on the involvement of both public and private stakeholders in the consultations,
information gathering, and debates that characterized the process of designing the 1994 forest
law.82 It involved its technical expert team, other international organizations, and the private
sector in this process. The government was present through its MINEF, and the presence of
NGOs fortified country ownership. The effect of these multiple stakeholders with varied selfinterest was a tense situation. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James J. Gockowski observe that the
government of Cameroon (Presidency, Prime Ministry, and MINEF) was not genuinely
committed to the forest reforms. Key stakeholders such as foreign logging companies and the
Cameroon parliament were in opposition to the reform. The Bank itself failed to formulate an
implementation strategy compatible with the political, social, and economic realities of
Cameroon. One other issue was that although the discussions of these different stakeholders –
especially from the Bank – led to the inclusion of local communities as agents of forest
sustainability and economic beneficiaries of forest products, local communities were not
included in the law drafting process.83

governments of Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), and the European Union
(EU). This donor community signed a code of conduct in January 2006 to ensure joint financing, monitoring,
evaluation, transparency, sustainability, and accountability. To the list of NGOs, Topa et al. also add Resource
Extranction Monitoring (REM), Global Forest Watch (GFW), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and Last Great
Ape Organization (LGA). There were a total of 13 NGOs involved in the forestry law debates, and these are
currently active in shaping forest activities in Cameroon. The IMF constantly insisted on transparency and economic
reforms, and its persistent inquiry on significant issues of the forest reform as related to economic reforms
influenced the debates and ensured that the forest sector reforms remained a key issue to decision makers. Through
conditionality, the World Bank insisted on partnership with the donor community and the involvement of
international NGOs in conformity with the Bank’s global development strategy. See Topa et al., The Rainforests of
Cameroon, 23-26.
82. Amariei, “Legal Compliance in the Forestry Sector,” 7.
83. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James J. Gockowski, Cameroon Forest Sector Development in a Difficult
Political Economy: Evaluation Country Case Study Series (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), xx.
With the exclusion of local communities from the debates that led to the enactment of the 1994 forestry law, the
Bank cannot, therefore, be totally right in claiming that its development objective in Cameroon’s forest has not only
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Nevertheless, the inclusion of local communities as direct causal actors in the forest
management law is a very significant novelty that contrasts with the old provisions of the
government. It is really the product of the COH. The 1994 forest law speaks of such a
community as a “village”.84 To procure a community forest, the village has to prepare a simple
management plan, and sign a convention with the Ministry of Forest and Wildlife (MINFOF).85
The procurement is based on a pre-emption right – a legal reference by which local communities
can request ownership of a forest within their village from the government.86 According to the
Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement (CED), this right encourages local
communities to own forests.87 Thomas K. Erdmann notes that although the acquisition is by
right, the exploitation of the local community forest has to be small-scale logging as prescribed
by MINFOF.88 Vabi et al. add that the benefits from this logging go to the village.89
Furthermore, as Jean-Christopher Carret observes, local communities receive forestry fees in
accordance with the decentralized forestry taxation system. The two types of taxes paid by
timber companies to local communities as direct or indirect transfers are annual forestry fees and

been to promote sustainability, ecological stability and economic efficiency, but also to encourage the involvement
“of all stakeholders in forest conservation and participation.” See World Bank, 2004. Cameroon - Forest and
Environment Sector Program Project. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), 14. Accessed February 1, 2014.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5153567/cameroon-forest-environment-sector-program-project
84. Republic of Cameroon, Law No.94-01, Section 37 (1).
85. In 2004, the government split MINEF into the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) and the
Monistry of the Environment and Protection of Nature (MINEP).
86. Ibid., Section 37 (1), (2), and (7).
87. Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement, Le Droit de Préemption: Option pour un
Développement Local Durable (Yaoundé: Editions CED, 2002), 3.
88. Thomas K. Erdmann, The Potential Contribution of Community Forestry to Sustainable Forest
Management and Biodiversity Conservation in the Biodiversity Conservation in the Dja-Odzala-Minkebe
Landscape. Report to the Western Congo Basin Moist Forests (Washington, DC: WWF,2003), 10
89. Vabi et al., The Devolution of Management Responsibilities to Local Communities: Context and
implementation Hurdles in Cameroon. Working Paper (Yaoundé: WWF-CPO, 2000), 2-6.
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a sort of royalty or “ecotax” of CFA 1,000 (U.S $1.50) per cubic meter of timber exploited in a
vente de coupe that a village claims customary right over.90
The discussion in this chapter has focused on the application of the COH in Cameroon’s
forest sector. Two points are worthy of note from the discussion. First, there was negotiation
between the Bank and the government of Cameroon in the reform of Cameroon’s forest sector.
Second, reform ideas and policies put forth by the Bank came into contact with those expressed
by the Cameroon government. The totality of the outcome of this contact was neither what the
Bank put forth, nor what the Cameroon government suggested. Rather, in the interactions, the
policies attained a life of their own as the COH. The next chapter focuses on how this COH has
impacted forest management in Cameroon.

90. Jean-Christopher Carret, “La Réforme de la Fiscalité forestière au Cameroun: Débat Politique et
Analyse Économique,” Bois et Forêts des Tropiques, 264, no.2 (2000): 17-18 and 45-48.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONDITIONALITYOWNERSHIP HYBRID ON FOREST MANAGEMNT IN CAMEROON
This study seeks an answer to one question: in what way has the relationship between
World Bank’s conditionality and ownership affected forest management in Cameroon within the
context of the international dependency development model? Having detailed the nature of
conditionality and ownership as distinct policies, established the hybridized relationship between
the two policies, and exposed the implementation of this hybrid in Cameroon’s forest sector
within the context of the Cameroon’s dependence on World Bank’s international development
assistance, it is appropriate at this point to turn to an analysis of how this implementation has
affected the management of forests in Cameroon. This management, as earlier mentioned
according to Brown and Ekoko’s studies on Cameroon’s forest sector, involves the maintenance,
use, control, and monitoring of forest. Therefore, it is in analyzing how the COH affects these
four dimensions in Cameroon’s forest management that one can attempt to answer the status
questionis of this study. In doing this, one will be examining essentially how the COH affects
what Carl Alwin calls “la possibilité” of forests – the forests’ resource yield, resource
exploitation, exploitation direction or control, and necessary checks to ensure that the regulatory
framework on the forest is respected by stakeholders.
From the previous chapters of this work, especially chapter four on the implementation of
the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector, this study is concerned with forest possibilities. As
indicated earlier, the determination and regulation of forest possibilities in Cameroon involves
firm decisions and regulations to achieve certain forest-based objectives, and to monitor the
attainment of these objectives specified in the national forest policy. These objectives, from the
research of Brown and Ekoko earlier mentioned, usually fall into four main categories:
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maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest resource exploitation. The administrative,
economic, legal, and social components of the planning and regulation of forests are integrated
into these categories. Formulating the objective categories and integrating the planning and
regulation of forests into them imply that the planning and regulation affect the objective
categories. This is the standpoint of the alternative hypothesis formulated in chapter one of this
work, as opposed to the null hypothesis that negates this relational impact.
One can conceptualize this impact in terms of what Alwin speaks of as “la possibilité”.
Forest possibilities are not restricted to what the forest can generate from a material perspective;
rather, they also include in the broad sense the different ways in which the forest can be shaped
by the administrative, economic, legal, and social actions of human agents. This shaping is at the
center of forest management; it is the focal point in the implementation of the COH in
Cameroon’s forest sector. This chapter is concerned with the precise way in which this
implementation has configured Cameroon’s forest sector by shaping the maintenance, use,
control, and monitoring of forest resources in the country. This is the last of the four questions
into which the problematic of this study was divided.
To answer this sub-question of the problematic, one needs to keep track of the COH and
its implementation in Cameroon’s forest sector (the x factor, or independent variable). One also
has to use necessary methodology (statistics, GIS, cost-benefit analyses, and juxtaposition of
hidden and public transcripts) to link this x factor to the maintenance, use, control, and
monitoring of forests in the country (the y factor, or dependent variable).
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Implementation of the COH in the Forest Sector: Disparity of Emphasis in Forest Management
Categories
From the discussion in chapter four herein, there are thirteen main features of the COH as
realized in Cameroon’s forest sector. These thirteen elements can be classified into the categories
of maintenance, use, monitoring and control of forests.
As shall be discussed below, forest maintenance is the core of sustainable forest
management. The three features of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector that fit into the
maintenance category are the introduction of forest management plans, the zoning of the national
forest estate into permanent and non-permanent forests, and the inclusion of local communities
as stakeholders that will presumably not use high capacity machines to exploit forest vastly, and
as such guarantee forest sustainability.
Six features of the COH in the nation’s forest sector are directed at the use of forest
resources for different purposes. These include public auction by which interested entities
procure concessions to exploit for economic purpose; the requirement of forest management
plans to be submitted to the government within the first three years of forest allocation, the right
given to holders of concessions licenses to exploit resources from the concession for a period of
15 years renewable (with assessment of the concession at three years interval), restrictions on the
exportation of logs, the inclusion of foreign logging corporations as stakeholders although they
resisted the forest reforms of the mid 1990s, and the granting of community forest to villages so
that they can exploit for their own economic, social and anthropological enrichment. Table 5
displays these and other features in their respective forest management categories
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Table 5. Implementation of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector
Feature
Policies
designer

Feature in the COH
World Bank and Country

Intellectual
Conviction

Dynamic conservatism and
social learning moves Bank
and national governments to
have some trust in each other’s
knowledge and values related
to forest management policies
and laws in Cameroon

Political support is aimed at
uniting political factions over
laws and policies to ensure
transparency, accountability,
and neoliberal efficiency and
productivity in the
management of resources
Stakeholders Selective inclusion of
Involvement stakeholders who are in
consensus with country
governments’ vision and
interest and without hindrance
to the interest and vision of the
Bank
Political
Support

Feature of the COH in Cameroon’s Forest Sector
1)World Bank and Cameroon government put forth a policy and legal forest
management framework (1994 forest law and its implementation degrees) that
safeguards the interests and values of the Bank through conditionality and the
Cameroon government through ownership
2) A watered down forest law that, yet, sought to achieve a balance between the
maintenance, utilization, monitoring and control of forests in Cameroon
3) Public auction as method of allocating forest concessions to logging companies
4) Government maintains right to rule on the final allocation of forests to
applicants, and to reclaim forest from manager if government deems necessary
5) Introduction of forest management plans
6) Zoning of national forest estate into permanent forests (state forest and council
forest) and non-permanent forests (communal, community, and private forests)
7) Introduction of concessions with license-holder having the right to collect
specified volume of wood for long-term (15 years renewable, and assessed every
three years) supply of his or her processing industry or industries
8) 70% of log production processed locally from 1994 to 1999; increased export
restriction after 1999 with some species exported after payment of graduated surtax
9) Introduction of independent observer and monitor to ensure transparency and
accountability in forest management
10) MINEF present, not genuinely committed to reforms, but maintains (with
MINATD) control of reforms implementation
11) Foreign logging companies oppose reforms, but included as stakeholders
12) Bank present as stakeholder, but does not formulate an implementation strategy
compatible with the political, social and economic realities of Cameroon
13) Local communities absent in reforms design process, but included as agents of
forest sustainability, and economic and social beneficiaries of forests’ resources.
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Five features of the COH in the country’s forest sector focus on the administrative control
of forest resource exploitation in Cameroon. These include: Feature 1 on the negotiations
between the Bank and the Cameroon government as two main actors in formulating the forest
sector policy and regulatory framework that embraced and excluded simultaneously some of
their interests and values; Feature 2 that touches on the categorization of the forest law as a law
that although it sought a balance between the maintenance, use, control and monitoring of forests
in Cameroon, nevertheless, remains weak with respect to its implementation; Feature 5 that
concerns the inclusion of forest management plans as a compulsory element of the forest
management process; Feature 10 on the lack of commitment from government institutional
representatives as stakeholders in the forest reforms; and Feature 12 related to the failure of the
World Bank to come out with the 1994 forest law implementation strategy compatible with the
political, social and economic realities of Cameroon.
Monitoring includes two features. These are Feature 4 on the right that the Cameroon
government’s maintains to rule on the final allocation of forests to concession applicants and to
reclaim forest from managers if the government judges that the body to whom the forest is
allocated is poorly managing the forest; and Feature 9 that concerns the introduction of
independent observers and monitors to ensure transparency and accountability in forest
management.
Before examining the impact of these features on the maintenance, use, control, and
monitoring of forests in Cameroon, a significant analysis deserves close attention. The thirteen
features are not equally distributed among the four categories of forest maintenance, use, control,
and monitoring. Table 6 summarizes the numerical classification of these features.
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Table 6. Classification of forest management elements and corresponding features
Forest Management Categories
Maintenance
Utilization
Control
Monitoring

Associated Features
Features 5, 6 and 13
Features 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, and 13
Features 1, 2, 5, 10, and 12
Features 4 and 9

Points
3
6
5
2

Table 6 also indicates the weighted points of features to corresponding forest
management categories. This weighted point is simply the total number of features associated
with a category. Figure 5 is a chart that displays the emphasis that the COH gives to each of the
forest management elements.

13%

19%

Maintenance
Use
31%

Control
37%

Monitoring

Figure 5. Disparity in emphasis that COH gives to categories of forest management
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 reveal that the areas of emphasis in the COH vis-à-vis forest
management in Cameroon are exploitative use of the forest resources (37%) and the control of
access and exploitation of forest by stakeholders (31%). Neoliberal economic policies
conditionality from the World Bank stressed the use of forest management for economic
enrichment. Political support dimension of ownership emphasized forest access control by the
government of Cameroon. Maintenance focused on the wellbeing of the object of attention,
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namely, the forest. Monitoring that deals with what the public deserves, namely, transparency
and accountability on forest management, constitutes 13%.
With 25% weighted average as the level of equal significance of the four categories,
maintenance of the forest and monitoring have little significance compared to use and control in
the direction of the COH to forest management in Cameroon. There is, therefore, a disparity in
the impact of the COH on forest management in Cameroon with respect to the categories of
maintenance or sustainability of forests, use or exploitation of forest resources for
anthropocentric purposes, the control that the Cameroon government has over the access to
forests and exploitation of forest resources, and monitoring forest related activities to ensure
accountability and transparency that the public deserves vis-à-vis the forest as wealth of the
Cameroon nation and global environmental welfare. Having considered the forest management
categories comparatively, it is necessary to pay closer attention to each of them.
COH and the Maintenance of Forests
As mentioned above, the maintenance of forest is the central concern of sustainable forest
management. In the same year (1993) that the government of Cameroon and the World Bank
were engaged in negotiations to formulate forest management laws and policies for the country,
and when suggested policies and laws were interacting with each other, the Helsinki Ministerial
Conference for the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) was discussing the multifunctional
sustainability of forests at local, national, and global levels. This conference defined sustainable
forest management as “the stewardship and use of forest in a way, and at a rate, that maintains
their biodiversity, productivity, regeneration capacity, vitality, and their potential to fulfill, now
and in the future, relevant ecological, economic and social functions, at local, national, and
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global levels, and that does not cause damage to other ecosystems.”1 The COH has affected
sustainable forest management in Cameroon in the light of this definition. Key related elements
in this definition are biodiversity and productivity, generational capacity and vitality, and the
“now and in the future” or intergenerational element of forest management. The impact of the
COH on the maintenance category of forest management shall be examined with respect to this
grouping. Just as the definition suggest, this analysis shall insight from earth sciences,
economics, and sociology.
Biodiversity and Productivity
One of the great impacts of the COH on forest management in Cameroon is the zoning of
the Cameroon forest estate. This zoning allocates forest spaces to specific uses. Logging
companies explore forest management units, which they log for their economic gains. Councils
can, and do, secure forest spaces for the use and enrichment of the councils. Local communities
can, and also own forests for their religious, social, economic, and cultural welfare. Through this
zoning, biodiversity is conserved in forest reserves, and stakeholders can access non-permanent
forests such as FMUs, community forests, and council forests for their own benefits. Figure 6
displays the current different zones of Cameroon’s forest estate.

1. Richard E. Saunier and Richard A. Meganck, “Sustainable Forest Management,” in Dictionary and
Introduction to Global Environmental Governance, 2nd ed. (London: Earthscreen, 2007), 243.
Liisa Saarenmaa criticizes the use of the word “maintains” in MCPFE’s definition of sustainable forest management.
In her argument, “maintain” fails to capture the dynamic nature of ecosystems and of resource management that
needs satisfy human needs in today’s world. She suggests that this dynamic management embodies the “(i)
exploitation that leads to reduction in the renewable resource, (ii) sustainable management that aims at maintaining
the renewable resource, (iii) progressive management that aims at increasing the renewable resource.” Liisa
Saarenma, “Sustainable Forest Management: Research Priorities and Coordination in Finland,” in Sustainable
Forest Management, ed. J. Bo Larsen (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 1996), 196.
Saarenmaa’s argument, however, fails to consider that “to maintain” does not exclusively mean not to change. When
technicians do maintenance work on a house, they do not seek to preserve the house in its original condition. Rather,
they remove some components associated with the functioning and integrity of the house, preserve what still
deserves to be preserved, and they add what will keep the house in the possible optimal condition. Analogically,
maintenance as a function of sustainable forest management can embody simultaneously exploitation (removal) of
renewable resources, preservation of forest resources, and additions (increase) to the renewable resource.
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Figure 6. Map of the zones of Cameroon’s forest estate
Source: Generated with Cameroon Forest GIS Data (World Resource Institute, 2013)
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The 2012 GIS Data on Cameroon Forest makes a significant revelation: for almost a
century (1905 to 1995), Cameroon had just fifteen protected forest spaces that encouraged
biodiversity growth. Through conditionality measures that called for the creation of more
reserved forests and Cameroon government’s ownership of the need to protect its national
biodiversity, eighteen protected forest areas were created and classified by the government in just

Year of Creation and Classification

two decades. Figure 7 represents this progress in chart from.
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Figure 7. Forests created and classified as protected areas from 1905 to 2012 in Cameroon
Source: Created with data from Attribute Table of “Aire Protégé” in Cameroon Forest GIS Data
(World Resource Institute, 2012)
Amidst this positive milestone, the COH has also caused significant biodiversity crisis in
the country. The high cost of producing forest management plans coupled with a 50%
devaluation of the CFA in 1994 as a function of the COH have forced local communities that
intended to own community forests to seek, through a system of trade by batter, the assistance of
logging companies with necessary financial and technical capacities to design the plan. In this
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system, logging companies produce forest management plans for local communities in exchange
for logging rights within the forest spaces of the communities. Intersection of the 2013 World
Resource Institute’s GIS data for Cameroon’s FMU and community forests reveals that logging
companies exploit resources in 268,953.019km2 of community forests that has a total area of
12,973,885.352km2. Let the area of intersection be ∑𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑡, and let the total area of community
forests be ∑𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡. The percentage of community forests exploited by logging companies
will be

∑𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑡.
∑𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡

x 100 = 2.07%

Charlie Pye-Smith envisions this phenomenon of logging companies exploiting resources
within community forests as a serious threat to biodiversity conservation because community
forests fall within the non-permanent forest zones that are not intended for biodiversity
maintenance but for economic, social, and spiritual uses. On average, Cameroon loses 13.3% of
its forest cover annually due to deforestation, in a country with an average of 2,400 species in a
forest area of 2,700km2.2 Logging companies are deforesting 2.07% of community forests. This
percentage value may seem insignificant. However, Nouhou Ndam et al. document that the
forest in the Mount Cameroon area habits an average of 2,400 species in an area of 2,700km2.3
This is a good representation of the biodiversity richness of forest in Cameroon – a richness that
has caused the World Bank and the Cameroon government to engage in the creation of more
protected forest areas in the country. If one extends the figures of Ndam et al to the national
scene, one would find by simple proportion that an average of 239,069 species individuals are at
risk in Cameroon forests because of logging by corporations. The situation is aggravated when

2. Charlie Pye-Smith, Cameroon’s Hidden Harvest (Bogor: CIFOR, 2010), 15.
3. Nohou Ndam et al., “Plant Diversity Assessment on Mount Cameroon: Surveys from 1990 to 2000,”
Systematics and Geography of Plants 71, no.2 (2001): 1017. Accessed January 30, 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3668735
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one considers that this deforestation also goes in the FMU concessions of the giant logging
companies directly procured from government. How right then must Philippe Auxel be to lament
that in the country, “species composition [in the forests] has changed due to the over exploitation
of high value timber species.”4
The COH led to the legalization of non-permanent forest that can be exploited without
concern for biodiversity conservation. The net effect of this laissez-faire regulation has been the
increasing loss of Cameroon’s biodiversity under a myriad of factors sustained by the COH –
factors that logging is only one of. Table 7 displays these factors.
Table 7. Biodiversity Threat under Policies and Laws upheld by the Bank and the Cameroon
Government under the COH
Activities Provoking
Habitat Change
Forest Clearing for
Agriculture

Logging
Uncontrolled Hunting
Poaching
Fuel wood

Nature of Change

Loss of Biodiversity

Flora and fauna vegetation
lost, introduction of new
species, e.g. cocoa,
rubber, oil palm, etc
Upset of ecological balance
wildlife habitat removed
Disturbance of wildlife
management
programme
Habitat destruction

Loss of biodiversity in quality
and quantity
Many species under threat
Reduced flora composition
Threat to wildlife population
Reduction of wild life
population, ecosystem
modification
Destruction of vegetation,
erosion

Source: Adapted from Republic of Cameroon, Cameroon Fourth Annual National Report to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Table 9. Convention on Biological Diversity.
Accessed March 1, 2014. https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/cm/cm-nr-04-en.pdf
The reason for this biodiversity crisis is that in the COH with respect to forest
management in Cameroon, the stakeholders seek to enforce biodiversity maintenance as an
environmental virtue by legal means but fail to interconnect this maintenance with economic and

4. Philippe Auzel et al., “Social and Environmental Costs of Illegal Logging in a Forest Management Unit
in Eastern Cameroon,” Journal of Sustainable Forestry 19, no.1/2/3 (2004): 157.
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social insights. As Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward, and Johanna Mang contend,
neoliberal free trade introduced by conditionality measures into the COH encourages the
exploitation of flora and fauna.5 For over four hundred years, neoclassical economic theorists
upheld the domination of nature by human beings based on the ability of human beings to
dominate and configure nature in a way that other animals and plans cannot do. The theories of
hierarchies in ecology (for example, the superior complexity of tissues over cells, of populations
over tissues, and of ecosystems over populations) corroborated the hierarchical structural system
that neoclassical economists upheld. In this hierarchy, economic systems restrict and alter natural
systems through based on a conception of time that does not follow the rules of nature. Tomde
Schiichier iterates that in the neoclassical economics system time is a duration in which the
“now” is most important. To natural systems, time is an unfolding of moments, and what is most
important is that nature stabilizes itself in the unfolding process. Thus, “the economical system
generates a malfunction and threatens the superior system with destruction and, by the same
token, its own destruction.”6 The impact of privatization is an example of this malfunction.
Although privatization has promoted the involvement of different stakeholders in forest
management, and thereby attempted to end profligate activities such as high bribery and
corruption within the high ranks of government, David Humphrey argues that “privatization
reduces the access rights of local communities and caters to the demands of markets for
immediate financial returns. Market mechanisms tend to generate only those forests goods with
monetary value that can be traded for profit. They cannot capture the full public goods value of

5. Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward, and Johanna Mang, The Root Causes of Biodiversity Loss
(London: Earthscan, 2000), 149.
6. Tommas Schlichter, “Relationships between Economics and Ecology,” in International Workshop on
Economics and Ecology: Proceedings, held in Caties, Turrialba, Costa Rica, 29-30 January, 1991 (Turriabba:
OLAFO/CATIE, 1991), 5.
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forests and thus promote a reductionist view of forests.”7 This reductionist view is also present in
some local peoples’ approach to forest regeneration and vitality.
Forest Regeneration and Vitality
The COH is an example of neoliberals’ betting on local communities to manage forest
spaces sustainably because the communities do not have heavy machines used by corporations to
log vast areas of forest. Through collective action, local communities could resist threats to
unsustainability within their forest spaces. Furthermore, the Bank’s sustainability argument in
the COH was that the fallow cropping system of agriculture practiced by local peoples will give
room for forest to regenerate before they cultivate in the same spaces again. Through ownership,
these arguments led to the legalization of community forests.
An unfortunate element of this reasoning is its failure to define “community” within the
context of Cameroon. The 1994 forest law uses the word “village” as synonymous to
community. However, while it is possible to have a community spirit or sense of social bonding
to others in a village, it is not always the case that such a spirit will reign. When one speaks of
his or her village in Cameroon, one is talking of where one hails from in the line of ancestral
descent. Immigrants who live in some villages do not identify where they currently reside as
their village. The cases of the “came-no-go” in the South West Region and of the Baka pygmies
in the East Province are evidence of this assertion that belonging to a community in Cameroon is
based on ancestral ties and not residence in a place with geographical boundaries.

7. David Humphrey, “Public Goods, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Deforestation,” 9 (Paper presented in
Panel 2.3 on “The High Politics of the Environment” at the Annual Conference of the British International Studies
Association, University of Cork, December 18-20, 2006). Accessed February 26, 2014.
http://www.ibcperu.org/doc/isis/7575.pdf
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The political sociologists and anthropologists, Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh,
note that descendants of persons from the French and Northwest Grassfield lands of Cameroon
who were sent by their chiefs to labor in the plantations in the Bakweri villages at the South
West Atlantic Coast of Cameroon are constantly referred to by the villages as “came-no-go” – a
derogatory expression for immigrants to the Bakweri geographical village; an expression that
refers to one without a home because one came from some other place into a new land, but one
has not returned to one’s place of origin. This opposition between the descendants of settlers who
are viewed by the “sons of the soil” (autochthones) as allogénes or strangers, feel rejected in the
Bakweri lands. Thus, they do not work together with the Bakweri towards forest regeneration.
Rather, with the leverage that their economic viability provides them, they buy lands in the South
West Region, cut down the forest, and build houses. Such cut forest cannot regenerate.8
Geschiere sees the fate of the Baka pygmies as similar to the “came-no-gos.” Under the
wave of political liberalization, the Baka who speak of themselves as people of the forest risk
losing their citizen rights. To the CPDM government, one is valued in these days on multiparty
politics in terms of what one can contribute to the victory of the CPDM in elections. To vote, one
needs a national identification document. Vote power is the currency to buy government officials
with vested interest in the forest and stop them from interfering in the forest spaces of local
peoples. Without identification documents, the Baka pygmies lack this currency. Thus, their
forests have been invaded by logging companies in which government officials own shares.9

8. Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh, “Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and
Belonging,” in Millenial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, ed. Jean Camaroff and John L. Camaroff
(Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2001), 182.
9. Peter Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 67-78 and 124-127.
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According to Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, the effect of this invasion has been displacement
of the pygmies, many of who now crowd the hunting, cultivating, and living spaces of the Bantus
in the East Region. With the contestation of social and food security spaces between the pygmies
and the Bantus, some pygmies move into living in other forest spaces. The consequence of this
political liberalization, social contest, and resettlement is that logging companies that have
chased the Baka pygmies out of the forest are deforesting areas once occupied by the pygmies,
and the pygmies and destroying forest in new areas where they settle.10 Figure 8 shows the
location of one such forest, namely CADENVI Ngoyla community forest (latitude 2.62278 and
longitude 14.02666).

Figure 8. CADENVI Ngoyla as one of five community forests (marked cyan) in Ngoyla Area
Source: Created Using GIS Cameroon Forest Data (World Resource Institute, 2013.
Figure 9 is a pixel view of the same forest location in 2000. It is a magnified view
(1:523,978) of the vegetation map of Africa, which was published by the same Institute in 2004.

10. Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, “Capitalism and Autochthony,” 183-185.
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Figure 9. Pixel view of the mosaic forest and cropland of CADENVI Ngoya Forest in 2000.
Source: Created using Africa Vegetation GIS Data of 2000 (World Resource Institute, 2004).
Figure 10 is a pixel view of the vegetation of the same forest space in 2013.

Figure 10. Pixel view of CADENVI Ngoya community forest area as rural complex in 2013.
Source: Created using GIS Cameroon Forest Data (World Resource Institute, 2013)
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The GIS data in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, and Figure 5.6 reveal the danger that the
sociopolitical and anthropological phenomenon described by Geschiere and Nyamnjoh presents
to forest regeneration and viability in Ngoyla community forest area. Comparing Figures 5.5 and
5.6, one sees that in 2000, the forest allocated to the community was mosaic/cropland forest. In
2013, this deforestation has occurred, and the forest has been transformed from forest land into
rural complexes. This transformation implies a loss of biodiversity that inhabited the forest space
in 2000.
One theory proposed by Phil Rene Oyono that accounts for the cause of this deforestation
is the survival instinct under poverty theory, which says that local peoples easily, and intensively
recourse to forest resources as a means of survival in a time of serious poverty as the sort that the
devaluation of the CFA under World Bank and IMF conditionality measures caused in
Cameroon. Devaluation brought about a fall in the purchasing power of consumers. For example,
among the Bantu, the average annual income per family dropped from USD 83.5 to 20, and
among the Baka pygmies from USD 25 to USD 6.5. Unfortunately, the SAP economic
conditionality package of the Bank also caused increases in the prices of commodities in
Cameroon. To survive, many families turned to the forest for food. Forests were cleared for
planting of food crops and animals were hunted for food, thus depleting the forest biodiversity.11
Sustainable natural resource management is an interdisciplinary phenomenon. If local
peoples’ economic welfare is neglected, they will turn to the environment for their means of
survival. Oyono’s theory suggests that it is simply in the nature of poor humankind to act in this

11.Phil Rene Oyono, “Cameroon Rainforest: Economic Crisis, Rural Poverty,Biodiversity: Local
Communities in the Lomie Region,” Ambio 27, no.7 (November 1998): 558. Accessed March 8, 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4314790
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way for the purpose of self-preservation in existence. Economic welfare and environmental
wellbeing cannot be alienated across the human life span.
“Now and in the Future”: Intergenerational Considerations of Forest Maintenance
Although decree no.0518/MINEF/CAB implementing the 1994 forest law as a product of
the COH prioritizes community forests, this high cost of producing a forest management plan
causes many communities to forfeit their rights to own forest lands. A GIS analysis of
Cameroon’s forest data in 2013 shows that only 151 local communities out of the 375 that have
submitted applications for community forests ownership (40.26%) have been able to produce the
plan.12 Communities without forest management plans are at the risk of forfeiting ownership
rights to their forest lands. These are lands that the communities had possessed in the traditional
and historical contexts in which land in Africa was perceived a property of the commons. Fondo
Sikod iterates that this cultural perception “ensured the conservation of certain plant and animal
species through the system of taboos.”13 Furthermore, forest land under this perception was not
viewed in the capitalist sense of commodities to be sold and bought, but in the anthropological
sense of intergenerational assert.

12. For this GIS analysis, I used the GIS forest data for Cameroon published by the World Resource
Institute in 2013. The shapefile used was CMR_Fcom_2013 that contains data on community forest in Cameroon. In
this analysis, I inserted a data frame in ArcMap, and labelled it Com_FMP (for Community Forest Management
Plan). I then opened the attribute table of CMR_Fcom_2013. The field named “DATE_PSG” has the dates the forest
management plan associated with a particular community forest was approved. After clicking on “Select by
Attributes” and ensuring the method is to create a new selection, I double clicked “DATE_PSG”. I then clicked >,
then clicked Get Unique Values, followed by a double click of ' '. Therefore, the expression box read:
"DATE_PSG" > ' ' I ended the query operation by clicking Apply. Looking under the field labeled
“ATTRIBUTAI,” I noticed, for example, that the management plans of the forest attributed to Cobadem have not
been approved, while that of Tinto has been approved. I then calculated the selected data in cyan (151) as a
percentage of the total number of community forests (375) visible at the bottom of the attribute table with selected
data.
13. Fondo Sikod, “Poverty and Environmental Degradation in Cameroon,” 1. Accessed March 1, 2014.
EOLSS. http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c11/e1-15-03-03.pdf
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As Ambe J. Njoh explains, this sense means that distant past generations in Cameroon
considered themselves custodians of lands for future generations. Ownership of forest lands was
preserved within family and village circles. 14 Mike A. Yanou and Patience Sone iterate that
proprietorship of forest lands was not lost because lands were not valued in economic terms and
sold to raise money for family and village needs.15 Rather, as Yanou and Sone add, forest lands
were involuntarily surrendered as spoils in cases of war.16 Temngah Joseph Nyambo notes that
forest lands were also possessed by inheritance along with family lands, thereby ensuring that
families always owned their lands.17 According to Emmanuel Neba Ndenacho, these family and
community owned forest lands were preserved, voluntarily offered by owners to migrants for
house construction and small scale agricultural purpose, and forest resource exploitation was
moderate for religious rites, medicinal objectives, and basic family agricultural subsistence
purposes.18
The COH has changed this ancestral perception of the integration of anthropocentric
necessities and the stewardship of the environment for the needs of future generations. Phil Rene
Oyono, Charlotte Kouna, and William Mala carried out an ecological anthropology study in the
local communities of Akok, Kaya, and Koli-Ngoumou in Cameroon to access how the present
generation in the COH era of forest management in the country perceives nowadays’ access to

14. Ambe J. Njoh, “Indigenous Peoples and Ancestral Lands: Implications of the Bakweri Case in
Cameroon,” in Essays in African Land Law, ed. Robert K. Home (Cape Town: Pretoria University Law Press,
2011), 71.
15. Mike A. Yanou and Patience Sone, “Women and Land Registration in Anglophone Cameroon: Lessons
from South Africa,” in Issues in Women’s Land Rights in Cameroon, ed. Lotsmart N. Fonjong (Bamenda, Langaa
RPCIG, 2012), 99.
16. Ibid., 88.
17. Temngah Joseph Nyambo, “Female Inheritance between Customary Law and Modern Jurisprudence in
Cameroon,” in Gender Relations in Cameroon: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo
(Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG, 2012), 104.
18. Emmanuel Neba Ndenecho, Decentralization and Spatial Development Planning in Cameroon
(Bamenda, Langaa RPCIG, 2011), 119-121.
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forest resource benefits in the country in an intergenerational timeline. Their findings are
represented in Figure 11.

Distribution of 100 pebbles in Akok, Kaya2, and Koli-Ngoumou
representing the perception of intergenerational access to forest
resources (vertical axis)
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Figure 11. Disparities in Intergenerational Access to Forest Resources as Perceived by the Akok,
Kaya, and Koli-Ngoumou Local Communities in Cameroon.
Source: Stakeholders’ perception of intergenerational access to forest resources data used in
constructing this chart was obtained from Phil Rene Oyono, Charlotte Kouana, and William
Mala, “Benefits of Forests in Cameroon: Global Structure, Issues Involving Access and
Decision-Making Hiccoughs,” Forest Policy and Economics 7 (2005): 360.
Figure 10 shows that although local communities risk dispossessing their ancestral forest
lands under the current forest management system constructed by the COH (as in the case of the
World Bank’s project in Ngoyla Mintom19), present generations over exploit forest resources

19. The World Bank project in Ngoyla Mintom involved the erection of a new protected area and logging
and mining concessions, which overlapped with resource areas customarily used by indigenous and local
communities. The project included plans for land use and land tenure studies. However, there were no measures
explicitly stated to foster the inclusion of indigenous peoples and local communities in the project design and
implementation process that would have ensured that the local communities continuously possessed their lands. The
Bank operationalized as “sensitization” workshops its own OP4.10 that calls for “Free Prior and Informed
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compared to past generations, and this exploitation will limit the access that future generations
will have to forest resources.
COH and the Use of Forest Resources
The COH associated reforms introduced auction - a competitive bidding system – as the
method of awarding a 15-year renewable harvesting right to the forest, with the claim that this
long duration (compared to the previous five year system) will allow concessionaires to reinvest
their capital in the forest, instead of engaging in quick cut-and-run that clears the forest. The
winner of the bid has to show proof of adequate technical expertise and investment capacity, and
comply with the technical, social and environmental obligations spelt out in the management
plan. Topa et al. note that Cameroon became the first country in the world to adopt this method
of opening the door for interested parties to use the forest, and it has had significant impact: “less
than 10 years after this system was implemented in Cameroon, harvesting rights went from being
administratively distributed, short-term concessions, free from any forest management
obligations, to being long-term, competitively awarded concessions, accompanied by forest
management obligations spanning the duration of the contract.”20 The auctioning system has
opened the doors for the government to generate more revenue from the forest. The
administratively set base in the form of forest annual tax in 1990 was $0.60 per hectare. Under
the market mechanism, the area tax to an average of $5.60 per hectare for FMUs and to $13.70
per hectare for ventes de coupe in 2005.21

Consultation” of local peoples before the start of any Bank projects. World Bank, “PPG CBSP: Conservation and
Sustainable Use of the Ngoyla Mintom Forest,” (June 20, 2010): 5. Failure to include the indigenes in the project
design and implementation sidelines and denies local peoples of their customary rights to their forest lands.
20. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 39.
21. Ibid.
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Economically advantageous as this free market system is, Topa et al. observe that the
efficiency of this neoliberal forest procurement model depends both on confidentiality and
competition.22 Confidentiality means that information provided by the bidders on their identity
and capacity has to be treated as secret by the awarding body in order to protect them from unfair
competition from other bidders. This is an ethical stand that raises two issues. First,
confidentiality hides information from the public on who intends to exploit the wealth of the
nation; second, it contradicts the necessity of free access to information by which competition in
the market is enhanced.
From the discussion on transparency in chapter one, this unavailability of information is a
non-transparent measure that may present unpleasant surprises to the public. Such is the case of
the American palm oil company, Herakles Farm. The people of Nguti were surprised to find that
their source of livelihood, namely, the forest, had been procured by this company following a
confidential auction deal with the government, without any prior notification of the local peoples
who were henceforth excluded from accessing the forest that they had relied on for many years
for their food and energy supplies and spiritual needs. Greenpeace vividly documents this
unpleasant phenomenon:
The area [acquired through confidential auction] includes 62,433 hectares (154,209 acres)
of dense natural forest as well as farmland and agroforestry smallholdings. . . . A
Greenpeace team documented that the setting up of one of the project’s nurseries at Fabe
deprived people of access to a valuable collecting area for forest products, and that cocoa
farms have been taken without farmers’ consent. Locals were not properly consulted
before the establishment convention was signed. The convention gives Herakles Farms
the exclusive right to farm in the area and includes no provisions for compensation of
residents. The company claims “a huge outpouring of support from communities”, and
says its project will not displace people, yet simultaneously communities have
consistently objected to the plans by complaining to the government, signing petitions
and organizing peaceful demonstrations.
In 2010, Herakles began illegally clearing forest to establish oil palm nurseries, in
the absence of a presidential decree authorizing the concession, which is required by law.
22. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 40.
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Herakles has also violated a court decision, made in the town of Mundemba, to suspend
all activity of its plantation following a complaint filed by local people. Furthermore, the
company was found guilty of illegal logging; forestry officials issued a report detailing
these activities in April 2012.23
Although the actions of Herakles Farms constitute a take-over of lands on which men
farm their cocoa, women are the most affected in this land grab confidential auction system.
Women gather forest products such as bush mango (Irvingia gabonensis), monkey cola (Cola
lepidota), and bush pepper (Piper guineensis) with which they provide food to families. They
also sell these products locally and in the Nigerian international market to improve their
economic status. Greenpeace documents that these “forest products provide around 30% of
women’s cash income in the region.”24 Robert Dibie highlights the contention of Marxist
feminist theory that gender inequality has its roots in class inequalities created by the capitalist
political economy.25 In line with this theory, one notes that the procurement of the Nguti forest
by Herakles Farms, and the fact that local women cannot access this forest as they did in the past,
therefore, constitute acts of the disempowerment and control of women with respect to forest
management. This ceasing of women’s spaces in forest management and the associated
economic impoverishment limits their space of control in the local decision-making process
because they lack the financial strength to bargain their influence in the Cameroon society:
“where women have economic power,” writes Akwalefo Bernadette Djeudo, “they are able to
control their lives better than elsewhere.”26

23. Greenpeace, Herakles Farms in Cameroon: A Showcase of Bad Palm Oil Production (Washington, DC:
Greenpeace USA, 2013), 4 and 6. Greenpeace. Accessed March 8, 2014.
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/planet3/PDFs/Forests/HeraklesCrimeFile.pdf
24.Ibid., 8
25. Robert Dibie, “Globalization and Women’s Empowerment in Africa,” in Globalization and the Third
World Women: Exploiting, Coping and Resistance, ed. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern and Isidor Wallimann (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2009), 162.
26. Akwalefo Bernadette Djeudo, Concepts that Shape Politics and Government in Cameroon: A
Handbook of Political Theories for Stakeholders (Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2013), 70.
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At the heart of this disempowerment of women is a problem in the 1994 forest law that
rarifies the COH. It is a problem that can be articulated in two ways. First, the law assumes that
there is equal rights in local communities with respect to resource management. Consequently,
and second, the law is silent on gender inequality with respect to natural resource management in
the country.27 Driss Ezzine de Blas, Manuel Ruiz-Pérez, and Cédric Vermeulen capture the first
perspective in these words: “Finally, the 1994 Forestry Law interprets ‘community’ as a
homogeneous group of forest users relating to power and land tenure, bypassing the reality of
local forest tenure, which is mainly composed of adjacent spaces owned by different families
with unequal historical rights.”28 Historically, unequal rights with respect to forest tenure and
forest resource use are most visible in the inequality that exists between women and men vis-àvis forest resource management in Cameroon. It is because of such inequality that, as Joyce
Endeley found in her research on women empowerment in the country, Bafaw women, led by the
women’s traditional council (Wupunda), have demanded that the Bafaw traditional council
should give and recognize the right of Bafaw women to possess, control, and dispose of all lands
– forest and otherwise – just as men do.29 Frank F. K. Byamughisha iterates that “legal
recognition of women’s land rights is the first step toward reversing the discrimination against
women.”30 Thus, a legal framework of forest management that fails to recognize and highlight

27. Patience U. Ajonina et al. claim that “gender-sensitive policies” were a “concern in the reformed 1994
forest, wildlife and fisheries legislation.” See Patience U. Ujonina et al., “Gender Roles and Economics of
Exploitation, Processing and Marketing of Bivalves and Impacts on Forest Resources in the Senaga Delta Region of
Douala-Edea Wildlife Reserve, Cameroon,” International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology
12 (2005): 170. However, there is no mention of gender issues anywhere in the 1994 Forest Law. It seems,
therefore, that if the claim of Ajonina et al. is true, then the sensitivity resulted in a deliberate avoidance of any
statement that has gender connotations in the law.
28. Driss Ezzine de Blas, Manuel Ruiz-Pérez, and Cédric Vermeulen, “Managing Conflicts in Cameroonian
Community Forest,” Ecology and Society 16, no.1 (2011): 8. Accessed April 3, 2014.
file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/ES-2010-3845.pdf
29. Joyce Endeley, “Conceptualizing Women’s Empowerment in Societies in Cameroon: How Does
Money Fit In?” Gender and Development 9, no. 1 (March 2001): 37.
30. Frank F. K. Byamugisha, Securing Africa’s Land for Shared Prosperity (Washington, DC: Agence
Françias de Développement and World Bank, 2013), 15.
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the role of women in forest management, in a society in which there is gender inequality, is
based on a COH dimension of selective inclusion of stakeholders that fails to include clearly
women in the management of forest resources.
It is worth noting that the relationship between forest and women is not only one way;
that is, just as women (and the families to which they provide food) benefit economically and
nutritionally from the forest, the forest also benefits from the approaches that women adopt in the
use of forest land and resources. In the division of labor that characterizes traditional societies in
Cameroon and many other African countries, men cut-clear permanently forest spaces to grow
cash crops such as coffee and cocoa for the economic wellbeing of families. Women, however,
engage in a form of agro-forestry that preserves many trees on plots to serve the clamber growth
needs of climbing crops such yams (Dioscorea species of the family Dioscoreaceae).
Furthermore, as Peter K. Karani observes using the traditional Ugandan society as an example of
forest management practices in traditional Africa, “cultivation of food crops . . . did not involve
the destruction of all trees on the plot . . . because they were too large to fell.”31 Nowadays,
neoliberalism gives room for logging companies such as Herakles Farm to dominate forest lands
by using technologically sophisticated machines to destroy more trees than women do in
traditional farming methods. If these are the sort of equipment that the Bank argued would lead
to sustainable forest management, then ironically for the good of the forest, women, as Esther
Mwangi, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Yan Sun found in their study of forest management in Latin
America and Africa, do not have access to these machines.32

31. Peter K. Karani, Sustainable Management of Tropical Forest in Uganda (London: Commonwealth
Secretariat, 1994), 4.
32. Esther Mwangi, Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Yan Sun, “Gender and Sustainable Forest Management in East
Africa and Latin America,” Ecology and Society 16, no.1 (2011): 17. Accessed April 5, 2014.
file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/ES-2010-3873.pdf
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Three other characteristics of women’s agro-forestry are crop rotation, mixed cropping,
and fallow farming. Cameroonian women do not exploit forest in large scale as logging
companies do. Women are interested in cultivating forest lands for food production and low
scale production of crops that they often sell in the local markets for their economic welfare.
Therefore, they have to equilibrate farming for economic enrichment and ensuring that forest
lands remain fertile for food crops cultivation. Based on indigenous knowledge, women adopt
mixed cropping and crop rotation to attain this balance. Jane I Guyer observes that in mixed
cropping Cameroonian women, for example, plant leguminous plants such as groundnuts and
maize in the same forest space. Nitrogen fixing bacteria such as Rhizobium leguminosarum
attach to the roots of leguminous plants. By fixing nitrogen in the soil, they improve soil fertility,
thereby improving crop yield and fostering the growth of forest plants in fallow times when
women leave the forest to regenerate.33
Concerning crop rotation, women plant crops such as maize on a forest plot in one
season, then plant beans on the same plot in the next farming season. The FAO acknowledges
that “crop rotation is a key principle of conservation agriculture because it improves the soil
structure and fertility, and because it helps control weeds, pests and diseases.”34 These are
sustainable forest management approaches that women use in their exploitation of forest lands.
The COH, by minimizing the role of women as stakeholders in forest management and
upholding logging by giant corporations, and by denying women access to forest lands that they
have cultivated sustainably for many decades, as in the above mentioned case of Herakles Farm,
ends up withholding from the forest these elements of soil fertility and resource regeneration.

33. Jane I Guyer, Family and Farm in Southern Cameroon (Boston: African Studies Center, 1984), 86.
34. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), “Crops and Cropping Systems,” 104. Accessed April 4,
2014. http://www.fao.org/ag/ca/AfricaTrainingManualCD/PDF%20Files/06CROP1.PDF

145

With respect to competition, the politics of “to the victor belongs the spoil” suggests that
competitive approaches to acquiring natural resources have the risk of turning those resources
into objects that are dominated by the victor, and “spoiled” in this phenomenon of dominion. The
victor turns to value the resources only as objects to be exploited and used for the victor’s own
gains. Focusing on the case of logging, one finds that the volume of timber species harvested in
Cameroon has significantly increased since the 1994 forest law was enacted by the Cameroon
government after negotiations with the World Bank and the hybridization of forest management
policies and regulations from both parties. This volume of timber harvest in Cameroon’s forest is
represented in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Timber volume harvested in Cameroon forest from 1987 to 2010
Source: Data for 1987 to 1996 came from Richard Eba’a Atyi’s “Cameroon’s Logging Industry:
Structure, Economic Importance and Effects of Devaluation,” Center for International Forestry
Research Occasional Paper No. 14 (August 1998): Figure 6. Data for 1997 to 2002 came from
Foahom, “Biodiversity Planning Support Programme,” 16-17. Data for 2002 to 2010 came from
the earlier cited Republic of Cameroon, “Cameroon Fourth National Report to the Convention on
Biological Diversity,” Appendix III.
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The graph shows that timber harvest quickly rose after the enactment of the 1994 forest
law; thus, expressing a negative effect of the COH in terms of biodiversity conservation, and a
positive impact of the COH with respect to the exploitation of the forest for economic gains. The
fall in timber exploitation after the year 2000 is thanks to Cameroon government “owning” the
forest reforms by imposing a log export ban, although the World Bank’s conditionality measures
opposed this action of the government. Due to this opposition, the government did not totally
stop the ban, rather it modified the ban rules in 2003 by restricting the exportation of only some
species of timber. This, again, caused more timber exploitation. This increase in timber
exploitation at the availability of the least regulatory opportunity can be explained in terms of
firm theory. To lay a foundation to provide a firm-theory based explanation for the increase in
timber harvesting, it is necessary do carry out a cost-benefit analysis so as to determine the
financial gains that logging companies ideally make.
If one assumes constant cost and benefits for a three years period of forest resource
exploitation within a concession, then one can carry out a cost-benefit analysis to determine
when logging companies break-even, and what cumulated discount cash flow they have at the
time that they break even. Using data from multiple sources,35 one finds that logging companies
that exploit concessions hypothetically break-even within the first year of procuring a concession

35. The cost of legality compliance, cost of forest certification, baseline timber harvesting annual operation
costs (based on one annual coupe), and cost estimates for meeting legality and/or sustainability for timber producers
values came from Table 10.2, Table 10.3, Table 5.1, and Table 10.4 respectively in Atyi’s “Study on Development
and Progress in Timber Procurement Policies. Country Case Study: Cameroon.” I calculated the value of timber
export products to European markets using 2007 average. In the above mentioned article, precisely in Table 6.5,
Atyi provides the US dollar value of all concession products sold in the European market in 2007. Paolo Omar
Cerutti, Robert Nasi and Luca Tacconi on page 36 of their article titled, “Sustainable Forest Management in
Cameroon Needs more than Approved Forest Management Plans,” Ecology and Society 13, no.2, state that there
were 101 concessions in Cameroon in 2007. I divided the total number of each product as Atyi provides by 101 to
determine the average number of each product from a concession. Considering that Atyi also provides the market
value of the total of each product, I then used simple proportion mathematics to determine the market value of each
product from a concession. Finally, I summed up the European market value of each product from a concession.
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in Cameroon. Table 8 displays the ideal cumulative cash flows of these companies within three
years of timber harvesting.
Table 8. Cost-Benefit Analysis/ Capital Budgeting in US $ for Logging within Concessions in
Cameroon
Discount Rate =

0
2

Year
0
1
3
Cash Flows
Cost of Legality
Compliance
($308,418.330)
Cost of Forest Certification
($98,481.570)
Baseline timber harvesting
($489,184.000) ($489,184.000) ($489,184.000)
annual operation costs
(based on one annual coupe)
Value of Timber Export
$3,520,905.040 $3,520,905.040 $3,520,905.040
Products to European
markets using 2007 average
Cost Estimates for Meeting
Legality and/or
sustainability for Timber
Producers
Total Cash Flow
Cumulative Cash Flow

($41,911.030)

($41,911.030)

($41,911.030)

($406,899.900) $2,989,810.010 $2,989,810.010 $2,989,810.010
($406,899.900) $2,582,910.110 $5,572,720.120 $8,562,530.130

The economic theory of the growth of the firm as elaborated upon by Edith Tilton
Penrose asserts that this quick break-even is an incentive for companies to aim at profit
maximization by taking advantage of every opportunity to expand production for the growth of
the firm.36 Robinson Djeukam iterates that with this sort of incentive, companies increase log
harvesting in order to generate more revenue from sales of logs from their concessions.
Logging companies consider the forest only in its economic dimension and their single
objective is to maximize financial benefit. Their “grab-it-and-run” logic – a good
example of what early 20th-century European geographers called Raubwirtschaft –
consists in extracting the maximum of rich timber species in very little time, without
36. Edith Tilton Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),
29.
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concern for sustainability. These practices are based on high discount rates, indicating an
undervaluation of the future. Companies want to get profits to pay back debt to banks
(that charge interest rates), to pay dividends to shareholders, and to make further
investments. Profits are obtained by discounting future sustainability. Accordingly,
companies perceive sustainable management as a constraint to overcome.37
Selective logging, which is the approach towards sustainability fostered by stakeholders
through the COH, may be less hazardous to canopies than clearing. However, Djeukam argues
that this approach encourages companies to search for the best trees by constructing roads deep
into the forest, thereby failing to appreciate the socio-ecological complexity associated with
forest management in the hands of corporations. Selective logging has had the effect of
destroying peasant fields, opening up the forest to human settlements and farming, and to
commercial hunting. The effect of these practices on forest management in Cameroon has been
unaccountability in the forest sector. Human settlements within forest spaces inevitably render
forest resources such as Loxodonta africana cyclotis and Gorilla gorilla accessible to people
who are hardly accountable to the government on how they extract resources from the forest for
their social, religious, economic, and medicinal interests.38 Djeukam also argues:
Although promoters of timber exploitation argue that selective logging on large
concessions is required in order to reach sustainable management, none of this, in actual
practice, is proven to be true . . . . Present logging methods [promoted by the COH that
encourages logging with heavy and more effective machinery] are very destructive since
the extraction of each cubic meter of wood implies the destruction of larger volumes,
resulting in a significant change of the initial ecosystem diversity. Harvested volumes can
be as low as 5–6 m3/ha out of a potential volume of 35 m3/ha. This is because only a few
high value timber species (8% of known species) are extracted from the forest for
commercial purposes . . . .
In addition, it is important to note that there is much waste of the valuable wood –
up to 25% of raw logs – at the logging sites in the forest as well as at the sawmill . . . .39

37. Robinson Djeukam, “Forestry and Communities in Cameroon,” 10. Accessed March 04, 2014. Friends
of the Earth International. http://www.ceecec.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Forestry_in_Cameroon_19-05.pdf
38. Ibid., 10.
39. Ibid.
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These socioeconomic phenomena and forest resource wastage factors are not considered
by the Bank and the Cameroon government in the formulation of sustainable forest management
legal framework. Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward, and Johanna Mang emphasize that these
factors contradict the assertion that the legal enforcement of biodiversity maintenance measures is

sufficient to the control of standing volumes that can be logged annually.40 Therefore, the
suggestion that allowing logging companies to continue extraction within a concession for longer
periods of time is a sustainable forest management approach that incentivizes companies to stop
cut-and-run forest resource exploitation is a faulty argument. Private ownership, Lawrence C.
Christy et al. argue, does not always give the incentive to care for forest land considering that
individuals and business entities give less value to long-term benefits because of the time-value
of money.41
One can also ask to extent to which the use of forest resources is providing economic
benefits to local communities. Apart from the state that does not need to produce a plan on how
it will manage its own protected forest lands before the government itself can approve the
reservation, all other potential forest land owners must submit a forest management plan to the
government within the first three years transition period of concession allocation. Within this
period, the manager is allowed to exploit a thirtieth of the concession each year. This need of a
management plan does not envision any difference between the capacities of local communities,
councils, logging companies, and private individuals to produce the required plans.
In a study on development and progress in the timber procurement policies of Cameroon,
Richard Eba’a Atyi found that for an average concession size of 58,971 ha that would

40. Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward and Johanna Mang, The Root Causes of Biodiversity Loss
(London: Earthscan, 2000), 149.
41. Lawrence C. Christy, Forest Law and Sustainable Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007),
66.
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theoretically involve a harvest on 1,966 ha per year to produce approximately 13,762m3 of
commercial logs annually, the company managing the forest has to invest an average of
147.4million CFA (294,158 US$) to produce a management plan. It cost an additional 3.9
million CFA (7,666 US $) annually to obtain and manage a legality certificate.42 C. Julve et al. in
a study of community forests in the country found that the development of a simple forest
management plan costs 8,195,000 CFA (16,390 US$) and the operational cost will be 89,640 /m³
(179.3 US$/m3).43 One cannot expect that villagers in a country with a United Nation’s Human
Development Index value of 0.495 and a multidimensional poverty index of 0.287%44 will easily
raise at least 8 million CFA to produce a forest management plan. Comparatively, logging
companies that have sufficient capital can bear the cost of producing a forest management plan,
and thereby fully possessing forest spaces more easily than local communities or villages.
COH and Forest Management Control
Forest Management control in the light of the COH in Cameroon can be analyzed from
multiple perspectives. Here, one shall consider the zoning of forest in Cameroon as a way to
create small forest units that can be controlled, and decentralization in forest management. The
case of the coopting council forests into the national political alliance of the ruling CPDM is
peculiar in the realities of the zoning of forest in the country.

42. Richard Eba’a Atyi, “Study on Development and Progress in Timber Procurement Policies. Case Study:
Cameroon,” (8 August, 2009): 7 and 8. Accessed February 1, 2014. International Tropical Timber Organization.
file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/Cameroon_[en].pdf
43. C. Julve et al., “Séduisante, Théorie, Douloureuse Pratique: La Foresterie Communautaire
Camerounaise en Butte à sa Propre Législation,” Parcs et Réserves 62, no.2 (2007): 21-22.
44. United Nations Development Program, “Human Development Reports, Cameroon.” Accessed March
15, 2014. United Nations. http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/CMR
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) examines the nature and intensity of poverty at the individual level, with
poor people being those who are multiply deprived and the extent of their poverty being measured by the extent of
their deprivations. The MPI creates a vivid picture of people living in poverty within and across countries, regions
and the world. The MPI is calculated by multiplying the incidence of poverty (percentage of people who are poor)
and the average intensity of MPI poverty across the poor (%).
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Coopting Council Forests
According to the 1994 forest law and the implementation degree of 1995 that translates
the COH into a legal framework, 50% of forest lands in the country have to be national forests,
40% have to be council forests, and 10% have to be community forests. A GIS based calculation
(from attribute table) shows that the total area covered by national forest in 2013 was
71,151,751.017km2; the total area of council forest was 9,340,062.938km2; and the total area of
community forests was 12,973,885.352km2. Table 9 displays these areas in terms of percentages.
Table 9. A Comparison of the legal and actual percentages of the Cameroon’s National, Council,
and Community forest zones in 2013.

Forest Zone

1994 Forest Law (% Area)

Actual (%
Area)

National

50%

76.13%

Council

40%

9.99%

Community

10%

13.88%

Source: The data herein were calculated using Cameroon’s GIS forest sector data published by
the World Resource Institute in 2013.
These data suggest that Cameroon prioritizes national forests over council forests. This is
not unexpected, considering the political relationship between councils and the state or national
government. In Cameroon, councils and national governments are headed executively by
political parties, and the ruling CPDM party governs most councils. Jean-Paul Kouega suggests
that under party allegiance, municipal councilors often forsake their rights of independent
administration of council affairs to party hierarchy elites within the national executive.45 This

45. Jean-Paul Kouega, A Dictionary of Cameroon English Usage (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2007), 23.
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allegiance can be explained in terms of the elite theory of political science and the matching
hypothesis proposed by social psychologists.
According to the elite theory that Gaetano Mosca posits, political classes or elites have “a
certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority” over those they govern.46 Bringing
together insights from psychology and sociology, Vilfredo Pareto observes that elites are adept at
using such superiority in two modes of political rule, namely, force and persuasion.47 Juan Linz
points out Robert Michels’s contention that as elites use these modes to gain control of funds,
promotion, and the flow of information, they concentrate organizational functioning power in
their hands.48 When this occurs, lower institutions of power within managerial structures become
stooges who lose their power and rights to independent management of collective resources such
as council forest lands. This elite theory can be corroborated by the matching hypothesis of
social psychology. Spencer A. Rathus expressed this hypothesis in the proverb, birds of one
feather flock together.49 As “birds” do so “flock,” it is easy for the municipal councils under the
ruling CPDM to ally with the national CPDM party and interests of high party officials within
the state executive branch. This alliance puts potential council forests at the risk of being taken
over easily by national interest without contest from the CPDM councilors. This deprives the
councils of large scale ownership of forests.
On another note, there is a significant confusion in the forest zone designations. Council
forests fall under the permanent forest zone. Under the non-permanent zone, one finds
“commune”. What does this “commune” refer to, especially because it does not appear in

46. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 51.
47. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology (New York: Dover, 1935),
paras.2031-2034 and 2051.
48. Juan Linz, Robert Michels, Political Sociology, and the Future of Democracy, ed. H.E. Chehabi (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 86.
49. Spencer A. Rathus, Psychology: Concepts and Connections, Brief Version, 8th ed. (Belmont, CA:
Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 515.
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Cameroon’s territorial administration structure?50 A “commune,” writes Carol J. Pierce Colfer, is
“a district, municipality, council, an administrative unit.”51 In this regard, it is redundant to make
a commune a distinct forest zone because it can also be a council forest. This redundancy breeds
uncertainty and confusion in the management of forest in Cameroon.
Decentralization
The 1993 forest policy, by including limitedly local populations in forest management,
suggested that the Cameroon government to some extent valued the decentralization of forest
management. The 1994 forest law laid out the legal framework for this decentralization by
creating permanent forest controlled by the government and non-permanent forest controlled by
different stakeholders such as councils, communities, “communes,” and private individuals. On a
positive note, as has been indicated above, decentralization has increased the formal access
(recognized under Cameroon law) of local peoples to forest resources. It has also weakened the
prebendalistic clientelism in forest management, thereby saving forest management – to some
extent – from the dominion of political elites.
Decentralization of forest management with respect to the COH needs to be understood
within the context of the World Bank’s concept of “good governance”. Matthias Finger,
Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche avow that this is a concept that gives the World Bank
the theoretical foundation to interfere in the political and social conditions of a country in a way
that avoids confrontation with the government. 52 In this concept, the Bank rejects misconceived

50. Cameroon’s formal territorial administrative structure includes, in descending units order, state,
regions, divisions, subdivisions, and councils. Villages are communities that identify themselves as cultural and
traditional tribal units.
51. Carol J. Pierce Colfer, The Complex Forest: Communities, Uncertainty, and Adaptive Collaborative
Management (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2005), 361.
52. Matthias Finger, Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche, “Introduction: Conceptual Elements,” in The
Multi-Governance of Water, eds. Matthias Finger, Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche (New York: State
University of New York Press, 2006), 8.
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post-independence development models in Africa that “have failed” because they emphasized
rapid-state led industrialization as modernization in Africa without insisting that African nations
have to adapt Western type democracy.53 This is the sort of democracy, which in Abraham
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, asserts that “government of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish from the earth.”54 The Bank suggests that this conceptualization of
Western style democratic governance is not alien to traditional African society as the colonial
development paradigm that sort the elimination of traditional African values from public life
claimed on the basis that the beliefs and practices of African society were incompatible with
Weberian bureaucracy.55 According to Max Weber’s bureaucracy, governments are
representations of moral orders understood as “sets of authoritative rules and institutional
arrangements – that impose certain obligations on their members, including the obligation to
obey.”56
Contrary to this colonial development paradigm that embraced absolute top-to-bottom
administrative approach, good governance, says Pierre Landell-Mills, the Bank’s former Senior
Policy Advisor for the African Region, affirms that there are “close links between governance,
cultural relevance and the components of civil society.”57 Accordingly, the Bank posits that

53. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washinton, DC: World
Bank,1989), 3 and 83.
54. Majid Behrouzi, Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the People: The Betrayal of an Ideal
(Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2005), 16.
55. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 60
In the Bangwa tribe of Cameroon, there is a cultural dance in which the populace define their influence in the affairs
of tribal governance. The dancers, in the musical act known as leke, proclaim that there are twelve chiefs of the
Bangwa land led by the Fon of the land; although the Fon is head, power is devolved to the different communities of
the tribe headed by the chiefs who the Fon consults and listens to in matters of tribal administration. This
sociological ontological narrative indicates that African traditional society involved popular participation in the
affairs of villages, tribes and clans through small community institutions that had the powers to influence village,
tribal and clan affairs through representatives who the tribal head consulted, and did not merely govern by a top-tobottom approach.
56. Tompkins, Organization Theory and Public Management, 43.
57. Pierre Landell-Mills, “Governance, Cultural Change and Empowerment,” Journal of Modern African
Studies,” 30 no.4 (1992): 567.
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“each country has to devise institutions which are consonant with its social values.”58 Managerial
institutions, adds the Bank, therefore, must “reflect national characteristics and be consistent
with the country’s cultural values.”59
These good governance affirmations are expressions of the Bank’s policy of ownership.
The Bank also insists that good governance is the bedrock for positive outcome of aid
conditionality for economic growth.60 Good governance, therefore, can be said to be a metaphor
of the COH. The Bank’s thoughts in this metaphor ultimately imply that in a country as
Cameroon in which the existence and legal recognition of traditional institutions that govern
village life is part of the hidden transcript of the management of societal affairs, villages cannot
be excluded from forest management. In as much as these institutions exist alongside a more
publicly recognized state, the state cannot also be excluded from forest management. In this
existential juxtaposition of the state and local communities, the power to manage forest has to be
shared between state structures and local institutions. This participatory approach constitutes the
decentralization of forest management in Cameroon. Decentralization has structural impact on
forest management.
Norman Jones posits from an engineering viewpoint that structural impact looks at how
structures and components behave within a large dynamic system that yields inelastic
deformations.61 Inelastic deformations involve the stressing of materials beyond yield point or
limits of permanent alterations. Analogically, and in managerial institutional terms, structural
impact examines the behavior of structures and components of institutions within a dynamic

58. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 60.
59. World Bank, Governance and Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992), 12.
60. World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 37.
61. Norman Jones, Structural Impact, 2nd ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
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managerial system characterized by abnormalities that have attained permanent status. An
example of such abnormalities is ingrained corruption.
In 1998, Transparency International, which ranks countries according to the way citizens
perceive corruption in their public sector, ranked Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the
world. In 2007, the same agency list the forest sector of Cameroon as one of the highest “poles
of corruption” in the country.62 How has the COH contributed in putting the forest sector (thus,
forest management) in this pole?
The COH assumed that by putting in place independent observers who focus on
transparency in the legal institutions and economic transactions associated with forest
management, corruption in forest management will be eliminated. This assumption fails to
consider an important point that has been raised by William Q. Judge, D. Brian McNatt and
Weichu Xi. Corruption is not merely an economic phenomenon. It is also a moral problem that
affects the socio-cultural norms and political outlook of a society. Considering that the bribery
and corruption “scratch my back, I scratch your own”63 proverbial maxim of the ruling
government in Cameroon expresses these norms and outlook, forest management in the country
cannot be free from corruption based on a narrow economic and legal scope. In as much as the
COH allows government officials with questionable moral integrity to make final decisions on
the allocation of concessions, approval of forest management plans, collection and management

62. Transparency International, “Cameroon 2007,” National Integrity Systems Country Study Report.
Berlin. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis/regional/africa_middle_east
63. “Scratch my back, I scratch your own” is a very common proverb that one hears from members of the
ruling CPDM party in Cameron in both the public and private arena. It is a hidden transcript by which they assert
themselves in Cameroon’s sociopolitical landscape, and justify their modus operandi with respect to the
administration of public goods. Coined in Pidgin English, one can literarily translate the maxim into English as “If
you scratch my back, then I will scratch yours.” Basically, it means that officials exercise their duties as favors
returned for something given by he or she who needs their services. This “something given” often means bribe.
Patrick Hanks,

157

of forest financial resources, and justice for defaulters on the forest management law,
decentralized forest management remains under what Phil Rene Oyono terms, “captivity.”64
Oyono provides a phenomenon that exemplifies this captivity: administrative slowness.
There is a long and slow path from the demarcation of community forest to when the Ministry of
Environment and Forests approves the application.65 There is a disparity in the number of
applications submitted for the demarcation of community forest in a year, and the number of
applications that actually get approved for a management agreement to be signed. This long
period of waiting results from a difference in the perception of time that characterizes the COH.
The COH seeks through conditionality to use classical economic models to manage forest
resources so as to encourage investments and savings. These models involve a positive rate of
time preference William A. McEarchen notes that in this per-second perception of time, the
“now” is more valuable than the “then.”66 In the conception of time that the Cameroon
government brings into the COH through the policy of ownership, however, time is not chronos,
or, to use the words of “duration that affects the faith of the individual. It is the rhythm of the
breathing of the social group.”67 In the African conception of time as social, what matters is not
when one arrives for an event; value is rather in presence that exceeds – no matter when one
arrived. In philosophical terms, chronos emphasizes when something happened, while social
time centers on whether something happened. One focuses on the “when,” and the other stresses
the “what”. To government officials in the Ministry, therefore, what is significant is approval or

64. Phil Rene Oyono, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Paradoxes of Natural Resources Management
Decentralization in Cameroon,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no.1 (March 2004): 100.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876175
65. Oyono, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?” 100.
66. William A. McEarchen, Economics: A Contemporary Introduction, 10th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), 281.
67. Boubou Hama and J.KI-Zerbo, “The Place of History in African Society,” Methodology and African
Prehistory, ed. J. Ki-Zerbo (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 44.
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rejection of the management plan and not when the approval or rejection decision is made. This
social time value of the COH, therefore, introduces slowness and delays in the forest
management process.
When the application is approved, there has to be the signing of the management
agreement between the applicant and the government represented by the senior divisional
officers and divisional officers who head the divisions and sub-divisions administrative levels of
the Cameroon territorial governance structure. “This signature,” writes Oyono, “is generally
marked by deep delays, primarily because administrative authorities . . . and officials of the
Ministry of Forests ask for money.”68 In this corrupt system administrative authorities and the
“external elite” of the villages maintain control of forest management. The dark face of the
structural impact of decentralization, however, is tempered by transparency measures.
COH and Forest Management Monitoring
The COH has significantly fostered transparency and accountability in the management
of forests in Cameroon. This has mainly been through independent observers and monitors that
became part of the forest sector on account of the COH, because the disclosure and
dissemination of public information were among the dramatic changes in the country’s forest
sector between 1998 and 2008. Topa et al. observe that as information has become more
available to the public, the political and financial risk associated with the old clientele system has
been heightened. Forestry officials no longer allocate forest concessions according to their
whims and caprices.69 Figure 13 shows the fines that have been paid to MINFOF by
concessionaires because the IO pointed out their illegal logging acts to the government.

68. Oyono, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?” 101.
69. Topa et al. The Rainforests of Cameroon, 79.
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Figure 13. Fines paid for illegal forest activities between 2001 and 2007
Source: Created using data from Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, Figure5.2
Years with low fines payment do not imply that there was a reduction in illegal logging
within that year or that the independent observer failed in its duties. Rather, as Giuseppe et al
point out, MINFEF’s decision to settle some of the illegal logging cases out of court whenever
the defaulter accepts responsibility causes the government to loss much money.70 In 2003,
MINEF caused the National Assembly to pass a financial law by which the former enforces
forest management regulation on the basis of negotiation with defaulters such as forest
enterprises that have national elites as shareholders. In this negotiation process, MINEF is often
interested in generating state revenue (as the Bank desired), rather than enforcing punishment by
measures such as imprisonment of the defaulters. In this option for money, MINEF secures the
political interest of the ruling government with these elites. Thus, with regard to this option,
Amariei says that “the provisions of the Financial Law of 2003 applied to illegal activities by

70. Topa et al. The Rainforests of Cameroon, 79.
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MINEF neglect the provisions of the Forest Law concerning illegal activities, which stipulate the
involvement of the judiciary system.”71 Liviu Amariei observes that because of this neglect,
which is a failure in the monitoring responsibility of MINEF and MINFOF with respect to forest
management, Cameroon losses between five to ten million US Dollars annually from illegal
logging. In 2004, when transparency measures from the IO caused the government to act
seriously against illegal logging, the government collected CFA 916,000,000 in fines.72
Conditionality measures would have prevented this neglect because it insisted on
enforcement of the forest management law; however, ownership opened up possibilities for the
neglect of the law by refusing to give to an independent judiciary the powers to discipline
stakeholders who engage in illegal logging. The COH, therefore, embraced an environmental
management law that can be laid aside and not implemented by the Cameroon government
whenever the executive branch of government prioritizes political and financial interests above
environmental regulation. Thus, one can say that the COH creates a forest management system
that can put environmental wellbeing at odds with government’s political and financial interests.
This is also a system in which decentralization and transparent forest management can only be
realized amidst bureaucratic bottlenecks.
Furthermore, Time Fomete and Paolo Cerutti observe that “the responsibility for the
functioning and maintenance of control and verification systems still seems to lie excessively
with external donors, and ownership by concerned ministries is still very limited.”73 The
government does not allocate enough money for the Provincial Brigades who monitor forest

71. Topa et al. The Rainforests of Cameroon, 19.
72. Liviu Amariei, Legal Compliances in the Forest Sector. Case Study: Cameroon, Final Report (7
January 2005): 7. Food and Agricultural Organization. Accessed March 3, 2014. http://www.fao.org/forestry/195800b266e69b6880da012e1a1875f2319a15.pdf
73. Tim Fomete and Paolo Cerruti, “Verification in the Forest Sector in Cameroon,” VERIFOR Country
Case Study 11 (April 2008): 5.
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resource exploitation. Consequently, the Brigades rely on resources from logging companies to
cover some of their cost. Poor staffing and lack of equipment continue to plague the monitors
who often do not have access to basic data and transportation vehicles to monitor the forest.
These problems facing transparency and accountability in forest management in
Cameroon reflect the complexity of and the interwoven nature of issues facing forest
management in Cameroon. Garry Rodan and Caroline Hughes underline that in a nation where
democratic institutions are weak and the economy is not very strong, transparency and
accountability are not simply ethical virtues that can be fostered simply by some institutions
labelled “independent”. These virtues, rather, become interwoven in the political, social, and
economic fabrics of the nation. In fact transparency in public administration cannot even be
fostered by mass media action alone that attempts to make information available to the public. 74
There also needs to be political will, economic resources, and capacity building in order to equip
those who are assigned to ensure transparency and accountability in the administration of
national and natural resource

74. Garry Rodan and Caroline Hughes, The Politics of Accountability in South East Asia: The Dominance
of a Moral Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 123-126.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This study has focused on the way that the relationship between the World Bank’s
policies of conditionality and ownership impacts forest management in Cameroon within the
context of the international dependence development model. It began with a number of remarks:
first, that the neocolonial, false-paradigm, and dualistic theses cannot fully explain the nature of
the relationship between powerful international development institutions such as the World Bank
and the countries that rely on the Bank for development assistance; second, inasmuch as this
reliance exist, one cannot deny that there is international dependence development; rather, and
third, one has to seek a different thesis to account for this model. World Bank’s development
work in Cameroon was taken a case study to investigate what thesis today can explain the
international dependence development model nowadays. After establishing that development
today cannot be separated from environmental issues, this research sought to find and validate
this thesis by investigating the way that conditionality and ownership has affected forest
management in Cameroon. The implicit assumption here was that forest management in
Cameroon has the signatures of both the World Bank and the Cameroonian government under
the banners of conditionality and ownership wherein the two parties interact and their policies
interact. The logical assumption to formulate this theory was:
-

Inasmuch as there is international dependence development, there must be a theory to
explain its nature today.

-

Because one is dealing with international development, one needs to find a body that is
concerned with international development and a country that receives the body’s assistance.
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-

The World Bank is an international development institution, and it assists the Cameroon
government that relies on the Bank for development aid.

After selecting the subjects of attention, one needed a link or a case that will show how the
subjects relate within the context of international development. The Cameroon’s forest sector
provided this case. The recent nature of the reforms in the forest – reforms that are still ongoing
– was a good foundation to understand international dependence development today. The study,
therefore, had to focus on this case that exemplifies the nature of the international dependence
development model today.
The complexity of the status questionis, and the nature of the chosen case pushed this
study to adopt an interdisciplinary research approach that made use of theoretical insights and
methodologies from disciplines such as geosciences, environmental studies, political science,
economics, and sociology. The study could not aptly focus on the problematic without a
theoretical framework. The nature of the reliance of developing countries on development aid
and loans from international development institutions such as the World Bank creates a system
of interactions between the provider and receiver of aid and loans. In this system, there are
agreements and conflicts of both ideologies and power. The simultaneous existence of these
agreements and conflicts leads to policy hybridization. Hybrids as resultants of this phenomenon
of hybridization have synergized impacts on whatever they influence. Consequently, interaction,
hybridity, and synergy constituted the triad in the framework of this study.
Focusing on this case study without an x-ray of the policies that frame the case would
have been an attempt to walk without a foundation. Consequently, the study exposed the nature
of conditionality and ownership. Considering the assumption that the case study has the hand of
the Bank and the Cameroon government, the research had to investigate how these hands shake
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each other within the case. This investigation showed that conditionality and ownership are
related as hybrids in the international development model. This finding would have sufficed: the
study could have simply stated that in the international dependence development model, there is
a hybrid relationship between stakeholders and their policies. However, this statement needed
validation. This led the research into the operationalization of the conditionality-ownership
hybrid in Cameroon’s forest. To verify the truth of this thesis, the research needed to show that
Cameroon’s forest today is affected by this hybrid. This is the path that this study has taken.
Therefore, by way of conclusion, there is a hybrid relationship between policies in the
international dependence development model today, as exemplified in the real effects that this
hybrid has on resource management in countries such as Cameroon.
These effects are multifold. For example, the conditionality-ownership hybrid has caused
the politicization and formalization of forest in Cameroon, fostered costly forest management
practices, promoted both sustainable and unsustainable forest management, given room for
logging companies to enrich themselves, ushered the reign of decentralized forest management
that, nevertheless, still leaves much to be desired, allowed the government to retain some grip
over forest management in the country amidst neoliberal political economy reforms, and
improved transparency and accountability despite bureaucratic constraints. Some of these effects
arise from conditionality and others from ownership. However, because these policies affect
forest management ensemble, they are really the synergized effects of the COH.
This research finds and validates the hybrid relationship between the World Bank’s
policies of conditionality and ownership in the international dependence development paradigm..
This finding and validation positions policy hybridity within the international dependence
development model. The study, therefore, proposes policy hybridity as a thesis that accounts for
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international dependence development model. The neocolonial thesis over emphasizes power
disparity in international dependence development, ultimately considering less-developed
countries as powerless in this model, without considering the inherent and tactical power that
developing countries have and exercise in international development issues. The policy
hybridity thesis acknowledges that there is power disparity in the international dependence
development model, but it emphasizes that this disparity does negate the power that lessdeveloped countries have and exercise in ways that range from modification to outright rejection
of development insights from western-based international development institutions. The falseparadigm thesis suffers from an untrue generalized categorization of development paradigms
formulated in western countries as unsuitable for the development of less-developed countries.
The policy hybridity thesis objects this generalization by contending that whereas some
development policies from western countries are blind to local realities in less-developed
countries and are therefore unsuitable for the development of these countries, other policies
actually produce some good development results in less-developed nations. The dualistic model
is limping because it fails to see that development policies in developed nations and in lessdeveloped countries cannot be absolutely polarized in a globalized world today. The policy
hybridity thesis resolves this problem by capitalizing the interaction between institutions and
countries and their policies in today’s globalized world.
The research contributes to the deposit of knowledge in international development and it
opens up two paths. The first is the need for further research to investigate whether there is
policy hybridity in a large pool of international development activities. The second is a nouvelle
way of beginning to frame policy hybridity as a thesis of the international dependence
development model in an age of global interconnections.
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